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mental; it is the means of effectuating policy. Particularly true is this of the federal courts.
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis
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INTRODUCTION
Jurisdictional legislation, like the law of procedure with which it
tends to be grouped, can become disembodied from the political and
social contexts in which it was enacted, the political and social contexts in which it functions, and the historical and institutional circumstances that affect—if not determine—its significance. Scholars who
are preoccupied with doctrine, and courts that must try to make sense
of jurisdictional legislation and precedent interpreting it, may be content (or constrained) simply to grapple with the technical details.
Those who seek to understand law’s significance, however, require
1

FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2 (1927).
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perspectives in addition to the internal logic of technical reasoning.
Particularly when the law in question is labeled “procedure,” they
must resist the temptation to accept a doctrinal question at face value
(that is, to regard doctrine as an end in itself), to view such a question
apart from the litigation dynamics that it engenders, and otherwise to
ignore issues of power that may be at stake in its resolution.
Some of the political and social implications of the Class Action
2
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) are hard to miss. That statute, after all,
resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the aisle by
interest groups associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), partisan wrangling, and, following two successful filibusters, fragile com3
promises. Not only does CAFA mark a sharp break from a nearly uni4
form history of congressional contraction of diversity jurisdiction.
The scope of putative class actions that, at the end of the day, the statute brings within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts
is very broad. Those facts—coupled with the legislation’s place in a
trio of “tort reform” measures sought by the Bush administration, and
with unrelenting attacks on lawyers in general and plaintiffs’ lawyers
in particular—help to understand why some critics regard the compromises as insufficient and the ultimate legislation as inimical to the
5
interests of numerous groups of potential litigants.

2

Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
See, e.g., “Tort Reform” Bill Dies in the Senate, in 59 CQ ALMANAC PLUS 13-10 (2003);
Seth Stern, Fearing Spate of Amendments, Frist Pulls Class Action Bill After Senate Cloture Vote
Fails, 62 CQ WKLY. 1691 (2004) (describing the Senate’s failure to pass a previous version
of CAFA in 2004); Seth Stern, Republicans Win on Class Action, 63 CQ WKLY. 460 (2005)
(calling CAFA’s enactment “the capstone of a six-year slog through Congress”).
4
See Brett Curry, Institutions, Interests, and Judicial Outcomes: The Politics of Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction, 60 POL. RES. Q. 454, 456-58, 464 app. A (2007). For much more
modest departures from that history of contraction that may have influenced the deliberations concerning CAFA, see the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorizations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020(b)(1), 116 Stat. 1758, 1826-27
(2002) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V 2005)), which provides for federal jurisdiction in cases arising from certain accidents in which at least seventy-five people have
died; the Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, § 15(c), 113 Stat. 185, 201-02 (1999) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 6614 (2000)), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over Y2Krelated class actions; and infra text accompanying notes 293-297.
5
See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and
the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823; Stephen Labaton, Senate
Approves Measure To Curb Big Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1 (“Republicans say they hope the vote will provide momentum for two other major bills overhauling the tort law system, one on asbestos litigation, the other on curbs on medical malpractice lawsuits.”).
3
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How, one might wonder (particularly after reading supporters’
protestations to the contrary), could a statute that purportedly does
not change the state substantive law usually applicable in federal di6
versity litigation be considered “tort reform”? The answer is simple.
Members of Congress now realize what most informed observers have
7
long realized, to wit, that procedure is power. More specifically, all
informed observers of the litigation process now understand that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and state class action rules, although
regulating the process of litigation, can still have major substantive
8
impact. Even if such rules do not change the substantive law directly,
they can change the practical enforcement of substantive rights,
whether by enabling plaintiffs to sue who would not otherwise be able
to do so, or by exerting irresistible pressure on defendants to settle
cases that they regard as lacking in merit.
It has also long been clear that plaintiffs’ lawyers react to changes
that make litigation more difficult in one court system by moving their
cases to other court systems, while defense counsel seek forum advantages for their clients by using the tools available to them to affect the
site of litigation. Forum shopping is not necessarily, indeed not usually, a ground for criticism of lawyers or their clients, as the existence
and historic rationale of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in the fed9
eral courts suggest. Moreover, a price of federalism is that people
6

See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 56 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 53 (“S.
5 is court reform—not tort reform.”). But see “Tort Reform” Bill Dies in the Senate, supra
note 3.
7
See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1703 (2004).
8
“[T]his Court’s rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and
political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989). In a footnote, the Court invoked Rule 23 as an example of a procedural rule with important
substantive effects. See id. at 392 n.19.
9
As Debra Bassett argues,
Forum shopping is not a form of “cheating” by those who refuse to play by the
rules. Playing by the rules includes the ability of plaintiff’s counsel to select—
and defense counsel to seek to counter—the set of rules by which the litigation “game” will be played. The availability of more than one legallyauthorized forum results in legitimate choice, and lawyers ethically are compelled to seek the most favorable forum to further their clients’ interests. Selecting the most favorable forum is a rational strategy . . . . The widespread
criticism of forum shopping simply does not withstand scrutiny.
Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 395 (2006); see also Alan B.
Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way To Handle the Problem of
Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1524-25, 1530 (2005) (making similar
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who can sue and perhaps secure relief in one state can’t sue, or can’t
secure relief, in another. Forum shopping may, however, be a good
reason to reexamine the constellation of legal rules (and other influences) that causes it. One’s normative assessment of any particular
forum-shopping phenomenon should consider differences in the ability of different types of litigants to benefit from forum shopping, the
purposes for which a forum is being selected, the fairness of the forum selected to the parties and legal systems concerned, and the pro10
portionality of forum choice.
CAFA begins with statements of findings and purposes, the latter
pitched at a high level of generality. The statute’s stated purposes are
to “(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims; (2) restore the intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction; and
(3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer
11
prices.”

arguments). For the historic rationale of diversity jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
10
Cf. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in Private International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of Commonand Civil-Law Systems, in 295 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 68 (2002) (discussing proportionality as a basic
concern in the design of judicial jurisdiction, one that seeks to provide appropriate
forums that are “sufficient in number” but not so numerous as to encourage “unjustified forum-shopping”).
11
CAFA § 2(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005). CAFA’s antecedent findings report the importance and value of class actions “when they permit the fair and
efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties,” but they also assert a
decade of abuses that had harmed both deserving plaintiffs and innocent defendants,
“adversely affected interstate commerce,” and “undermined public respect for our judicial system.” Id. § 2(a)(1)–(2). After enumerating ways in which class members, who
“often receive little or no benefit from class actions,” id. § 2(a)(3), have sometimes
been harmed by them, the statute states,
(4) Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free
flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are—
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court;
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-state
defendants; and
(C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States
and bind the rights of the residents of those States.
Id. § 2(a)(4).
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CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions, by contrast, are detailed, complicated, and replete with both undefined terms and ambiguous phrases.
Having worked hard to close off avenues of forum choice that are
available in the jurisdictional regime that CAFA largely replaces for
class actions, CAFA’s architects were forced by the need to compromise (and perhaps inclined by a strategic preference for ambiguity) to
12
leave some questions implicating forum allocation unanswered.
They thus guaranteed years of work for lawyers and courts that is un13
related to the merits of the underlying disputes.
As courts confront, and commentators begin to write about, the
many jurisdictional questions that emerged from CAFA’s long and
messy legislative process, I propose to set that legislation in context.
The contexts that I find most revealing concern the history of federal
diversity-of-citizenship litigation in general and, within that larger
story, the history of diversity class actions in federal court. Because all
questions of federal court subject matter jurisdiction implicate the
14
“happy relation of States to Nation,” both accounts will necessarily
pay attention to state court litigation and to the impact of doctrinal
12

They sought to answer many of those questions in legislative history. A number
of federal courts have declined to rely on the 2005 Senate Report, S. REP. NO. 109-14
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, for this reason. See, e.g., Brill v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the use of the Senate
Report because “naked legislative history has no legal effect”). Other courts have also
inferred that the legislative history was not available to senators when they voted. See,
e.g., Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno, 472 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Senate Report
was issued ten days after the enactment of the CAFA statute . . . .”). Yet, it has been
contended that, although not ordered to be printed until after CAFA was signed into
law, the 2005 Senate Report “was submitted to Congress before CAFA became law.” H.
Hunter Twiford, III et al., CAFA’s New “Minimal Diversity” Standard for Interstate Class Actions Creates a Presumption that Jurisdiction Exists, with the Burden of Proof Assigned to the
Party Opposing Jurisdiction, 25 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 17 n.28 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (citing 151 CONG. REC. S978 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2005)); see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co.,
483 F.3d 1184, 1206 n.50 (11th Cir. 2007) (“While the report was issued ten days following CAFA’s enactment, it was submitted to the Senate on February 3, [2005]—while
that body was considering the bill.”). Moreover, although there was no House Report,
there was a House Sponsors’ Statement, see 151 CONG. REC. H727-29 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), and extensive discussion and debate on the
House floor. Finally, it should be noted that much of the 2005 Senate Report was contained in a 2003 Senate Report. See S. REP. NO. 108-123 (2003); see also infra note 56.
13
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste
and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1554 (2008) (decrying “social waste by litigation”);
id. at 1565 (“This sloppily drafted statute created a lot of useless social friction and
costly litigation by not foreseeing things like effective-date problems.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1592 (“Our study of these decisions shows most of this litigation to have
been socially wasteful.”).
14
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 2.
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change on the federal-state equilibrium. To focus on one to the exclusion of the other—on class actions to the exclusion of ordinary diversity litigation, or on federal litigation to the exclusion of state litigation—risks a critical loss of perspective. The same risk attends the
failure to mark the peculiar history of corporate citizenship for jurisdictional purposes. It is my view that the true measure of CAFA’s significance is to be found not so much in its technical details as in the
historical and institutional circumstances that brought it forth.
Although mastery of technical reasoning is not a sufficient condition for illuminating scholarship about procedural law, it is a neces15
sary condition. Readers of this Article should have what they need to
evaluate for themselves the potential significance of the changes
CAFA effected in jurisdictional law, as well as of changes in the law
that it did not attempt. For that reason, I will begin in Part I with a
description—a snapshot, if you will—of the jurisdictional rules govern16
ing federal diversity class action litigation prior to CAFA, as a prelude
to a description, in Part II, of the changes in jurisdictional law that
17
CAFA ushered in (or may have ushered in). Readers who are familiar with those details may want to move directly to Part III, where I review the history of ordinary diversity litigation in the federal courts,
18
with particular attention to the status and role of corporate litigants,
and to Part IV, where I revisit pre-CAFA diversity class action litigation
in the context of the broader world of modern federal and state class
19
actions and of overlapping class actions. Finally, in Part V and the
Conclusion, I seek preliminary answers to the question of CAFA’s sig20
nificance.
This work suggests reasons for concern about the impact that
CAFA may have on the enforcement of state law. In addressing that
concern, I consider whether changes in the litigation landscape since
1958, when Congress formally embraced corporate citizenship, might
be thought to justify the changes in the balance of power in forum selection that CAFA brings about. Critical to my views in that regard are
the failures of the Supreme Court to police interstate forum shopping
effectively through constitutional control of personal jurisdiction or
15

See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343
(2002).
16
See infra Part I.
17
See infra Part II.
18
See infra Part III.
19
See infra Part IV.
20
See infra Part V and Conclusion.
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choice of law, and the steroidal effect of the modern (post-1966) class
action on the incentives that drive forum choice. I recognize that the
state court abuses cited by CAFA’s supporters tended to be episodic
and transient. I also recognize that some of what they alleged as
abuses go to the heart of the modern class action. At the same time,
however, at least where nationwide class actions are concerned, it
takes only one state court to declare an empire, and what the political
process takes away, it can restore.
In the circumstances, and given the stakes involved, I conclude
that it was not unreasonable for Congress to assert a federal interest in
regulating the process by which, and the forums in which, nationwide
and multistate (collectively, “multistate”) class action decisions are
made. To be sure, the interest in question bears little relation to the
historic account of diversity jurisdiction with which we are familiar.
But, as Part IV demonstrates, this interest is consistent with the policy
that the Supreme Court pursued when umpiring ordinary diversity
litigation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and
consistent as well with the policy that Congress pursued in its 1958
21
amendments to the diversity statute. Neither the Court nor Congress
has limited diversity jurisdiction to accord with the traditional account
of the reasons for the constitutional grant. In my view, therefore,
CAFA’s basic approach—which is similarly not so limited and is in that
respect continuous with past practice—should not be tarred with the
motives of some who supported the statute, and neither should the
federal judiciary.
I reach a very different conclusion with respect to the numerous
class actions within CAFA’s reach that are not in any meaningful sense
“multistate.” Although the 1958 Congress effectively blessed the fictions of corporate citizenship created by the federal judiciary, it left in
place (if it did not enhance) the instruments of countervailing power
for plaintiffs that had developed in the system and that made the fictions tolerable. The 2005 Congress dismantled those instruments in
order to open federal courts to multistate class actions. It conveniently forgot them when it came time to fashion exceptions. In the
process, Congress neglected the critical role the exceptions played in
equilibrating not just plaintiffs’ and defendants’ interests, but also
federal and state interests. Ultimately, a combination of special interest overreaching, abetted by the fictions of corporate citizenship, and
confusion about legislative aims, abetted by the institutional federal
21

See infra text accompanying notes 307-348.
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judiciary’s schizophrenia regarding overlapping class actions, led
Congress to lose sight of its duty, when fashioning CAFA’s exceptions,
22
to preserve the “happy relation of States to Nation.” As a result,
CAFA represents an affront to federalism in two respects and a potential affront in a third.
First, CAFA deprives states of the ability to regulate matters of intense local interest by enlisting for that purpose the regulatory potential of the class action as the states conceive it, on the basis of a definition of national interest that rests on legal fictions and on a vision of
aggregate litigation that ignores the costs of complexity. Second, and
quite apart from the regulatory void that CAFA may entail, the means
by which Congress reached that result are deplorable. Working with
exceptions so complicated that even some academics have been unable to penetrate them—and in a fog of ambiguity and hypocrisy—
Congress sacrificed transparency and accountability in the interests of
preserving deniability. Third, by exalting the gathering powers of the
federal courts, Congress has created incentives for litigants and courts
to create ever bigger “litigations.” Whether in the form of multistate
class actions or through nonclass aggregations, such litigation packages may replicate in federal court some of the supposed abuses in
state court class actions to which CAFA supposedly responded, including the subordination of factual and legal differences of intense inter23
est to individual states.
The last concern also highlights questions about the effects that
the increased federal caseload attributable to CAFA—consisting of
substantial numbers of new district court cases that are notoriously
demanding and also of appeals from orders granting (or denying)
motions to remand—will have on the ability of the federal courts to
deal fairly with all of their cases. Concerns about the effect that
CAFA’s predecessor bills would have on the federal courts’ workload
were long-standing and legitimate. It is thus surprising that, through
inability to speak clearly with one voice, the Judicial Conference allowed a vision of the gathering powers of federal courts to compound
the potential damage. It appears that federal courts are now seeking
to minimize that damage by resisting some of the more blatant overreaching by CAFA’s supporters. If so, the phenomenon marks a return to a more sober view of institutional self-interest and in so doing

22
23

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 2; see also supra text accompanying note 14.
See infra text accompanying notes 349-391.
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contributes to an understanding of the federal judiciary as an interest
24
group.
I do not propose to treat discretely or in detail those sections of
CAFA that address class action settlements. The provisions in question, such as those requiring heightened scrutiny of, and regulating
25
attorney compensation for, so-called “coupon settlements,” are not
without interest for one who seeks to divine CAFA’s significance. The
fact that some of them reflect legislation by anecdote may be evidence
of an unarticulated agenda, as may the fact that, although the provisions in question apply to all class actions in federal court—where by
2005 they were arguably unnecessary—they do not apply to any state
26
court class actions, in some of which they still might be useful. Indeed, the incentives created by their differential application are a potentially important part of the story of the vastly expanded privilege of
forum choice that CAFA confers on defendants, one that my col27
league, Tobias Wolff, explores in his article for this Symposium.
Moreover, descriptions of the supposed class action abuses that
CAFA’s provisions address are suggestive of a crabbed view of the
24

See infra text accompanying notes 396-399.
28 U.S.C. § 1712 (Supp. V 2005).
26
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1713–1714 (protecting class members against loss and against
“discrimination based on geographic location”). Professor Laurens Walker suggests
that § 1713 was based on one case and § 1714 on testimony in a congressional hearing.
See Laurens Walker, The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights: A Policy and Political Mistake,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 849, 860 (2007); see also Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The
Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings
and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1740 (2008) (suggesting that the evidence that
led to § 1713 “is a class of one, an anecdote based on an unusual case”). The December 2003 compromise that enabled CAFA’s ultimate passage is also suggestive in this
respect. One of its elements, tying attorney compensation to either coupon redemption or hours actually billed, put teeth into the regulation of coupon settlements, while
another removed a ban on any compensation for named class representatives that
might reasonably have been regarded as intended to deter even the “legitimate” class
actions that CAFA purports to celebrate. See 149 CONG. REC. S16,102-03 (daily ed. Dec. 9,
2003) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (describing the compromise that led to CAFA’s passage).
For a discussion of federal rulemaking that arguably made (most of) CAFA’s provisions regulating class action settlements unnecessary in federal court, see Richard L.
Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1793-96 (2008).
27
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2042 (2008) (noting that CAFA does
not prevent defendants from seeking collusive settlements in state court). “The fact
that S. 2062 purports to protect absent class members, but does not allow them to remove when defendants and class counsel collude to bring about an unfair settlement,
further demonstrates that the bill is not about fairness to class members, but solely
about protecting defendants.” Morrison, supra note 9, at 1548.
25
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28

proper role of class actions, one that some of the statute’s supporters
evidently hoped is (or will be) shared by the federal courts. This Article is, however, primarily an account of jurisdictional law, one in
which provisions like those in CAFA that regulate class action settlements are part of the changing mix of incentives and disincentives
that determine how jurisdictional law in the books affects litigation
29
behavior and the enforcement of the substantive law.
28

See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14-20, 58-59 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
14-21, 54-55 (arguing that lawyers received a disproportionate share of class action settlements and also that class actions should not be used to create “private attorneys general”). “Even if the critics were correct that deterrence was an intended purpose of
class actions, that assertion is self-defeating because, in the Committee’s view, the concept of class actions serving a ‘private attorney general’ or other enforcement purpose
is illegal.” Id. at 59, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 55; see also John H. Beisner, Matthew Shores
& Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1451-62 (2005) (criticizing the “private attorney general” model of
law enforcement through class actions); David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness
Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247,
1286 (2006) (“Some of the law’s principal proponents identified the supposed illegitimacy of large-scale economic regulation through private litigation based on state
law causes of action as a chief rationale for the statute.”). But see infra text accompanying note 190 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s intent to facilitate the litigation of
negative-value claims in the 1966 amendments to Rule 23).
29
A study of publicly available opinions found only one case, Figueroa v. Sharper
Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007), that involved disputes about CAFA’s
provisions targeting alleged class action abuses. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note
13, at 1555 n.4. Clermont and Eisenberg’s speculation that this lack of cases “may be
because reformers had exaggerated the degree of the abuse,” id. at 1556 n.4, neglects
the irony, noted in the text, that those abuses were said to occur primarily in state
courts, to which the provisions do not apply. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 53-54, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 49-50. Professor Walker suggests that “[s]urely soon . . .
cases commenced after the effective date will reach the settlement stage and the judicial
application process will begin.” Walker, supra note 26, at 850 n.6. Moreover, he argues
that “the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights [is] the most significant provision of the
new law.” Id. at 849. His prediction in that regard is based on the supposed political
incentives of state attorneys general to respond vigorously to the notices of settlement
that CAFA requires, see id. at 853-54, and on the supposed role that these officials
might play under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, see id. at 856-58. I doubt that it is
sensible to liken their role under CAFA to “enforcement opportunities.” Id. at 854. In
addition, Professor Walker may overestimate both the possibilities for intervention under Rule 24 and the freedom of an intervenor to participate in the litigation. See
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 378 (1987) (concluding
in the course of denying an interlocutory appeal that extensive limitations on a permissive intervenor were not so onerous as to constitute a constructive denial of intervention). He may also underestimate the combined forces of budgetary constraints,
priorities, and inertia. For these and other reasons, attorneys general, if they decide to
become involved at all, may prefer to “convey their views informally to parties rather
than file official complaints or intervene in cases.” Peter Geier, State AGs Eschew CAFA
Review, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 23, 2006, at 5. For a case where these provisions may have
made a difference, see Figueroa, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292. See also Marcus, supra note 26, at
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I stress at the outset that this Article is a preliminary effort that
does not pretend to exhaust the history explored, even for the purpose of assessing CAFA’s legal significance. Fortunately, this Symposium also includes an assessment of CAFA’s social significance from
one of this country’s best legal historians (on whose prior work I rely
30
heavily in Part III). My hope is that, in combination, our work will
provide useful perspectives for those who follow us.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER CLASS ACTIONS
IN THE DEFAULT REGIME
A. Original Jurisdiction
Before turning to CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions, it is worthwhile
to recall the law governing federal subject matter jurisdiction that
CAFA replaces for cases within its reach. The law in question concerns, and only concerns, jurisdiction predicated on diversity of citizenship. Moreover, even as to diversity class actions, this law continues to provide the rules with respect to cases that are not subject to
CAFA, for instance, putative class actions in which the class consists of
fewer than 100 persons or in which the aggregate amount in controversy does not exceed $5 million. For this reason, I shall refer to this
jurisdictional law as the “default regime.”
Under the default regime, the existence or absence of diversity of
citizenship is determined by considering only the citizenship of

1796 (citing Figeuroa as an example of a case where the opposition of attorneys general
to a proposed settlement may have swayed the court); Linda S. Mullenix, CAFA and
Coupons, NAT’L. L.J., Nov. 12, 2007, at 24 (noting the importance of the Figueroa case).
Ongoing research by the Federal Judicial Center will “document any appearance by a
public official at a settlement review hearing.” Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1740.
I also do not propose to consider so-called “mass actions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)
(Supp. V 2005), which CAFA largely assimilates to class actions for jurisdictional purposes. Civil actions “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions
of law or fact,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) (emphasis added), are apparently not
common. Clermont and Eisenberg’s study unearthed only two cases that involved a
mass action and only three others that discussed a mass action. See Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1556 n.5; see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser et al., The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Federalization of U.S. Class Action Litigation, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J.
398, 408 (2006) (“Plaintiffs should therefore be able to keep ‘mass actions’ in state
court if they adhere to current practices, which typically avoid the filing of complaints
seeking the joint trial of plaintiffs in numbers even remotely approaching 100.”). For
my purposes, in any event, mass actions would be a distraction.
30
See Purcell, supra note 5.
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named class representatives and of defendants. As to those parties,
however, complete diversity is required, with the result that jurisdiction cannot be exercised if any named plaintiff is a citizen of the same
31
state as any defendant. This aspect of the default regime, perhaps
more than any other, empowers class action plaintiffs who desire to
32
litigate in state court. In addition, whereas the default regime treats
corporations as citizens only of the states by which they are incorpo33
rated and of the state of their principal place of business, it treats unincorporated associations as citizens of every state of which their
34
members are citizens.
As to the amount in controversy, which is currently in excess of
$75,000 exclusive of interest and costs for diversity jurisdiction gener35
ally, the default regime was for many years unclear as a result of conflicts among the lower courts concerning the effect, if any, of the 1990
36
supplemental jurisdiction statute on the rule—established by the Supreme Court through interpretation—that the claim of every member
of a plaintiff class must satisfy the amount-in-controversy require37
ment. Shortly after CAFA was enacted, the Supreme Court held that,
so long as the required diversity of citizenship exists, supplemental jurisdiction can be exercised over the claims of all members of a class
when at least one named representative has a claim satisfying the
38
amount-in-controversy requirement. That decision does not, however, disturb the default regime’s rule that claims cannot usually be

31

See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921). The same rule applies to defendant class actions
which, because of their rarity, will not be further discussed in this Article.
32
Subject to very weak control by the federal courts under the rubric of “fraudulent joinder,” see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
189 (6th ed. 2002), class counsel need only designate as a named plaintiff someone
who is a citizen of the same state as one of the defendants, or a defendant who is a citizen of the state from which a named plaintiff hails, in order to destroy statutory diversity.
33
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
34
See United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 149-51
(1965) (acknowledging the artificiality of distinguishing labor unions from corporations
for diversity purposes but stating that any change was for Congress to enact). The
same is true of partnerships. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 192-96 (1990).
35
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
36
Id. § 1367.
37
See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973).
38
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005).
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aggregated to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, and
thus the default regime continues to require that at least one claim
meet that requirement.
B. Removal Jurisdiction
The default regime’s treatment of class actions for purposes of
removal from state to federal court tracks the treatment of ordinary
litigation. That is to say, a class action cannot be removed unless it
would fall within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts under
40
the rules summarized above. In addition, when diversity jurisdiction
alone is claimed, all defendants must join in (i.e., consent to) the no41
tice of removal; removal is not permitted when any (properly joined
and served) defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action was
42
brought, and although removal is possible (if timely sought) if the
removal results from subsequent developments in the state litigation
that make the case removable for the first time, there is a one-year
43
limitation (from the commencement of the state action). Each of
these requirements for removal creates additional options for class
counsel to structure and/or conduct class action litigation so as to
keep it in state court.
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, they have
a duty to ensure the existence of jurisdiction—constitutional and
44
statutory—at all times and at every level of the federal court system.
45
Since the advent of various abstention doctrines and the general
46
embrace of the forum non conveniens doctrine in the 1940s, it has
been hard to take seriously lofty language that once posited a similar
duty on the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction that Congress has
39

See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969) (approving the lower courts’ practice of allowing aggregation where claims are “joint and common,” but not where
claims are “separate and distinct”).
40
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
41
See id.; cf. id. § 1441(c) (allowing removal of separate and independent claims in
federal question cases).
42
Id. § 1441(b).
43
Id. § 1446(b).
44
The exercise of this duty has famously led the Supreme Court, on its own motion, to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction cases, fully adjudicated below, in
which all parties sought review on the merits. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1908).
45
See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943); R.R. Comm’n of
Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
46
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-12 (1947).
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47

conferred on them. It is another mark of this different attitude toward putatively erroneous findings of no jurisdiction that, in the default regime, Congress has generally forbidden appellate review, “on
48
appeal or otherwise,” of orders remanding removed cases.
II. CAFA’S JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
A. Original Jurisdiction
CAFA opens the federal courts to class actions that could not be
brought there under the default regime. The provisions of new subsection 1332(d) change the default regime in a number of significant
respects. Before discussing those changes, however, it is useful to understand the cases that are explicitly excluded from the legislation’s
49
reach, the so-called jurisdictional carve-outs.
1. Carve-Outs
CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions do not apply to any class action in
which “the primary defendants are States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed

47

See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”). The qualifier
that the obligation is “virtually unflagging,” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976), does not help (to take “the lofty language”
seriously).
48
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000) (providing, however, an exception for civil rights
cases removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1443). This provision originated in an 1887 statute.
See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553. The Judiciary Act of March 3,
1875, which substantially expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts, had authorized review of remand orders by appeal or writ of error. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch.
137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472. The 1887 provision rescinding that authority was inserted
without discussion, see 18 CONG. REC. 2543 (Mar. 2, 1887), during Senate debate on a
House bill that was designed “to diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the
Supreme Court of the United States, to promote the convenience of the people, and
to lessen the burden and expense of litigation.” 18 CONG. REC. 613 ( Jan. 13, 1887); see
also Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1934) (noting that congressional legislation had
restricted the jurisdiction of the federal trial court). The provision was preserved virtually unchanged in the 1911 codification of laws relating to the judiciary. See Act of
Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1095. It was inadvertently omitted from the
1948 codification, prompting legislation to restore it the following year. See Act of May
24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102. The exception for civil rights cases was added
in 1964. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 901, 78 Stat. 241, 266.
49
Federal subject matter jurisdiction may, however, exist under the default regime.
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50

from ordering relief,” and they also do not apply to actions in which
“the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggre51
gate is less than 100.” It is apparent that the latter carve-out was designed to leave actions on behalf of small groups of people in state
court, while the former acknowledges the unfairness of permitting
state officials to remove cases, only to plead the bar of sovereign
52
immunity.
I should also mention here the exclusions for class actions involving solely a claim “concerning a covered security as defined [in the
53
Securities Acts],” “relat[ing] to the internal affairs or governance of a
corporation or other form of business enterprise” under the law of the
54
state of incorporation or organization, or “relating to the rights, duties, . . . and obligations relating to or created by any security” as de55
fined by federal securities law. According to the Senate Report,
“[t]he purpose of this provision is to avoid disturbing in any way the
federal vs. state court jurisdictional lines already drawn in the securities litigation class action context by the enactment of the Securities
56
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.”
50

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V 2005).
Id. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
52
See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 41-42 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 39-40; cf.
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 618-24 (2002) (holding that removal waives
sovereign immunity with respect to state law claims for which immunity was waived in
state court). The federal courts could learn a valuable lesson from this in their administration of the forum non conveniens doctrine in diversity cases. Why should state
courts that do not have any such doctrine, or that follow a version that is less robust, be
deprived of the power to hear a case that would be dismissed on that ground on motion of the removing party? This suggests that federal courts should either apply state
forum non conveniens law in diversity cases or hold that, by removing, the defendant
“has thereby waived any personal privilege he might have had to be sued in another
[court].” Sayles v. Nw. Ins. Co., 21 F. Cas. 608, 608 (C.C.D. R.I. 1854) (No. 12,421). In
Sayles, the court upheld personal jurisdiction in a removed case involving the attachment of property. The case could not have been maintained originally in the federal
court to which it was removed. See id. For a recent decision holding that Louisiana
waived whatever sovereign immunity it had against removal under CAFA by joining
with its claims against insurers the claims of a putative class of Louisiana and nonLouisiana citizens, see In re: Katrina Canal Litigation Breaches, No. 08-30145, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7933 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2008).
53
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A).
54
Id. § 1332(d)(9)(B).
55
Id. § 1332(d)(9)(C).
56
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 45, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 42. Identical language can be found in the 2003 Senate Report. See S. REP. NO. 108-123, at 46 (2003).
For an interesting and valuable analysis of the interplay between CAFA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), arguing that Congress was mistaken
51
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2. Diversity and Amount in Controversy
Turning then to the main event, CAFA changes the default regime by predicating jurisdiction on minimal diversity. Thus, the statute confers jurisdiction, subject to the amount-in-controversy requirement, over any civil action that is a class action in which “any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
57
defendant.” Moreover, unincorporated associations are assimilated
to corporations, in that they are deemed to be citizens only of the
state where they have their principal place of business and the state
58
under whose law they are organized.
As for the amount in controversy, CAFA again changes the default
regime, first by raising the required amount to in excess of “the sum
or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and also by
providing that “the claims of the individual class members shall be ag59
gregated to determine” whether the required amount is in controversy.
3. Definitions
The provisions of new subsection 1332(d) are subject to definitions, the most important of which for present purposes is the definition of a “class action” as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more
60
representative persons as a class action.” For jurisdiction, this means
that status as a putative class action suffices. This is also clear from
another provision, which states that subsection 1332(d) “shall apply to
any class action before or after the entry of a class certification order
61
by the court with respect to that action.” The question arises, howin believing that the latter had solved the relevant problems and thus also mistaken in
refusing to extend CAFA to securities cases, see Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 621, 646-47 (2006).
57
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Subsections 1332(d)(2)(B) & (C) carry out the
same plan for cases involving aliens and foreign states.
58
Id. § 1332(d)(10). This provision was apparently added “to ensure that unincorporated associations receive the same treatment as corporations for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.” S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 45-46, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4244. From the perspective of unincorporated associations alone, it could have the effect
of reducing access to federal court in a minimal (as opposed to complete) diversity regime, although it would very rarely make a difference in that regard.
59
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d)(6).
60
Id. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
61
Id. § 1332(d)(8).
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ever, whether jurisdiction subsists when, in a case brought in or removed to federal court under CAFA, the court declines to certify a
class. The importance of this question is likely to be greatest in a case
removed from state court, and the implications of the answer to it may
be most dramatic with respect to subsequent attempts to litigate in
62
state court.
63

4. Exceptions

CAFA divides the universe of cases in which the basic requirements (minimal diversity and more than $5 million in controversy)
are met into four sets, with its exceptions applying to three of them.
In the first set are cases in which one-third or fewer of the members of
all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate (“class members”) are
62

The decisions to date are split. Compare, e.g., Genenbacher v. CenturyTel Fiber
Co. II, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1016-17 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (reasoning that a denial of class
certification did not affect the court’s subject matter jurisdiction), with Hoffer v. Cooper Wiring Devices, Inc., No. 06-0763, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75806, at *3-4 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 28, 2007) (dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after class certification was denied). See also Good v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., No. 06-1027, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3982, at *46-50 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 2008) (inviting parties to submit supplemental briefs, and reviewing the decisions of other courts, on a “new and evolving
legal issue,” whether a court has jurisdiction over individual claims after CAFA class
certification has been denied). The 2003 Senate bill contained a provision requiring
the court to dismiss a case in which certification had been denied, see Class Action
Fairness Act of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2003), and one of the elements of
the compromise that enabled the passage of the 2005 legislation was the deletion of
that requirement. Senator Chris Dodd asserted that the “compromise eliminates the
dismissal requirement, giving federal courts discretion to handle Rule 23-ineligible
cases appropriately. Potentially meritorious suits will thus not be automatically dismissed simply because they fail to comply with the class certification requirements of
Rule 23.” 149 CONG. REC. S16,102-03 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003). Of course, even if a
court consulted this legislative history, it might conclude that the “appropriate” treatment of the “Rule 23-ineligible cases” would be to see whether they are within federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
63
“Exceptions” is a loaded word in this context, because labeling a statutory provision as such, rather than, for instance, as an “exclusion,” may have unjustified influence in determining the location of the burden of persuasion concerning the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of
Jurisdictional Proof, 59 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 11-12), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005477 (“The notion that one can divine legislative intent by somehow distinguishing certain provisions as ‘exceptions’ immediately raises a
number of perplexing questions.”); Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59
BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 98-102 (2007) (concluding that plaintiffs should not bear the burden of proving jurisdiction where a small subset of cases is carved out from a very
broad grant of jurisdiction, regardless of the linguistic label applied to such a carveout). I use “exceptions” here only as a concession to the shortness of life.

2008]

CAFA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

1457

citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed (the “origi64
nal state”). Even if all defendants are citizens of that state, a federal
court has no discretion to decline jurisdiction: there is no exception
for such cases. In the second and third sets are cases where both the
65
“primary defendants” and either between one-third and two-thirds or
66
two-thirds or more of class members are citizens of the original state.
A federal court must decline jurisdiction in the third set (the “homestate exception”), and it has discretion to decline jurisdiction in the
second (the “discretionary exception”) based on a consideration of six
factors, the first of which is “whether the claims asserted involve mat67
ters of national or interstate interest,” and the last of which is
“whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class
action, 1 or more other class actions asserting the same or similar
68
claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been filed.”
CAFA’s fourth set, triggering the “local controversy exception,”
comprises cases in which (1) greater than two-thirds of class members
are citizens of the original state; (2) there is at least one defendant
from whom “significant relief” is sought, whose alleged conduct forms
a “significant basis” for the claims asserted, and who is a citizen of the
original state; and (3) “principal injuries resulting from the alleged
conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred” in
69
the original state. Even if all of those requirements are met, the exception’s duty to decline to exercise jurisdiction does not apply unless
“during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no
other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual
allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or
70
other persons.”

64

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)–(4).
See id.
66
See id. § 1332(d)(4)(B).
67
See id. § 1332(d)(3)(A).
68
Id. § 1332(d)(3)(F). The other factors focus attention on the laws that will govern the claims asserted, “whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that
seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction,” whether the original state has a “distinct nexus
with the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants,” and whether class
membership is disproportionately composed of citizens of the original state. See id.
§ 1332(d)(3)(B)–(E).
69
Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i).
70
Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(iii).
65
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B. Removal Jurisdiction
Although CAFA may prove a boon to putative class members who
71
would prefer, as an original matter, to litigate in federal court, one
would have thought that, in the near term at least, its major impact
72
would be felt as a result of its removal provisions. These provisions

71

This would include litigants in states, like Texas, whose courts have made the
path to class certification not only significantly more difficult in recent years, but also
more difficult than it is in many federal circuits. See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 439-42 (Tex. 2007); see also infra note 263.
72
Note in that regard accounts of multiple state court filings in anticipation of
CAFA, see Seth Stern, Lawyers Seek Loopholes in Class Action Overhaul, 63 CQ WKLY. 494,
494 (2005) (“[O]nce Congress put the bill on the fast track this year there was a lastminute dash by plaintiffs’ lawyers to the courthouses that have been particularly
friendly to class action plaintiffs.”), and the amount of post-CAFA litigation concerning
the effect, if any, of amendments to state court complaints on the question of whether
the action was “commenced” prior to CAFA’s effective date (February 18, 2005). See
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The “Commencement” Problem: Lessons from a Statute’s First
Year, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 469 (2006) (examining the issues posed by these post-CAFA
complaint amendments and ultimately concluding that state law should define when
an action is “commenced”); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The Cost of CAFA, NAT’L L.J.,
Aug. 27, 2007, at 13 (discussing the risk that corporate defendants will have to pay
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for improper removal, as these defendants “reflexively remove
all state class actions into federal court”). Yet, the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) empirical studies do not support the supposition in the text; its data indicate that a majority of CAFA cases have been filed as original actions in federal court. See Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1752.
Although both diversity removals and original proceedings increased, comparing the pre- and post-CAFA periods, the greatest increase is observed in the
original proceedings. Pre-CAFA, the average number of monthly removals of
diversity class actions was 16.6; post-CAFA the comparable figure was 23.7, an
increase of, on average, about 7 class actions. But pre-CAFA, the average
number of monthly original proceedings of diversity class actions was 10.8;
post-CAFA, the comparable figure was 31.5, an increase of about 20 class actions per month.
Id. It may be worth determining the extent to which these findings were affected by
the FJC’s decision—for all consolidated cases, including those subject to the multidistrict litigation (MDL) process—to include only lead cases in their analysis database. See
id. at 1746. That decision is understandable for purposes of workload and resource
studies, but it is not obviously appropriate in comparing filing and removal rates (particularly pre- and post-CAFA rates).
The FJC’s researchers suggested in an earlier report that plaintiffs’ counsel, preferring state court but not confident about their ability (or not willing) to structure the
litigation so as to keep it there, may have decided that the game was not worth the
candle. See THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT
OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 16-17
(2007). Moreover, as that report also points out, by filing in federal court originally,
plaintiffs’ counsel preserved the choice of forum (where personal jurisdiction and
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change the default regime in at least four respects. First, the statute
enables any defendant to remove, whether or not other defendants
73
Second, it extends that privilege even to in-state defenconsent.
74
dants. Third, CAFA eliminates the default regime’s one-year time
75
limitation on removal. Fourth, it provides for discretionary appeals
76
from orders granting or denying motions to remand.

venue law afford choice). Id. at 17; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000) (prescribing the
venue of a removed case as “the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending”). Additional analyses have
shown that the mix of post-CAFA original and removed cases varies among the circuits,
prompting the researchers to look for correlations between those circuits attracting
larger percentages of either original filings or removed cases and circuit reputations
for liberality or conservatism in class certification. See Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at
1761-62 (reporting mixed data as to whether such a correlation exists). Part of that
inquiry—as, for instance, concerning the high percentage of removed cases in the
Fifth Circuit—should include attention to state certification law and practice. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text.
Finally, the contrary (nationwide) finding of empirical work based on opinions
publicly available—that cases removed under CAFA do dominate those originally
filed—may indeed be one more piece of evidence of the risks of empirical research
that relies on published opinions:
Probably the difference shows merely that among CAFA class actions, removed cases are the ones generating pitched battles and hence published
opinions, and especially opinions that expressly mention CAFA. The difference between the two studies thus may reflect the danger of relying only on
published cases to get a picture of what is really happening on the ground.
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1563. Note, however, the question above
about the FJC data concerning consolidated cases and the fact that the composite FJC
data mask differences among the circuits.
73
28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (Supp. V 2005).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. § 1453(c)(1). The removal provisions contain carve-outs mirroring those
under revised § 1332. Compare id. § 1453(d) with supra Part I.B. To my knowledge, the
federal courts have not wrapped themselves in knots over the potential problem created by § 1453’s failure to require explicitly that there be original jurisdiction under
§ 1332(d)(2), as contemplated by the legislative history. See Clermont & Eisenberg,
supra note 13, at 1557 (assuming the usual requirement that the removed action be
one that could have been entertained by federal court as a matter of original jurisdiction “in accordance with the clear legislative history despite the absence of appropriate
statutory wording”); Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs’ Ears, and Congressional
Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and its Lessons for the Class
Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 279, 292-98 (2006) (discussing this disconnect between CAFA’s text and its legislative history regarding the requirement of original jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2)); see also Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, No. 070098, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6354, at *29 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 29, 2008) (“ATTM, therefore, may not rely on CAFA to circumvent the long-standing requirement that only a
true defendant may remove a case to federal court.”).
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III. DIVERSITY LITIGATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
More than two centuries have not shed much light on the reasons
why the Constitution includes in Article III a grant of judicial power in
77
“Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States.” Early on,
however, the Supreme Court embraced what has become the traditional view, and the Court has never abandoned it. Under that view
the constitutional grant of diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction was intended to make available a neutral forum for litigants worried about
78
local bias in the courts of states other than their own. Consistently
with that view, the Court, in 1806, interpreted the statute implementing the grant of judicial power for inferior courts to require complete
79
diversity.
Apart from its pedigree in decisions of the Supreme Court, the
traditional view has in its favor that it was the rationale advanced by
80
Hamilton in the Federalist Papers and, according to Henry Friendly,
the rationale most frequently invoked when Article III was debated in
81
state ratifying conventions. The fact that Friendly’s research in pre1787 decisions of state appellate courts found no evidence of actual
77

U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87-88 (1809).
79
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). In cases kept from federal court by that interpretation, a state court intent on disfavoring an out-of-state citizen would also have to disfavor one of its own. This is not to say that an interpretation
not requiring complete diversity would in all circumstances be inconsistent with the
traditionally ascribed purpose. Moreover, the fact that—from the beginning and still
today—a plaintiff can (as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction) sue an out-of-state
defendant in a federal court in the plaintiff’s state is inconsistent with the traditional
account. This “anomaly” may be evidence of the existence of reasons for the constitutional grant other than, or in addition to, the fear of bias. Congress has long been
urged to eliminate the anomaly. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 128 (1971)
(testimony of Richard H. Field, Professor, Harvard Law School) (“Now, so far as the instate plaintiff is concerned, this represents about half of the diversity cases.”); ALI,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
§ 1302(a), at 123-24 (1969) [hereinafter STATE-FEDERAL STUDY] (proposing to prohibit the invocation of diversity jurisdiction, either originally or on removal, by an instate citizen). Although Congress has declined to do so, it has eliminated the twin
anomaly of a venue option of plaintiff’s residence. See Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(2000)); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 94 (1990) (advocating
the elimination of the venue anomaly).
80
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
81
See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 492 (1928).
78
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82

bias may only confirm that a different kind of bias—publication
83
bias—was acute in the eighteenth century. Research designed to determine the extent of actual bias does not in any event speak to the
existence of solicitude for the fear of biased treatment on which the
84
Court in fact relied. Certainly, as John Frank observed, there was
evidence of biased treatment of some aliens, namely British creditors,
sufficient to insulate from question the basis for the cognate grant of
judicial power in “Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens

82

See id. at 493-95.
“Publication bias” refers to the confounding effect in studies based on published opinions of nonrandom differences in the rate of publication. It may account
for the prominence of cases removed under CAFA in publicly available opinions. See
supra note 72. A vivid example of the phenomenon was revealed by the Second Circuit’s observation that it published decisions reversing grants of summary judgment far
more often than decisions affirming them. See Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9,
12 (2d Cir. 1986). John Frank analyzed (for different purposes) “5[9]4 reported cases
in seven colonies and states from 1658 to 1787 . . . [, which comprised] substantially all
available reported cases.” John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 24 (1948). I have corrected the figure given in the original
quotation (554) to accord with Frank’s Table 3—it now says 594. See id. at 25 tbl.3.
Even noting a likely appeal bias in cases of “diverse origin” and coding generously in
favor of that group, Frank found that the group contained only fifty-five of the 594 total cases, and many of the fifty-five were “not interstate cases, but English-state cases.”
Id. at 24-25 & tbl.3. In comments on a draft of this Article, Kevin Clermont suggested
that there may also have been a selection effect at work:
83

[T]he last place I think you would see actual bias in old cases is in the cases
themselves. Litigants would be painfully conscious of bias, and would not sue
or settle to avoid the bias. The reported cases would turn out to read just like
cases in a total absence of bias. As we showed in our Xenophilia articles,
[Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (1996)] and [Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441 (2007)], win rates can show whether bias is more
or less than the parties expect, but cannot show whether bias exists or not.
E-mail from Kevin M. Clermont to author (Nov. 18, 2007) (on file with author).
84
See supra text accompanying note 78. Friendly acknowledged that a change to a
bill in the first Congress was “clearly in line with the theory, already orthodox [in
1789!], that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to prevent the baneful effects of
local prejudice.” Friendly, supra note 81, at 501. Of course, CAFA itself may represent
an example of solicitude for the fear of biased treatment that either does not exist or is
statistically insignificant. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney
Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 591, 653 (2006) (finding “little difference in the rulings issued by the two sets
of courts,” notwithstanding attorney beliefs that “state courts are more permissive toward class actions” than are federal courts). But see infra note 367 (discussing methodological and interpretive questions raised by this study).
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85

thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” Moreover, Frank
also provided reasons to believe that Madison “and his colleagues ob86
viously thought of national and international diversity together.”
Whatever the role of actual bias or fear of bias in its creation, the
87
diversity clause elicited only a “tepid” defense by Marshall in the rati88
fication effort. Just as proponents may have been loath to articulate
a bill of particulars against biased state courts, so too may they have
been content to mask their true goals for the diversity clause in the
supposed apprehensions of their countrymen. In that regard, Article
III contains a number of grants of judicial power that, Frank argued,
89
were “of actual practical significance to large landholders.” Moreover, Madison’s remark on which Frank relied for the conflation of

85

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Frank, supra note 83, at 24 (“There can be
no doubt, for example, of direct bias in the administration of justice against British
creditors in Virginia.”).
86
Frank, supra note 83, at 27.
87
Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928).
88
See Friendly, supra note 81, at 487-88. Friendly acknowledged Felix Frankfurter’s assistance. See id. at 483 n.*; Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 383 (1964) (noting that Friendly, in 1927,
was “working, under the guidance of Professor Frankfurter . . . on a paper”). Frankfurter, in turn, relied heavily on Friendly’s article in an article of his own published the
same year. See Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 520-21. Proceeding from the doubts that
Friendly’s research had engendered about the existence of the problem that the constitutional grant was traditionally viewed as addressing, Frankfurter launched a vigorous attack on the need for diversity jurisdiction in 1928, stressing its controversial nature and political and social costs. An advocate of abolishing statutory diversity
jurisdiction, he argued that, in any case, “[c]ertainly the obvious abuses of diversity jurisdiction should be promptly removed by legislation.” Id. at 523. Moreover, he made
it clear that in his mind the most obvious of such abuses was corporate diversity litigation. See id. at 523-26. Frankfurter also used his article to advocate passage of a Senate
bill that would have overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), see Frankfurter,
supra note 87, at 529-30 & n.152, revealing neither that he wrote the bill nor that he
did so at the suggestion of Justice Brandeis. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1109 n.433 (1982). The circle was closed when
Brandeis cited Frankfurter’s article in his opinion for the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 n.6 (1938). See infra note 162 (noting the repeated citations
to Frankfurter’s article in Justice Brandeis’s opinion).
89
Frank, supra note 83, at 20. Although Frank acknowledged that the grant in
cases “between Citizens of the same State claiming Land under Grants of different
States,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, was the “most obvious relevant clause,” he argued
that “the diversity and treaty clauses were the jurisdictional clauses most immediately
affecting large landed interests.” Frank, supra note 83, at 20. He also concluded that
the “Supreme Court aided virtually every land speculator who came before it from
1790 to 1815.” Id. at 22; see also id. at 20 (discussing the favorable treatment given to
landholders by the Constitution).
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interstate and international diversity also linked “justice” to “foreign90
ers” with the promotion of trade. Whether or not, as Friendly concluded, “the desire to protect creditors against legislation favorable to
91
debtors was a principal reason for the grant of diversity jurisdiction,”
92
it surely was one reason animating some of its supporters. As I have
previously argued,
An important reason for the existence of Article III federal judicial
power in diversity (including alienage diversity) cases and for the First
Congress’s decision to create lower federal courts had to do with concerns that state courts were hostile to creditors. Although this concern
was at its height in connection with British creditors, the discriminatory
treatment of whom might prove a cause of war, it was by no means confined to such cases. In the period immediately preceding the Constitutional Convention there was ample evidence of the propensity of states
to favor debtors. Indeed, concerns about the impact of such laws on
contract and property rights and on the ability of the new country to
progress to a developed commercial state led to more than a head of judicial power; they contributed to a substantive restriction in the Consti93
tution, the prohibition against the impairment of contracts.

There is thus evidence that the grant of diversity jurisdiction in
Article III was designed to make available a forum where the creditor
class would receive “justice.” Moreover, as Frank suggested, although
94
the “typical case [in 1787] was still A v. B for a cow,” the framers and
90

See Frank, supra note 83, at 27; supra text accompanying note 86.
Friendly, supra note 81, at 496-97; see also Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 520 (citing Friendly and arguing that fear of state legislatures, not state courts, motivated diversity jurisdiction); Friendly, supra note 81, at 498 (“There was a vague feeling that the
new courts would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business men’s courts.”).
92
Note in that regard Hamilton’s argument that judicial independence would
serve to temper “unjust and partial laws”:
91

But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than
to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
93
Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations
on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1323-24 (2000)
(footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1325-26 (discussing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 46-47 (1825), an intensely controversial decision in which Chief Justice
Marshall candidly discussed the perceived problem of state court bias and speculated
“about the reason Congress conferred local federal power to alter state final process
law in the Process Act of 1789”).
94
Frank, supra note 83, at 26.
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ratifiers of the Constitution should perhaps be credited with imagining developments in interstate and international commerce with
95
which they had no experience.
One development that those responsible for the Constitution
surely did not anticipate, but that was uppermost in the minds of
CAFA’s supporters, was the role of corporations in the economy.
96
Business corporations in the modern sense hardly existed in 1787,
and for some fifty years thereafter their creation in most states re97
quired special legislation—generally in the form of charters. During
that period, the ability of corporations to sue or be sued in federal
court was restricted by the requirement of complete diversity. Since

95

Both Friendly and Frank also suggested, with very little evidence, that the constitutional diversity grant was intended to provide possible refuge from state courts that
were inefficient or worse. See Frank, supra note 83, at 27 (“Poorly paid, short-term state
judges were, in the minds of the Philadelphia Convention, sometimes incompetent
and inept.”); Friendly, supra note 81, at 497-98 (suggesting that “[t]he method of appointment and the tenure of the judges [in state courts] were not of the sort to invite
confidence”).
96
As Henry Butler explains,
Following the American Revolution, there was almost universal assent to the
proposition that the power to form corporations was vested in the state legislatures. All corporate charters were issued one by one by individual legislative
acts, and the overwhelming majority of the corporations chartered in the late
1700s were banks, insurance companies, water companies, and companies organized to build or run canals, turnpikes, and bridges. Many of the public
utility or transportation corporations were awarded monopoly privileges and
police powers of the state (for example, eminent domain) in exchange for the
financing and construction of quasi-public goods by the private firms.
Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate
Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 138 (1985) (footnote omitted); see also JAMES WILLARD
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1780–1970, at 7 (1970) (“There is no evidence of significant demand for corporate charters for local enterprise until about 1780; both opportunity and means
were lacking for undertakings ambitious enough to invite using the corporation.”); id.
at 17 (noting that, of the 317 special charters enacted in the states between 1780 and
1801, “less than 4 per cent were for general business corporations”); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283,
300 (1990) (“At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there were very few corporations.”).
“Common issue” class actions, of course, also hardly existed in 1787. “Thus, the
form was entirely absent from the Founders’ thinking.” Purcell, supra note 5, at 1860.
97
New York enacted the first general incorporation statute of widespread applicability in 1811, but until 1845 only two other states (New Jersey and Connecticut) followed suit. See Butler, supra note 96, at 143. “The special chartering system inherently
possessed the potential for rent-seeking behavior, and many examples show how charter applicants strained to get more generous terms from their legislators than those
obtained by rival groups already in the field.” Id. at 141.
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corporations were not themselves viewed as citizens at that time,
courts employed the technique of looking to the citizenship of their
98
shareholders instead. In a move that heralded, if it did not reflect,
the increasingly important role that corporations played in an increas99
100
ingly interstate economy, the Supreme Court, in a confusing but
heroic bit of fiction-making, blundered to the solution that corporations would be accorded the benefits of citizenship for diversity purposes through an irrebuttable presumption that their shareholders
101
As a result, corporations
were citizens of the incorporating state.
98

See Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 64-66 (1809); Blumberg,
supra note 96, at 302-03 (discussing the rationale behind Justice Marshall’s decision, in
Deveaux, to tie the citizenship, for jurisdictional purposes, of a corporation to the citizenship of that corporation’s shareholders); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1598 (1988) (noting that looking to
the citizenship of a corporation’s shareholders precluded many federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction in many corporate suits).
99
Butler suggests that the replacement of special charters with general incorporation statutes (the two systems coexisted in many states for much of the nineteenth century) was due to the increase in interstate commerce and the development of a competitive market for incorporation. The competitive market emerged when it became
clear that states were constitutionally required to allow foreign corporations to conduct
interstate commerce within their borders. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
183 (1868) (upholding the constitutionality of a Virginia statute requiring the payment
of a fee by out-of-state insurance companies seeking to do business in Virginia, but expressly resting this decision on the propositions that insurance does not constitute
commerce and that a corporation is not a “citizen” protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Butler, supra note 96, at 133, 155-56 (explaining that Paul forbade states from discriminating against foreign corporations by implicitly holding that
a state could not exclude a corporation from engaging in interstate, rather than intrastate, commerce); id. at 150-51 (“Prior to the 1850s, it was either assumed or required
that the operations of corporations—both special and general law—would be confined
to their chartering state.”).
100
The confusing nature of the Court’s opinions on corporate citizenship may
have contributed to confusion about their effects. Thus, one commentator described
Deveaux as “allow[ing] easy access to federal courts because it was easy to demonstrate
diversity of citizenship.” Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 73
(2005). Given the requirement of complete diversity, this cannot be right.
101
See Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
497, 555-56 (1844) (holding that a corporation created by a state is to be deemed a
citizen of that state); Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328-29
(1854) (holding that stockholders of a corporation are presumed to be citizens of the
corporation’s state of incorporation); see also Blumberg, supra note 96, at 304-05 (describing the legal fiction, arising in Letson and Marshall, that gave the corporation “jurisdictional opportunities” without according it “citizenship”); Frankfurter, supra note
87, at 523 (“[L]egal metaphysics about corporate ‘citizenship’ has produced a brood of
incoherent legal fictions concerning the status of a corporation . . . .”). As Hovenkamp
observes, the logic of the Marshall decision “was undermined two years later by Dodge v.
Woolsey,” 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855), “which entertained a diversity action between a
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were treated as if they were outsiders, potentially subject to biased
102
treatment, in the courts of all states but one.
It was not just the federal law of subject matter jurisdiction that
impeded corporate litigation well into the nineteenth century (and
that makes a suggestion of the framers’ prescience look like wishful
thinking). In combination with a conception of corporations as enti103
ties that could not act outside of the chartering state or could do so
104
only with express or implied consent of other states, state personal
105
jurisdiction law, which was highly favorable to defendants, made it
shareholder and a corporation.” Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 1599. For the role that
decisions about corporate citizenship for diversity purposes may have played in the
subsequent recognition of corporations as “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 1642-43; Krannich, supra note 100, at 76-80, 91-92.
102
Charles Warren described the Marshall decision as follows:
This malignant decision has resulted in allowing a corporation sued in the
State in which it actually does business, to remove the suit into a Federal Court
on the ground of diverse citizenship, simply because it happens to be chartered in another State. No single factor has given rise to more friction and
jealousy between State and Federal Courts, or to more State legislation conflicting with and repugnant to Federal jurisdiction, than has the doctrine of
citizenship for corporations. And this diverse citizenship jurisdiction created
by the Constitution and intended to allay friction and to afford equal and
identical law to citizen and non-citizen in a State, has resulted in putting foreign
corporations in a more favorable situation than domestic corporations . . . .
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 90 (1923); see also Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 524-25 (describing the potential for unfairness arising out of the use of diversity jurisdiction by corporations).
103
See supra note 99 (Butler quotation). “Logically applied, this theory of nonmigration prevented suit in a non-chartering state, for the corporation could not be
there.” Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169 (1939).
104
See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839) (“Every
power . . . which a corporation exercises in another state, depends for its validity on
the laws of the sovereignty in which it is exercised; and a corporation can make no
valid contract without their sanction, express or implied.”). Compare Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 1649 (“In Bank of Augusta, the Supreme Court held that a state could
more-or-less arbitrarily exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its
territory.”), with HURST, supra note 96, at 64 (describing the Bank of Augusta Court as
erecting a presumption “that a foreign corporation might do business within a state
unless it were positively shown that the state’s policy was one of exclusion”). For a discussion of the gradual recognition of “the right of corporations to work in multistate
markets,” see Hovenkamp, supra note 98, at 1650; supra note 99.
105
I have argued this point in another paper:
The traditional grounds of adjudicatory jurisdiction in this country (domicile,
tag jurisdiction, and quasi in rem jurisdiction) are general. In times when
travel was costly and difficult, they favored defendants, requiring the plaintiff
to sue where the defendant lived, unless he or she could be served while present in some other state (or had property in another state).
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106

hard to sue them anywhere else. As calls for a local forum for those
harmed by the activities of entities that did in fact operate outside of
their respective states of incorporation became more insistent, the
107
In 1856, the Supreme
states responded with fictions of their own.
Court rejected the argument that a state court judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because the rendering court’s jurisdiction
was predicated on implied consent to service of process on an in-state
108
But it was not until 1871 that the Court explicitly blessed federal
agent.
109
corporate litigation outside of the incorporating state, and not until 1878

Stephen B. Burbank, All the World His Stage, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 741, 745 (2004) (book
review).
106
If you could not arrest a corporation, you could not tag it with service under
the power theory that was dominant in the nineteenth century. Cf. Neirbo, 308 U.S. at
171-72 (“The deletion of ‘in which he shall be found’ [in an 1887 venue provision] was
not directed toward any change in the status of a corporate litigant. The restriction
was designed to shut the door against service of process upon a natural person in any
place where he might be caught. It confined suability, except with the defendant’s
consent, to the district of physical habitation.”). The other main antidote to traditional pro-defendant jurisdictional rules, quasi in rem jurisdiction, apparently was
available as against foreign corporations through attachment of their property, at least
in some states. If diversity existed, such cases could be removed even though they
could not have been maintained as original actions in federal court. See, e.g., Sayles v.
Nw. Ins. Co., 21 F. Cas. 608, 608 (C.C.D.R.I. 1854) (No. 12,421); Bliven v. New Eng.
Screw Co., 3 F. Cas. 715, 715 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 1550); JOHN F. DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS 27 (St. Louis, G.I. Jones &
Co. 1876).
107
“The fact that corporations did do business outside their originating bounds
made intolerable their immunity from suit in the states of their activities. And so they
were required by legislatures to designate agents for service of process in return for the
privilege of doing local business.” Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 170. As Purcell has observed,
In 1870 . . . only a half-dozen states had enacted laws that required foreign
corporations to consent to jurisdiction in order to do business within their
borders. By 1900, however, forty states had adopted such laws, and by 1910
virtually every state in the nation had done so. Most immediately relevant, the
statutes often authorized jurisdiction over corporations on causes of action
that arose in other states, thus allowing nonresident plaintiffs asserting claims
that arose in their home states to secure personal jurisdiction over corporations in the enacting states.
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 181 (1992) (footnote omitted).
108
See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407-08 (1856).
109
See R.R. Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 65, 83-84 (1871); PURCELL, supra note
107, at 17-18. Harris was not a diversity case, but rather “[i]t was controlled by acts of
Congress local to the [District of Columbia].” Harris, 79 U.S. at 86. That may explain
why lower courts failed to follow its logic in diversity cases. See infra note 110.
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that the Court made it clear that the same rule applied in diversity actions
111
and (in dictum) that such suits could be removed to federal court.
These last developments were key contributing factors to the “system of corporate diversity litigation” so brilliantly chronicled by the
112
legal historian Edward Purcell. Purcell’s book, which should be required reading for all who teach and write about federal courts and
federal practice and procedure, shows how and why corporate litigants used the federal courts, primarily through removal from the
state courts, to gain litigation advantages over their opponents, particularly the growing number of individuals injured in “Industrial
America” and, with the spread of insurance, the growing number of
policyholders. The litigation advantages they sought included, first,
the opportunity to inflict punishing expense and delay on, and extract
favorable settlements from, opponents with fewer resources to spend
on litigation. The value of this strategy decreased when automobiles
became ubiquitous, federal courts became more numerous, and the
113
population became more urban. The second advantage was the opportunity to secure more favorable rules of substantive law, especially
after the federal courts expanded the sphere of application of general

110

See Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 378 (1878) (noting “the practice in the
circuit courts generally . . . to decline jurisdiction in this class of suits,” but reasoning
that the cases relied on by the lower courts were “in conflict with the rule [in Harris]”).
111
See id. at 377 (“As the company, if sued in a State court, could remove the cause
to the Circuit Court, and thus compel a citizen of the State to submit to that jurisdiction, we see no reason why the citizen may not, if he desires it, bring the company into
the same jurisdiction at the outset.”). “As a result of Ex parte Schollenberger, it was clear
that a corporation came within the provisions of the removal statutes so as to give jurisdiction to the circuit court in every state in which the corporation transacted business through an agent.” FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 90 (footnote omitted). As Purcell observes, “Although Harris and Schollenberger had opened the federal
courts to foreign corporations in the 1870s, both explained that they did so to assist
individuals who wanted to sue those corporations in federal court.” PURCELL, supra
note 107, at 18.
112
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 4.
113
These considerations led Judge Dillon to recommend raising the amount in
controversy, or increasing the number of federal courts or judges, in 1876:
In view of the inconvenience and expense of litigating in the Federal courts,
held often more than one hundred miles distant from the residence of the
parties; the crowded state of their dockets; and considering that removals, especially by foreign insurance and railway corporations, often have the effect to
delay, if not to oppress, those having claims against them, it is quite clear that
the amount to justify a removal should be enlarged, or the Federal courts multiplied, or at all events their judicial force increased.
DILLON, supra note 106, at 25-26.
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federal common law and the Supreme Court became enamored with
freedom of contract (i.e., increasingly in the period Purcell studied,
until the 1930s). The third advantage that corporate litigants sought
in this period was the possibility that the federal courts might act in
accordance with the view of them held by many people—namely as
bastions of business interests—especially in times of social upheaval
(i.e., intermittently in the period Purcell studied).
In addition, corporate litigants came to understand that although
Congress closed the avenues for remedial dispensation that judgment
creditors had sought in actions at law, where federal diversity courts
114
were required to apply state procedure, no such constraint applied
to equitable remedies (e.g., injunctions), as to which conformity had
115
never been required.
Finally, late in the period Purcell studied, a
(Democratic) Congress added to the federal courts’ remedial arsenal
a discretionary remedy—the declaratory judgment—that quickly became an additional incentive for corporate forum shopping, particu116
larly in insurance litigation.
Once corporate litigants were given broader access to federal
court, plaintiffs’ lawyers devised tactics to deny them the litigation advantages they sought by keeping cases in the state courts. In line with
the growing popular view that the federal courts favored business in114

See Burbank, supra note 93, at 1327 (explaining that, in response to the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825), “the proponents of change secured legislation in Congress that required federal courts to follow state laws concerning final process as of 1828 and that channeled
their power to alter state law on final process in one direction, namely the adoption of
post-1828 state laws”).
115
See Burbank, supra note 88, at 1039 (“Equity had remained free of any requirement of conformity [with state procedure] since the beginning of the Republic . . . .”).
But see Burbank, supra note 93, at 1321 (“[E]ven prior to 1938, federal courts tended to
follow state law that expanded the remedial rights of litigants, and assertions concerning the inability of state law to affect federal equity from that period must be carefully
evaluated . . . .”). For a description of the use of federal equity in insurance litigation,
see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 206-09. Note also railroads’ use of state court injunctions against Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) litigation in allegedly inconvenient forums, which the Court put a stop to through interpretations of the statute’s
venue provision. See id. at 222-24, 370 n.82.
116
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 212-13. An interesting article by Andrew Bradt
has rescued Congress’s 1934 statute from oblivion, reminding us of the multiple purposes that animated its chief promoters, who were law professors, and at least one of
whom (Edson Sunderland) was a progressive/realist. See Andrew Bradt, “Much To Gain
and Nothing To Lose”: Implications of the History of the Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2)
Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 771-91 (2006). The perspective taken in the text suggests
that further research may reveal that this statute, like the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
enacted the same year, was welcomed by people of very different political persuasions.
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117

terests, some states sought to assist plaintiffs in that effort, including
by attempting to domesticate corporations that they licensed to do
118
As Purcell describes, the Supreme Court put an end to
business.
this maneuver in 1896, at the height of a period when its decisions
119
might well be thought to have justified the popular view. Thereafter
and more typically, stuck with an increasingly implausible view of corporate citizenship (under the traditional view of the purpose of the
diversity grant), plaintiffs’ lawyers relied on various stratagems to defeat removal.
The most promising techniques for defeating removal were the
120
joinder of nondiverse defendants and the manipulation of the dam121
ages claimed, either of which could prevent corporate defendants
from satisfying the requirements of original jurisdiction. Each of
these maneuvers elicited countermeasures from corporate defendants, and the federal courts were required to umpire the system
through the interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes.
Key to defending against the joinder stratagem was a provision
permitting the removal of separable controversies (now separate and
122
independent claims).
Long treated by scholars as complex if not
obscure, and having been amended in recent years to reach only federal question claims, this provision is still a fertile source of doctrinal
123
It once was much more than that. Purcell shows how
questions.
corporate defendants—and in particular railroads—sought access to
117

See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 26 (“The belief that federal judges tended to
favor business was a widely shared part of American political culture . . . .”); Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 522 (“Moreover, it is politically highly unwise to permit the
federal courts to be used as an escape from state tribunals and thus to associate the
federal court in the public mind as the resort of powerful litigants.”).
118
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 18 (describing the development of corporate
domestication); Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 521 (“With a view to circumventing this use
of jurisdiction by foreign corporations, states have resorted to every variety of legislation, frequently frustrated by the Supreme Court.”); supra note 102 (Warren quotation).
119
See St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562-63 (1896) (holding that
state law cannot change corporate citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction);
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 18 (“James, in other words, ensured that corporations
could restrict their jurisdictional citizenship to only one state and thereby preserve diversity with citizens of every other state in the union.”); id. at 267 (discussing two Supreme Court decisions that “expanded corporate removal rights” by allowing removal
by corporations to the federal courts in the state of filing, even where neither party was
a citizen of that state).
120
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 104-26.
121
See id. at 90-97.
122
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000); PURCELL, supra note 107, at 106-07.
123
See, e.g., WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 32, at 235-42.
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federal court by contending, among other arguments, that claims
against the (diverse) corporation and a (nondiverse) employee were
not “joint” because they were based on different theories of liability;
how some lower courts (led by the future Chief Justice, William How124
ard Taft) accommodated them by accepting this contention; and
how the Supreme Court vacillated and temporized before ultimately
remitting the answer to state law, which tended to be favorable to
125
plaintiffs (foreclosing removal by treating the claims as joint).
Plaintiffs pursued a wide variety of antiremoval tactics involving
126
the amount in controversy, some less seemly than others. It suffices
here to mention two. First, some plaintiffs deliberately alleged damages less than the amount required for diversity in their state court
complaints, only to amend the ad damnum after the time for removal
had passed. Corporate defendants responded to delayed upward
amendments by removing and arguing that federal jurisdiction should
127
Having avoided the
not be defeated through fraudulent pleading.
128
question in a case squarely presenting it in 1890, the Court eventually approved the view of lower courts that rejected this tactic, holding
(in a case involving an amendment to drop a nondiverse party from
state litigation) that postcommencement developments making a case
129
removable restarted the time limit.
Second, a more interesting and apparently far more common tactic was the conscious discounting of claims that might yield recovery
in excess of the required amount in controversy for diversity jurisdic124

See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 111-12.
See id. at 118-21. Purcell notes that even then plaintiffs faced difficulty because
of lower court intransigence, the problems created by the need to keep the nondiverse
party (who might be a coworker) in the case, or corporate defendants’ determination
to impose expense even in cases where removal was clearly improper. See id. at 120-21.
126
The amount in controversy was raised from in excess of $500 to in excess of
$2000 in 1887, and to in excess of $3000 in 1911. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 91. For
an argument in favor of raising the amount by a sitting federal judge in 1876, see supra
note 113.
127
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 95-97.
128
See N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Austin, 135 U.S. 315, 318 (1890); PURCELL, supra note
107, at 95-97.
129
See Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 102 (1898); PURCELL,
supra note 107, at 112-14. The value of this rule to defendants was diluted in 1988,
long after the disintegration of the system of corporate diversity litigation, when Congress enacted an overarching one-year limitation. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000)). But see infra note 317 (suggesting that CAFA’s elimination of the one-year limitation on removal will provide further opportunities for collusion by defendants).
125
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130

tion.
This tactic became more attractive when that amount was
raised from in excess of $500 to in excess of $2000 in 1887, and to
131
Even so, it is sufficiently arresting to
more than $3000 in 1911.
prompt a reminder of the historical context—in particular, the facts
that federal court litigation could be significantly more expensive and
less convenient for plaintiffs than state court litigation;132 that some
defendants did not scruple to remove even in cases where it must have
been apparent that they had no right to do so; and that some lower
federal courts were happy to oblige those defendants, even in the
teeth of Supreme Court precedent. On that view, apart from any perceived advantages of litigation in state court, by discounting, plaintiffs
sought insurance against the transaction costs of removal battles.
More broadly, according to Purcell,
[T]he development of a collection of highly technical and apparently
trivial procedural rules centering on the jurisdictional amount helped
forge one of the great, if largely unspoken, social and legal compromises
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The operative rule
was simple and well understood. If plaintiffs agreed to keep their claims
133
reasonably small, they could guarantee themselves a state forum.

130

See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 90-97. At that time, according to Purcell, a
plaintiff’s recovery was generally restricted by state law to the amount stated in the
complaint. See id. at 91. Changes in pleading rules since that time have already caused
difficulties in litigation under CAFA. See, e.g., Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506
F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 2007) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (criticizing Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007), for imposing a higher
burden of proof (to a “legal certainty”) on a removing defendant when the plaintiff
alleges a specific amount less than the jurisdictional threshold, because “[s]ome states
do not allow any mention of damages in state court complaints”); Morgan v. Gay, 471
F.3d 469, 477 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We admonish that a verdict in excess of the demand
could well be deemed prejudicial to the party that sought removal to federal court
when the party seeking remand uses a damages-limitation provision to avoid federal
court.”); Strawn v. AT & T Mobility, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602-03 (S.D. W. Va.
2007) (observing that an ad damnum below the jurisdictional amount is not sufficient
to deny federal jurisdiction in West Virginia, where recovery is not limited to the
amount demanded in the complaint). For a valuable discussion of the doctrinal puzzles lurking in jurisdictional-amount requirements, both in the default regime and under CAFA, see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1568-79; see also Shapiro, supra
note 63, at 116-21 (discussing the validity of plaintiffs’ self-imposed caps on recovery
and the complications introduced by these voluntary caps in CAFA cases).
131
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 91, 99.
132
Purcell notes that the popularity of discounting by plaintiffs endured even after
developments, such as the automobile and increases in the number of federal courts,
that made federal litigation less onerous for individual plaintiffs. See id. at 148, 154-60.
133
Id. at 251.
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If the refusal of federal courts to follow state law concerning final
remedies—thereby favoring creditors—proved intensely controversial
134
in the 1820s, it is hardly surprising that, once the system of corporate diversity litigation was fully operational, the advantages it unquestionably conferred (and those that many people feared it conferred)
on corporations in litigation against individuals also provoked intense
controversy. We have seen that various efforts by states to thwart removal, such as by attempting to domesticate foreign corporations,
135
were unsuccessful. The controversy was equally intense in the halls
of Congress, where repeated efforts to abolish corporate citizenship or
otherwise curtail corporate access to federal court found substantial
support in the House—a number of the bills passed there—but always
136
failed in the Senate.
In his rich and nuanced account of the system of corporate diversity jurisdiction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Purcell vividly evokes the thrust and parry, not just of the litigants, but,
as it were, of the federal courts. He demonstrates that the Supreme
Court responded differently, indeed inconsistently, to the interpretive
questions posed, and that, even when the Court had appeared to settle a question, some lower courts did not get the message—at least if it
was one that disfavored the interests of corporate defendants. Acknowledging that it is difficult to read the Court’s decisions in the
1890s as something other than a conscious effort to enable corporate
134

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. For the checkered history of
state statutes tying a corporation’s permission to do business to its remaining in state
court, see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 201-02, 205. Purcell notes that such statutes
were of particular salience to insurance companies. Since insurance was not “commerce,” those selling it across state lines were not protected by the Commerce Clause
from the power to exclude. “If a state revoked an insurance company’s license [because it removed a case to federal court], then, the company would simply be out of
business in that state.” Id. at 202. These statutes ceased to be enforceable as a result of
Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922), in which the Court affirmed an
injunction barring the Arkansas Secretary of State from revoking a corporation’s license to do business because it had violated a state statute by suing an Arkansas citizen
in federal court and removing another case brought by an Arkansas citizen to federal
court. Id. at 532-33. The Terral Court remarked that “the Federal Constitution confers
upon citizens of one State the right to resort to federal courts in another,” and “that
state action, whether legislative or executive, necessarily calculated to curtail the free
exercise of the right thus secured is void.” Id. at 532.
136
See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 88-93, 136-45. The House passed
bills that would have eliminated corporate citizenship in 1880, 1883 (twice), and 1892;
a bill that would have limited Supreme Court review in diversity cases in 1890; and a
bill that would have eliminated railroad citizenship in 1894. See Curry, supra note 4, at
464 app. A.
135
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access to federal court, Purcell is careful both to note the larger political environment that probably contributed to that impulse and, identifying cycles of pro- and anti-access decisions, to eschew any one
causal explanation for the Court’s behavior, let alone a narrowly ideo137
logical causal explanation.
Felix Frankfurter appeared to accept Friendly’s argument that the
Constitution’s diversity grant was more likely animated by the purpose
of enabling creditors to escape prodebtor state legislation (and more
generally, perhaps, of providing “business men’s courts”) than it was
138
by the purpose ascribed to it by the traditional view. Yet when advocating the abolition of the system of corporate diversity, he was equally
happy to point out that some of the Supreme Court’s decisions providing corporate access could not be justified according to the tradi139
tional view. Purcell follows Frankfurter in pointing out the inconsistencies, but, as a historian not constrained by the decisions of the
Supreme Court (or the incentives of an advocate of change), he digs
deeper, ranges more broadly, and is more sensitive both to causal
multiplicity and to the transformation of law in the books.
Evaluating experience under the removal provision of the Local
140
Prejudice Act, Purcell provides evidence that bias against foreign
corporations was a rare and isolated phenomenon in the late nine141
Prejudice was, however, a very serious problem for
teenth century.

137
138

See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 121-26, 193, 262-91.
See Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 520-21 (quoting Friendly, supra note 81, at

498).
139

See id. at 525-26 (criticizing removal jurisdiction for state court cases between
two nonresidents, removal of a whole controversy under the separable controversy
provision, and receiverships based on diversity of citizenship); infra note 152 and accompanying text.
140
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, 558-59. As Purcell explains,
The original local prejudice act allowed nonresidents to remove regardless of
whether they were plaintiffs or defendants and to do so “at any time before
the final hearing or trial.” To remove under the act, parties had only to submit affidavits stating that they had reason to believe that from “prejudice or
local influence” they would be unable to obtain justice in the state courts.
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 129 (footnote omitted) (quoting Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch.
196, 14 Stat. at 559). For a description of amendments to the Act in 1887–1888, see id.
at 130-31.
141
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 137-42 (finding “several reasons to doubt
whether local prejudice constituted a major and pervasive threat to corporate defendants,” including the absence of evidence from noncorporate spokespersons and reported decisions showing that “corporate defendants failed to produce evidence of local prejudice in any significant number of cases”).
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the putative beneficiaries of the removal provision of the Civil Rights
142
Act of 1866.
Comparing the Court’s decisions under the two statutes in light of the general provisions concerning diversity jurisdiction, Purcell finds that “[i]n diversity cases federal law was willing simply to presume the existence of prejudice and to grant a broadly
effective remedy; in civil rights cases it was content to ignore the
143
This is part of the
prejudice and to offer only a paper remedy.”
powerful case he makes for the proposition that
a better explanation [than the traditional view] for the actual shape that
the Supreme Court gave diversity jurisdiction over the years—or, at least,
from the 1870s to the 1940s—was simply that the Justices generally if implicitly believed that they should maintain federal jurisdiction over issues
144
and interests that they regarded as having national importance.

Purcell’s account of federal diversity litigation after the early years
of the twentieth century is equally rich and nuanced, and equally fascinating. The advent of the automobile, the proliferation of federal
trial courts, and the movement to urban living reduced the advantages
145
of removal for corporate litigants, while the Federal Employers’ Li146
ability Act (FELA), which was quickly amended to bar removal, and
147
state workers’ compensation laws both provided attractive alternatives to a brutally laissez-faire general federal common law and empowered plaintiffs who desired to litigate in state tribunals. The loosening of restrictions on state court personal jurisdiction over
corporations encouraged an increasingly entrepreneurial plaintiffs’
personal-injury bar to turn the tables on corporate opponents by ven-

142

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 147.
144
Id. at 256; see also HURST, supra note 96, at 143 (“Conceptions of the legal character and the social uses and dangers of the corporation deeply colored the ideas of
national interest which the Court pursued.”). At times, however, Purcell may retroject
to political actors in 1787 and 1789 the much later belief system and motivation of the
Court (or of Congress). Consider in that regard the following:
143

The respective jurisdictions were created and construed not on the basis of
any showing about the dangers of “local prejudice” or any considered evaluation of the need for various carefully tailored remedies but, rather, on a desire
to accomplish divergent and ulterior social goals. For its part, diversity jurisdiction was simply designed to favor nonresidents who engaged in interstate
commerce. In a variety of ways, some intended and others not, it did just that.
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 147.
145
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 154-60.
146
See id. at 165-72.
147
See id. at 161-63.
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turing into other states in search of forum advantage. Noting that the
advantages sought often reposed not in rules of substantive law, but
148
rules of “procedure” broadly defined, Purcell describes the attractions of one state favored by plaintiffs, Minnesota, as follows:
The legal system in Minnesota was distinctly favorable to plaintiffs. It
recognized a far-reaching rule of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations, placed the burden of proving contributory negligence on the
defendant, provided that plaintiffs were not subject to examination before trial, and applied a generous employer-employee joinder rule, thus
making a critical antiremoval device readily available. Its supreme court,
too, construed remedial statutes liberally. The Minnesota jury was especially attractive. State law provided for a nonunanimous verdict by ten of
twelve jurors and gave its juries considerable latitude in fixing the
amount of damages. Equally or more important, its juries had a reputa149
tion for bringing in handsome verdicts for plaintiffs.

Corporate defendants that for decades had used the burdens of
distance and expense as tactical weapons to wear down individual
plaintiffs through removal started to protest the burdens that inter150
state forum shopping imposed on them. Moreover, ever eager to
148

See id. at 179 (explaining the effect that “procedure’s” “broad and often uncertain scope” had on creating significant differences, including outcome differences,
among state courts); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63
TUL. L. REV. 553, 573-74 (1989) (providing examples of cases in which procedural concerns trumped substantive concerns for plaintiffs, and arguing that conflict of law rules
often cannot prevent procedural forum shopping).
149
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 185 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 184 (“Of all
the states that offered attractive forums, however, none rivaled Minnesota in its combination of both favorable law and an enterprising plaintiffs’ bar.”). Minnesota continued to provide jurisdictional and choice of law rules that were very favorable to
plaintiffs long after the period that Purcell chronicles, and it also continued to provide
cases in which the Supreme Court sought to use the Constitution to put on the brakes.
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328-31 (1980) (holding unconstitutional Minnesota’s exercise of jurisdiction where the defendant’s only contact with the state was the
fact that his insurer did business, and “held” his insurance policy, there). Indeed, because of a very long statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Minnesota is still a
“hotbed for out-of-state plaintiffs.” Mark Hansen, Lawsuits Travel Up North, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 2007, at 16, 16-17.
150
As Purcell writes,
In their efforts to establish a doctrine of forum non conveniens and to have outof-state suits enjoined, corporations exhibited a keen awareness of the burdens that distance imposed on litigants. . . . Indeed, in a good many imported
cases the distance was less than the additional distance that removal imposed
on numerous individual plaintiffs. Nevertheless, when distance became a
plaintiffs’ tool, corporate defendants loudly proclaimed its unfairness and vigorously sought relief from its oppression.
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 189 (footnote omitted).
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take advantage of more favorable rules of general federal common
law—in a litigation environment where, because of “legislative en151
croachments,” those rules had less scope of application—they sought
and ultimately (in 1923) secured reversal of a 1906 Supreme Court
decision that, consistently with the traditional view of diversity litigation, had barred removal from the courts of a state in which neither
152
Purcell describes how, in
the plaintiff nor the defendant resided.
that 1923 decision and by other means, the Court in the 1920s and
1930s sought to police interstate forum shopping. Central to those
efforts were attempts to use the Constitution to restrain state court ju153
risdiction and state choice of law. Both efforts proved short-lived, as
154
the Court apparently realized that the Commerce and Full Faith and
155
Credit Clauses were equilibration instruments entirely too blunt for
the dynamics of forum selection.

151

See id. at 160-66 (describing how both Congress and the states removed some of
the power of federal common law by enacting various statutory schemes, including the
states’ workers’ compensation laws and Congress’s FELA).
152
See id. at 191-93. The decisions in question were Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.S. 449,
460-61 (1906), in which the Court prevented the removal of a case brought in a district
in which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resided, and Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway Co., 260 U.S. 653, 658-61 (1923), in which the Court overruled Wisner and held
that a case otherwise removable can be removed without regard to the original venue
requirements. Note Professor Frankfurter’s criticism of this result in terms of the historic rationale for diversity jurisdiction. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
When writing for the Court in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165
(1939), Justice Frankfurter had reason to think better of Lee, at least insofar as it cut a
path to making a federal court available to a plaintiff suing a defendant that had appointed an agent for service of process in a state of which neither was a citizen. See
Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 168, 171 n.8 (praising Lee for allowing parties to litigation to waive
statutory venue requirements).
153
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 192-99 (explaining the Court’s “numerous efforts . . . to develop constitutional doctrines of judicial forum control”).
154
Compare Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923)
(holding the assertion of jurisdiction under a Minnesota statute, based solely on the
presence of a “solicitation agent” of the railroad and not on the locale of the litigated
incident, unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause), with Int’l Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511, 517 (1934) (“[Davis] was confined narrowly within
the bounds of its own facts.”).
155
Compare Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932) (requiring a New Hampshire court to apply Vermont’s workers’ compensation statute as a
matter of full faith and credit), with Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n,
294 U.S. 532, 548-50 (1935) (distinguishing Clapper into oblivion in allowing California to
enforce its own workers’ compensation statute in a case arising from injuries suffered in
Alaska). In Purcell’s understated formulation, the Court in the latter claimed “somewhat unconvincingly to be consistent with Clapper.” PURCELL, supra note 107, at 198.
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The failed constitutional experiments of the 1920s and 1930s set
156
the stage for the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and
157
for its embrace of a broad forum non conveniens doctrine, the former antithetical to corporate interests and the latter something that
158
those interests had long advocated. Purcell here lays the groundwork for his subsequent, equally brilliant book, Brandeis and the Pro159
gressive Constitution, confirming what a close reading of the Erie decision and its progeny reveal. Quite apart from the “unconstitutionality
160
161
of the course pursued” under Swift v. Tyson, the Court was intent
to address the “defects, political and social” of the system of corporate
diversity litigation by eliminating the forum-shopping incentives that
162
different rules of decision created.
163
Scholars have tended to view International Shoe Co. v. Washington
as contributing to the development of the modern market for litiga164
tion by enhancing opportunities for forum shopping.
Although

156

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (refusing to “catalogue the circumstances” that will justify applying the forum non conveniens doctrine,
so as to leave the courts with discretion).
158
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 224-30.
159
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA (2000).
160
Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
161
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
162
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74; see PURCELL, supra note 159, at 141-91 (describing Justice
Brandeis’s political and social concerns in writing the Erie opinion). A very close reading of the Erie decision reveals a number of citations to Frankfurter’s 1928 article, supra
note 87, where, despairing of a judicial remedy to Swift, the author advocated the legislative fix that Brandeis had urged upon him. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 n.6, 77 nn.20-21;
see also supra note 88.
163
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
164
I have previously taken the view that
157

the greater latitude to assert jurisdiction afforded the states by International
Shoe and its progeny dramatically enhanced the opportunities for interstate
forum shopping and, coupled with loose federal control of state choice of law,
the incentives of both litigants and state courts to run a race to judgment, creating a market for litigation in which the voluntary extension of wholly domestic lis pendens doctrine to interjurisdictional litigation would constitute surprising self-restraint.
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 210 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also
Bassett, supra note 9, at 353 n.59.
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165

Purcell makes no such claim, his account raises the question
whether International Shoe was actually animated in part by the desire
to reduce forum shopping against corporations. By enabling states to
assert activity-based personal jurisdiction without resort to fictions
such as corporate presence, the Court may have hoped to change the
balance of incentives in favor of suit in the state where the corporate
activity grounding the claim occurred. The Justices may have hoped
thereby to reduce the incidence, and set the stage for a reconsidera166
tion, of what we now call “general doing-business” jurisdiction. If so,
rather than contributing to the impulses that led the Court, two years
later, to embrace forum non conveniens (a view that is in any event
suspect insofar as that doctrine has little if any role to play in cases of
167
specific jurisdiction ), International Shoe should be seen as part of a

165

PURCELL, supra note 107, at 220-21 (“The [International Shoe] decision limited
the ability of foreign corporations to structure their business so that they could carry
on activities in a state but remain beyond the reach of its courts, and it made it easier
for plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations in their home states.”).
166
As I have previously observed,
Apparently a creation of the courts, but subsequently adopted in the jurisdictional statutes of some states, doing-business jurisdiction was justified under
traditional theory by the fiction of presence. When that fiction was undressed
in International Shoe, a case that involved an assertion of what we would now
call specific jurisdiction but that reasoned to a new paradigm by surveying
cases of both specific and general jurisdiction, the future of this jurisdictional
ground was put in doubt. It is still in doubt.
Burbank, supra note 105, at 750 (footnotes omitted). This discussion prompted David
Shapiro to ask,
[I]sn’t it true that the contemporary justifications for asserting personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations were both over and under-inclusive?
That is, they might reach some cases where the corporation had “consented”
in order to do business (or was “present” in some abstract sense) yet the case
had no connections with the state, but wouldn’t reach others in which the underlying facts had significant contacts with the state?
E-mail from David Shapiro to author (Oct. 31, 2007) (on file with author).
167
See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning
of the Millennium?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 120-21 (1999) (evaluating Robert
Casad’s view, as put forth in Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions at the End of the
Twentieth Century, Forum Conveniens and Forum Non Conveniens, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 91, 105-06 (1999), that forum non conveniens is limited to cases involving only general jurisdiction). Both of the Court’s 1947 decisions embracing a broad forum non
conveniens doctrine, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), and Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), were federal diversity actions. Purcell describes them as a “respon[se] to the general rise in interstate forum
shopping,” PURCELL, supra note 107, at 235, and suggests that they may have contributed to the defeat of a bill that would have restricted venue options in FELA cases. Id.
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concerted attempt to develop alternatives to the failed constitutional
experiments of the 1920s and 1930s.
Whether or not International Shoe was animated by a goal of reducing interstate forum shopping against corporations, the role that the
168
forum non conveniens doctrine and its statutory successor were perceived to play in policing that phenomenon is evidence that, by the
late 1940s, diversity jurisdiction had come to be seen by many not as a
magnet for abusive litigation behavior by corporations, but as a source
of protection against such behavior on the part of plaintiffs. Of
course, the new role was linked no more closely to the traditional view
of diversity jurisdiction than that which it replaced. Moreover, it would
only have traction until such time as the Court or Congress came up
with alternative and more direct ways of restraining state court overreaching.
Purcell persuasively argues that, by the 1950s, the changes
wrought by Erie and its progeny, and the changed complexion of the
federal judiciary, effectively rendered the federal courts more likely to
169
be sought than feared by individual plaintiffs. Thus, at a time when
the federal courts were under attack for unpopular constitutional decisions, but when diversity cases were proving a burden, Congress rejected a bill sponsored by a southern congressman that, by eliminating
corporate citizenship entirely, might have cut the federal civil docket
170
Instead, Congress raised the
by as much as twenty-five percent.
amount in controversy to in excess of $10,000 and addressed what
were perceived to be the last vestiges of the system of corporate diversity litigation: giving plaintiffs in workers’ compensation cases the
same privilege of forum choice as under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and eliminating the abuse of tactical reincorporation fa171
mously blessed in the Black & White Taxicab case. The latter was acat 235-36. He also notes the likely influence in that regard of the transfer provision in
the draft Judicial Code, which was enacted in 1948 as 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Id.
168
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000). Added by the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code,
this provision authorizing transfer (rather than dismissal) of cases in which there is
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper venue had the effect of
confining the federal forum non conveniens doctrine to cases in which the alternative
forum is foreign.
169
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 230-43.
170
See id. at 241-42 (“The Tuck bill would have cut the diversity docket by almost
two-thirds and sliced the entire federal civil docket by 25 percent.”).
171
See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 529-31 (1928) (upholding the application of general federal common law different from Kentucky law in a lawsuit brought in federal court in Kentucky
by a local company that had strategically reincorporated from Kentucky to Tennessee).
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complished by providing that corporations are citizens both of the
states by which they are incorporated and of the state that is their prin172
cipal place of business.
Purcell’s discussion of the 1958 legislation adumbrates the point
that he develops at length in Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution
with respect to Henry Hart and Erie scholarship, namely that by this
point the actors had lost sight of the social meaning of the system of
173
corporate diversity litigation. As a result, the actors deemed the unusual and essentially local problem involved in the Black & White Taxicab case as emblematic of that system.
Whether those responsible for the 1958 legislation had forgotten
or were simply unaware of the serious and widespread social problems
that the system of corporate diversity litigation engendered, the manifest absurdity of treating modern business corporations as outsiders,
vulnerable to local prejudice, in all states but two cannot have escaped
174
them.
Or rather, it could not have escaped them if they had been
172

See Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)).
173
See PURCELL, supra note 159, at 229-57.
174
This is not to deny that members of Congress, or others considering the legislation enacted in 1958, echoed the traditional account of reasons for the diversity grant,
or that they entertained the possibility of prejudice against national corporations doing interstate business. It is, however, to suggest that their hearts were not in it and
thus to agree with Purcell’s interpretation of the legislative record. Consider that, in
identical language, the House and Senate Reports (1) espoused the goal of “reducing
the number of cases involving corporations which come into Federal district courts on
the fictional premise that a diversity of citizenship exists,” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3
(1958), S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958); (2) stated that the “jurisdictional amount
should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor
so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies,” H.R. REP. NO. 851706, at 3, S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; (3) having articulated the “underlying purpose of
diversity of citizenship legislation,” went on to observe that “[w]hatever the effectiveness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to local corporations which, because
of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another State,” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4,
S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4; and (4) noted that the change “will not eliminate those corporations which do business over a large number of States, such as the railroads, insurance companies, and other corporations whose businesses are not localized in one particular State.” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4, S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5. Consider also that
in his testimony before a House Subcommittee on behalf of the Judicial Conference,
which originally proposed the legislation, Judge Maris acknowledged that there were
intermediate measures Congress could take between expanding corporate citizenship
by adding the principal place of business and simply making diversity jurisdiction unavailable to corporations. See Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Concerning Diversity of Citizenship: Hearing on H.R. 2516 and H.R. 4497 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong. 30, 34-35 (1957) (statement of Judge Albert B. Maris). Moreover,
he stated that the measure proposed (and ultimately enacted) “is the minimum, . . .
and it is the one which the Conference felt it was proper for it to recommend.” Id. at
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thinking about diversity jurisdiction in the traditional way. Whatever
the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution may have intended in Article III, Congress in 1958—with far better reason (at least as a matter
of institutional legitimacy) than the Court in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries—had moved on, confirming what its repeal

30. Given that formulation, his additional comment that “[y]ou could go further and
say that a corporation shall be regarded as a citizen of any State in which it is doing
business, whether that is its principal place of business or not, though that would
eliminate many more corporations,” id., might have seemed an invitation. In that regard, Judge Maris also testified that the Judicial Conference had considered and rejected making corporations citizens of all states in which they were (doing or) qualified
to do business because “that would really eliminate American business, which is mostly
now incorporated, from access to the Federal courts.” Id. at 35. Withal, when asked
about possible opposition from “people representing corporations,” to the various possible measures discussed at the hearing, id., Judge Maris observed that they “seem to
regard pretty highly their privilege of taking their litigation into the Federal courts in
States remote from their headquarters where they don’t know the local people, and
they fear for the results that might be reached in the State court. They seem to feel
that way.” Id. at 35-36. He added that “it is the basis, I suppose, for the diversity jurisdiction, when all is said and done; why it was originally put in the Constitution.” Id. at 36.
Finally, the congressional materials informing the interpretation of the 1958 legislation are markedly different in this respect from some of the Judicial Conference materials they include. Most notable is the March 12, 1951, report of the Conference’s
Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue, see H.R. REP NO. 85-1706, at 12-27; S. REP. NO.
85-1830, at 15-30, chaired by Judge John Parker, no stranger to the system of corporate
diversity litigation in the 1920s and 1930s. See John J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and
Recent Attacks upon It, 18 A.B.A. J. 433, 434 (1932) (defending diversity jurisdiction
against critics he called “socialists and near socialists”); see also Marcus, supra note 28, at
1262 (describing Parker as a “staunch advocate for both diversity jurisdiction and the
Swift regime”). The Judicial Conference Committee insisted that “local prejudice continues to exist.” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 15; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 18. Tellingly,
however, much of the support it adduced for that proposition in connection with corporations came from the 1920s and 1930s, including the 1932 hearings that Purcell
discusses, see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 242, and a 1922 speech by Chief Justice Taft,
one of the architects of the system of corporate diversity litigation. See H.R. REP. NO.
85-1706, at 16-17; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 19-20; supra text accompanying note 124
(noting then-Judge Taft’s hostility to the tactic of joining nondiverse defendants to defeat removal). What emerges from the Judicial Conference Committee’s report is the
conviction that corporate access to federal courts is essential to “cultivat[ing] a national outlook” and ensuring that “there is the freest communication and intercourse,
with unrestricted flow of capital and commerce into the various parts of the Union.”
H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 16; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 19. To that end corporations
need not only “protection . . . against local prejudice,” but also “the benefit of the salutory rules and practice of the Federal courts.” H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 17; S. REP. NO.
85-1830, at 20.
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of the Local Prejudice Act ten years earlier had suggested.
cell observes, the important thing, rather, was

As Pur-

to recognize the dominant role of large corporations in the nation’s
economy and to accord their activities the time and attention of the national courts. The distinction that Congress drew between local and national corporations—for which it cited no significant evidence—allowed
it for the first time to give its formal blessing to the judicially developed
doctrine of corporate citizenship and to confer on national businesses
the statutory right of access to the federal courts. That policy judgment
was profoundly if subtly different from the traditional premise that justified diversity jurisdiction. In 1958 Congress was not concerned with protecting corporations against the dangers of local prejudice but with
keeping in the hands of the national courts what it regarded as in every
176
realistic sense the basic affairs of the nation.

Purcell’s point about “los[ing] contact with the social history of
177
[diversity jurisdiction and the federal common law]” is, however, far
more telling with respect to Hart than it is with respect to the 1958
Congress. For, as Purcell demonstrates, the system of corporate diversity litigation had been dismantled by 1958. Even if (or perhaps because) it reconceived the function of diversity jurisdiction in accord
with the Court’s actual practice during the system of corporate diversity litigation, Congress in that year did not alter the aspects of prior
law that had bestowed countervailing power on plaintiffs, and it did
not alter any aspect of Erie jurisprudence. Attacks on that jurisprudence are vulnerable to criticism to the extent that they manifest ignorance of the social and institutional contexts that elicited it. The
attacks are more troublesome to the extent that, if successful, they
might so alter the balance of power as to pave the way for a return of
the system of corporate diversity litigation.178
175

See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 238 (“[R]epeal of the local prejudice act dramatically captured the profound ambivalence and ambiguity that continued to underlie diversity jurisdiction.”).
176
Id. at 241.
177
Id. at 239.
178
See Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity
and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1938-44 (2006) [hereinafter Burbank, Aggregation] (rejecting the argument that courts can and should use CAFA as authorization to
fashion federal choice of law rules to govern class actions); infra text accompanying
note 250. Professor Hazard’s contribution to this Symposium seems to me problematic
in both respects. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2008) (interpreting CAFA as a congressional
statement that “the Erie Doctrine is seriously erroneous”). Moreover, to view CAFA as
repealing the Erie doctrine is wishful thinking that is contradicted both by most courts’
unwillingness to interpret CAFA silently to overrule long-standing precedent, see, e.g.,
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IV. DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Federal Class Actions in General and the Revolution of 1966

179

Class actions fascinate scholars, enrich lawyers, and are greeted as
either an instrument of salvation or an engine of destruction by clients. Although of ancient lineage, they have come to play consequential roles in American litigation chiefly within the last forty years.
Their fortunes during that period, moreover, well capture perhaps the
most critical dilemma of modern procedure, that is, how to provide
sufficient access to court in a society that depends heavily upon private
litigation for compensation for injury and the enforcement of important social norms with (1) fidelity to those norms, (2) due attention to
the interests of litigants and others affected by litigation, and (3) adequate attention to the limited capacity of American courts. One view
of the history I will sketch is that we have been fabulously successful in
affording access to court and that we are now experiencing the agonizing reappraisals of those who are the victims of their success.
Like so much in American law and American society, the class ac180
tion can be traced to England, although the parent might deny re181
sponsibility.
Yet, it should not cause surprise that the problem of
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2005) (refusing to
read CAFA as overturning the long-standing rule that the proponent of federal jurisdiction bears the burden of persuasion), and the statute’s legislative history. See Burbank, Aggregation, supra, at 1943 (noting evidence that Congress did not intend to alter
Erie’s federal-state lawmaking balance); infra text accompanying notes 360-361. Without authority in an act of Congress, lower federal courts “lack the freedom of law professors to overrule the Court.” Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor
Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 660 (1985) [hereinafter
Burbank, Afterwords]. Withal, CAFA may support a limited departure from precedent.
See Burbank, Aggregation, supra, at 1949-52 (suggesting that, where state choice of law
rules reflect a bias favoring aggregate litigation, CAFA’s jurisdictional policy may require federal courts to apply federal choice of law rules); infra note 361.
179
This Section draws heavily on Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American
Securities Regulation, in 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL 321 (Dieter
Leipold & Rolf Stürner eds., 1999).
180
For the history of the class action in England and the United States, see
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of
Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998).
181
I am reminded of the (undoubtedly apocryphal) story of Queen Elizabeth II’s
visit to Philadelphia during the Bicentennial of American Independence. Having met
the then–Mayor of Philadelphia, a former police captain by the name of Rizzo, the
Queen is supposed to have remarked, “If this is democracy, I want no part of it.” I can
imagine the Lord Chief Justice saying the same thing about the contemporary American class action.
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determining the rights of groups of people occupied the attention of
English lawyers and judges from very early times. That was, after all, a
society filled with groups—guilds, societies, etc.—and one in which,
for many people, group identity was central to personal identity. In
such a society, it made sense that one who already represented a
group—the Mayor of the City of York, for example-—also should be
able to represent that group in litigation on questions affecting the
182
interests of all equally. Moreover, it was not overly adventurous for
English courts to extend the principle of representation to other
situations in which litigation could not proceed to decision without
affecting the interests of those not before the court. A privateer’s action to divide the spoils of capture is not, in that respect, very different
from a proceeding to settle an estate, and the difference—relative certitude about the identity of those whose interests are affected—cuts in
183
favor of, not against, binding adjudication.
These are the types of cases in which group litigation was permitted in England at the time its wayward child insisted on independence, and they are, roughly, the types of cases in which class actions
were permitted in the United States during most of our history. The
year 1966 is thus as important to American class actions as the year
1066 is to English history. In that year, amendments to the Federal
Rules became effective that, we now know, facilitated, if they did not
initiate, a revolution in the use of group litigation. The formal stated
agenda of the rulemakers in revising Rule 23 was largely uncontroversial. They sought, in connection with Rule 23 as with other joinder
rules (i.e., Rules 19 and 24), to turn federal jurisprudence from abstract inquiries to functional analysis—analysis that considers the practical, as well as the formal legal, effects of litigation. But they also
reconceptualized the categories appropriate for class action treatment

182

See YEAZELL, supra note 180, at 52-69; Mayor of York v. Pilkington, (1737) 25
Eng. Rep. 946 (Ch.) (upholding equity jurisdiction in a suit seeking a bill of peace on
behalf of the residents of York).
183
See YEAZELL, supra note 180, at 182-83 (reviewing British courts’ willingness to
allow suits on behalf of all of a privateer’s crew members in disputes over money due to
the crew); Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 265-67 (1990) (reviewing
YEAZELL, supra note 180) (explaining that courts in the privateer cases respected individual litigants’ rights, only giving the “full benefits and burdens of the suit” to the present class members).
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and specified different procedural requirements depending upon the
184
category.
It was the third category (Rule 23(b)(3)) that has marked the
1966 amendments to Rule 23 as a major event in American legal de185
velopment. Here—remembering that all putative class actions must
satisfy the four requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality,
186
and adequate representation —a court may certify a case as a class
184

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966). The goals of the Advisory Committee can be
found in the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1966 amendments. For further discussion of these amendments, see generally Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note,
10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the
Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L.
REV. 356 (1966).
The first category (Rule 23(b)(1)), where “the prosecution of separate actions by
or against individual members of the class would create a risk” either of “inconsistent
or varying adjudications . . . [that] would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class” or of “adjudications . . . [that] would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties,” pretty accurately
captured the core of traditional class action practice. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1) (1966);
see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842-43 (1999) (noting that Rule
23(b)(1) was designed to stay close to the “historical model”); infra note 185.
The second category (Rule 23(b)(2)), where “the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,” FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(2) (1966), while somewhat further removed from that core, was still within its
conceptual reach. Moreover, both the published and unpublished material of the
drafters make clear their intention to enlist the revised rule in the struggle for racial
equality that was then the dominant social issue in the United States. Thus, the primary illustration of the new subdivision was “various actions in the civil-rights field
where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note (1966).
185
The Supreme Court described the development of this Rule as follows:
Although the Committee crafted all three subdivisions of the Rule in general,
practical terms, without the formalism that had bedeviled the original Rule 23,
the Committee was consciously retrospective with intent to codify pre-Rule
categories under Rule 23(b)(1), not forward-looking as it was in anticipating
innovations under Rule 23(b)(3).
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842 (citation omitted); see also id. at 861-62 (“[I]t was also the Court’s
understanding that the Rule’s growing edge for that purpose [mass tort litigation]
would be the opt-out class authorized by subdivision (b)(3) . . . .”); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (“In the 1966 class-action amendments, Rule
23(b)(3), the category at issue here, was ‘the most adventuresome’ innovation.”).
186
Rule 23(a) provides that
one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
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action if it finds that “the questions of law or fact common to the class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available meth187
If the
ods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
court does so certify, the rule requires that notice be given to the
members of the class and that they thereby be given an opportunity to
188
opt out of the action, avoiding its preclusive effects.
There has been much debate about the goals of the drafters of
Rule 23(b)(3). Study of the published and unpublished material relating to their work persuades me that, although they did not foresee,
and could not have foreseen, all of the effects of this change, they
were aware that they were breaking new ground and that those effects
might be substantial. Seeking to ensure that members of a class would
be bound by an adverse judgment as well as benefit from one that was
189
favorable, the drafters recognized that Rule 23(b)(3) would enable
those with small claims for whom individual litigation would be economically irrational to band together in group litigation against a
190
common adversary. But for most people so situated, notice and an

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
187
FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
188
FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
189
See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The 1966
amendments were designed, in part . . . to assure that members of the class would be
identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and
judgments.”).
190
See Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 684 (1997). As the
Court has indicated,
The use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may
offer substantial advantages for named plaintiffs; it may motivate them to
bring cases that for economic reasons might not be brought otherwise.
Plainly there has been a growth of litigation stimulated by contingent-fee
agreements and an enlargement of the role this type of fee arrangement has
played in vindicating the rights of individuals who otherwise might not consider it worth the candle to embark on litigation in which the optimum result
might be more than consumed by the cost. The prospect of such fee arrangements offers advantages for litigation by named plaintiffs in class actions
as well as for their attorneys. For better or worse, the financial incentive that
class actions offer to the legal profession is a natural outgrowth of the increas-
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opportunity to opt out are hardly important, which raises the question
why the drafters attached those procedural incidents to this subdivision and not to the others.
On this question the unpublished record is fascinating, revealing
that the right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class and the notice system
necessary to effect it were added very late in the drafting process.
Prior to that decision, the draft rule had made the provision of notice
191
discretionary. The Advisory Committee settled on notice and opt-out
rights to meet the expressed concern that (b)(3) classes might be used
by class counsel, in league with defendants, to force those with substan192
tial individual claims into group litigation inimical to their interests.
This account of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23(b)(3) suggests
that, where the amended Rule went beyond the traditional uses of the
class action, it did so because of the drafters’ desire to enlist procedure in an effort to facilitate access to court for those for whom individual litigation was prohibitively expensive. In addition, the drafters
were intent to equalize the risks of benefit and burden and to take advantage of the potential of the class action to reduce aggregate litiga-

ing reliance on the “private attorney general” for the vindication of legal
rights; obviously this development has been facilitated by Rule 23.
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 338 n.9 (describing the facilitation of negative-value
claims as “a central concept of Rule 23”); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388, 403 (1980) (“This ‘right’ [to have a class certified if the Rule’s requirements are
met] is more analogous to the private attorney general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to satisfy the ‘personal stake’ requirement.”); Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (“Rule 23 . . . provides for class actions that may enhance the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine
their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.”).
191
Professor Kaplan explained this discretionary notice provision to his colleagues
on the Advisory Committee as follows:
Then we have subdivision (d), which reminds the court of the artillery of orders that can be made in a class suit, and attention is called notably to the possibility of orders requiring notice to be given to the class. Of course, notice
may be useful in any given number of different directions. I cite only one: to
make sure that the representation[] is adequate, or as an invitation to intervene in order that the class be properly represented, or that a sub-class within
the class receive proper protection.
Proceedings of Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (Oct.
31–Nov. 2, 1963) (statement of Benjamin Kaplan) (on file with author).
192
See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 684 & n.34. The history of settlement classes suggests that, in this respect at least, the drafters of the 1966 amendments
had more foresight than is normally accorded them. See infra text accompanying notes
229-230.
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tion expense. Finally, we see that concern about the implications of
their handiwork for access to court also played a crucial role in the
innovation of notice and opportunity to opt out that is required in
(b)(3) class actions, but that the concern was possible use of the device to foreclose, rather than to open up, access.
B. The Supreme Court Leads a Counterrevolution
It is perhaps inevitable that courts will interpret jurisdictional statutes with attention to their own institutional interests. The Supreme
Court, for example, narrowed the apparent reach of the general federal question statute shortly after it was enacted in 1875.193 It did not
take long for the Court to realize the impact that amended Rule 23
could have on the federal caseload and to deploy interpretations of
the diversity statute in self-defense.
In an environment of proliferating statutory law and of greater
competition within the legal profession, the potential of the 1966
amendments both to serve the purposes espied by the drafters and to
enrich attorneys was quickly realized. There followed a period of
rapid growth in filings, of paeans, and of equally fervent denuncia194
Painted over a legal landscape that had previously known
tions.
them only in the corners, class actions soon occupied the foreground.

193

See, e.g., Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 202-04 (1877) (setting
forth the well-pleaded complaint rule). For early cases imposing other restrictive interpretations on the statutory “arising under” language, see WRIGHT & KANE, supra
note 32, at 102-10. As Purcell explains,
[T]he principal reason for the Court’s abrupt decision to establish the plaintiff’s pleading rule was most likely the belief that cutting federal question removal was a necessary trade-off to balance the swollen caseload that would result from the Court’s contemporaneous decisions that expanded the
opportunities of corporate tort defendants to remove diversity suits.
PURCELL, supra note 107, at 271.
194
See generally Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). In 1981, the Supreme Court observed:
Class actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice. They
present, however, opportunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and
counsel in the management of cases. Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a
class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel
and parties.
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1981) (footnote omitted).
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A major dilemma was presented by what our economist friends call
195
inefficient overenforcement.
Although Americans seem to abhor legal wrong without legal
remedy as nature abhors a vacuum, rules of substantive law enforceable through private litigation were traditionally framed using a
model of individual litigation. Too often it has not been clear
196
In
whether the lawmaker contemplated even private enforcement.
such a world, the economic irrationality of individual enforcement
may be understood not as a problem to be solved but as the contem197
Class actions can change that
plated price of economic progress.
198
calculus.
And so they did in the 1970s, prompting Congress to amend some
statutes where the fit was notoriously imperfect, such as the Truth in
199
Lending Act, and prompting the Supreme Court to use its control

195

See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 52-53 (1975).
196
See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 143-44 (5th ed. 2001) (“The most persistently controverted issue concerning actions arising under federal law is whether a federal statute creating a duty also
implies a private right of action.”).
197
I have previously elaborated this suggestion:
[I]t seems entirely possible that—prior to the introduction of the small claims
class action—a legislature may have been aware, and (collectively) content,
that in some circumstances the right and its attendant statutory remedy were
worth only the paper on which they were written. Indeed, perhaps the legislature was counting on the complex of other laws and institutions that determine whether rights can be vindicated to serve as filters. That view appears
particularly plausible with respect to a legislature that has sought only selectively to change one of the most important such filters—the market for legal
services—by providing for an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
It is also a view that will be familiar to those who have studied foreign legal systems in which rights often go unenforced through private litigation and may
not be enforced at all.
Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1929 (footnote omitted).
198
As Justice Powell observed,
At the very least, the result should be consistent with the substantive law giving
rise to the claim. Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law
of usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of usury claims, the
Court’s concern for compensation of putative class members in this case is at
best misplaced and at worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling Act.
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 355 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
199
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2000); see also Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. IV, 88 Stat. 1500, 151721 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3, 90 Stat. 197, 197-98 (1976). For more recent
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of the interpretation of federal jurisdiction statutes measurably to reduce the impact of Rule 23 by keeping out of federal court small state
200
law class actions. In Snyder v. Harris and Zahn v. International Paper
201
Co., the Court refused to permit aggregation of the claims of class
members to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement in the diversity statute and interpreted that requirement to apply to the claims
of all members of the class, named and unnamed. Neither decision
was foreordained, as there was precedent that could have been in202
voked to support the contrary result. Indeed, the Court’s refusal to
permit absent members of the class to ride on the coattails of their
named representative for this purpose sat quite uneasily with the con203
tinuing willingness to ignore the citizenship of such members. For,
like corporations, classes enjoy privileged access to federal court
through a fiction that eases satisfaction of the requirement of complete diversity. In any event, that the Court was consciously making
policy was clear from the tenor of the opinions, although the policy

amendments affecting class actions, see the Truth in Lending Class Action Relief Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, 109 Stat. 161 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640). The original
legislation, enacted at a time when the general federal question statute imposed an
amount-in-controversy requirement (which was eliminated in 1980), contained a targeted jurisdictional grant that did not impose such a requirement. See Consumer
Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 130(e), 82 Stat. 146, 157 (1968).
200
394 U.S. 332 (1969).
201
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
202
See id. at 308-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Snyder, 394 U.S. at 348-49 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting); Marcus, supra note 26, at 1773-75. Note also the suggestion that Snyder ignores the possibility “that the controlling amount is either the value to the plaintiff or
the cost to the defendant, whichever is higher.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J.
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1482 (5th ed. 2003).
203
See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 355 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the promulgation of
the old Rule 23 provided a new means for resolving in a single federal litigation, based
on diversity jurisdiction, the claims of all members of a class, even though some in the
class were not of diverse citizenship from parties on the other side.”); Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921). In a very interesting recent article,
Professor Pfander questions the pedigree of doctrine extending Ben-Hur’s treatment of
diversity jurisdiction to cases certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See James F. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of Article III, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1423,
1454-59 (2007); id. at 1456 n.147 (“As part of its expression of policy concerns, the majority opinion of Justice Black [in Snyder] described the docket-expanding potential of
the [Ben-Hur] rule as if it applied to all class actions; the opinion failed to distinguish
between the spurious or (b)(3) actions at issue in Snyder and the true class action that,
in Cauble itself, had been seen as justifying the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.”).
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sought to be served related to the workload of the federal courts, not
204
to the enforcement of state law.
A federal judge applied the epithet “Frankenstein monster” to a
205
securities law class action in the late 1960s, and that case elicited a
use of the Supreme Court’s interpretive powers to cut back on smallclaims federal law class actions as it had cut back on small-claims state
206
The mechanism for doing so was
law (i.e., diversity) class actions.
Rule 23(c)(2)’s requirement that, in an action maintained under Rule
23(b)(3), the court “direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
207
The
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”
Court held that the representatives of a putative class (or more realistically, their lawyers) must pay for sending such individual notice to
208
(in Eisen, millions of) reasonably identifiable class members and, in
another securities law case, that they must usually pay the cost of iden209
tifying its recipients.
These decisions, too, were not foreordained, and, although admittedly less transparent than the diversity class action decisions, may
have masked concerns not only about workload but about issues of social policy that largely escaped notice in 1966, including both positive
and normative questions regarding the respective roles of administrative and private enforcement of the securities laws and, more gener210
ally, the goals of civil process. Certainly, in any event, controversy at
204

Broader reform efforts, whether legislative or judicial, foundered on widely
shared awareness, as a result of experience under the 1966 amendments, that class action reform has predictable substantive implications and hence attracts well-defined
and well-financed interest groups. See Miller, supra note 194, at 684-93.
205
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen II ), 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968).
206
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen III ), 417 U.S. 156 (1974). I have never
believed that this decision can plausibly be read as an interpretation of the Due Process Clause rather than of Rule 23. Its vulnerability as an interpretation of either, in the
context of a negative-value class action, is enhanced by knowledge of the drafting history recounted above. See supra text accompanying notes 189-192.
207
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (1966).
208
Eisen III, 417 U.S. at 178-79.
209
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359-63 (1978).
210
See Hal S. Scott, Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 337 (1971); Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV.
937, 940-45 (1975) (noting that Eisen II and Eisen III resulted from the normative judgment that the purpose of class actions should be to compensate individuals rather than
to change behavior). Justice Douglas’s dissent in Eisen III framed the issue in terms of
the more general goals of the civil litigation process:
I think in our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to be innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures who would go
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the time centered on class actions seeking recovery on behalf of thousands or millions of investors, each one of whom could allege only a
small amount of damage but whose damages in aggregate were substantial indeed.
Decisions like Eisen III may have dampened the enthusiasm of the
class action bar, but in an increasingly sophisticated and competitive
211
environment —I refer to the legal profession, not financial markets—they could not for long restrain the entrepreneurial zeal of
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Pooling resources and using the proceeds of successful litigation to fund other litigation, the securities class action bar
was not about to be deterred by the requirement that they frontload
212
resources in promising “investments,” that is to say, litigation.
As a result of the Supreme Court’s efforts to discipline the effects
of Rule 23, and of other developments in the broader American legal
culture, the frenzy of the 1970s yielded to a period, lasting through
the 1980s, of relative quiescence. Indeed, in 1989, Stephen Yeazell,
the foremost American historian of the class action, posed the ques-

begging for justice without the class action but who could with all regard to
due process be protected by it. Some of these are consumers whose claims
may seem de minimis but who alone have no practical recourse for either remuneration or injunctive relief. . . . Or the unnamed individual may be only a
ratepayer being excessively charged by a utility, or a homeowner whose assessment is slowly rising beyond his ability to pay.
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small claimant has
against those who command the status quo. I would strengthen his hand with
the view of creating a system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as
to those liberally endowed with power and wealth.
Eisen III, 417 U.S. at 185-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
211
See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with
the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 938-46 (1993).
212
There is, of course, a vigorous debate about what made the investment promising, that is, whether the merits mattered in private securities class actions or whether
simply filing the suit as a class action was sufficient to induce a settlement. Compare
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499-501 (1991) (concluding that, in a “significant and identifiable class of settlements,” the merits have “little or nothing to do with determining
the amount of the settlement”), with James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 503-04 (1997) (criticizing and ultimately rejecting Alexander’s study and conclusion that the merits do not matter). For more recent work on
this question, see, for example, Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions,
57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1476-1507 (2004), which summarizes recent empirical evidence; Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007), which finds that the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act increased the correlation “between litigation and both
earnings restatements and abnormal insider selling.” Id. at 627.
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tion whether his entire legal career had been spent studying some213
thing about to become extinct.
He need not have worried. What I have called “the broader
American legal culture” is sensitive to changes in the economy and in
the locus of political power. Yet, although the economy and politics
help to explain both the Phoenix-like rebirth of the class action as a
litigation force and its return to center stage as a subject of reform
debate, they do not provide the entire explanation. Three related
phenomena seem to me especially important: federal mass tort and
settlement class actions, the growth of class action practice in state
courts, and the resulting phenomenon of overlapping federal and
state class actions.
C. Mass Tort

214

and Settlement Classes in Federal Court

Recall that the drafters of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 added
the requirement of notice and an opportunity to opt out in Rule
23(b)(3) class actions in response to the expressed fear that, otherwise, that category might become a tool of defendants and class coun215
sel to deprive individuals of the benefits of individual litigation. In
part for the same reason, the Advisory Committee Note accompanying
the amendments expressed the view that class certification under Rule
23(b)(3) would rarely be appropriate in “mass accident” cases, cases
involving a common disaster such as a hotel fire, bridge collapse, or
the like.216 And for many years one did not find many certified mass
tort class actions in federal court, and certainly not many involving

213

See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 685 & n.40. Also in 1989, the Supreme Court observed that “Rule 23 . . . has inspired a controversy over the philosophical, social, and economic merits and demerits of class actions.” Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 n.19 (1989).
214
“Mass tort” is a category that is differently formulated depending on the
speaker. See Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts,
26 REV. LITIG. 883, 890-91 (2007). I use it “to describe a large number of tort claims
arising out of the same factual circumstances and alleging the same or similar injuries,”
id. at 890, including both mass accidents and so-called “mass toxic torts” such as
“claims arising out of exposure to asbestos, Agent Orange, and use of pharmaceutical
products.” Id.
215
See supra text accompanying notes 190-192.
216
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action
because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability
and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different
ways.”); see also Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 684 & n.35.
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widely dispersed injuries apparently caused by common agents such as
217
pharmaceutical drugs.
Because most tort law is state law, those seeking to bring mass tort
class actions in federal court are required to satisfy the requirements
of diversity jurisdiction. From the perspective of the plaintiff class, the
major jurisdictional hurdle confronting other (diversity) state law class
actions—meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement as interpreted in Snyder and Zahn—was not likely to be a problem even before
218
the supplemental jurisdiction statute was found to overrule Zahn.
The problem lay elsewhere. Following a few mass tort class certifica219
tions that survived appellate review, the federal courts of appeals
began to insist on careful attention to the requirements of Rule
220
23(b)(3). This ultimately proved fatal to most attempted multistate
class actions, including but not limited to mass tort class actions. Absent a persuasive showing that, under the governing state choice of
law rules, the claims of class members would be governed by the law of
only one state, or perhaps of a few—and quite apart from factual dif-

217

Eventually, however, the federal courts became more hospitable to mass accident class actions, at least those governed by the law of only one state.
218
See supra text accompanying notes 36-39. This was particularly true in cases
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages.
219
See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Sch.
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008-11 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986);
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re “Agent Orange”
Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987);
Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 858, 866-71 (1995) (discussing mass tort cases in which the class action had
been used). Professor Hensler’s recent article on the future of mass toxic torts contains an extremely useful table listing all of the “thirty-five product-related mass personal injury litigations that arose between 1960 and the late 1990s,” Hensler, supra note
214, at 896, that had been uncovered by two previous studies and by her additional research. See id. at 897-903. She summarized as follows:
Half (seventeen) of the mass personal injury litigations identified by the studies were consolidated and transferred to a single federal court under the
multi-district statute. Only one-third (twelve) were resolved wholly or to a significant degree by a class action settlement, although class certification was
sought and denied (or granted but then vacated by appellate action) in a larger number, and in two instances class actions settled a small fraction of cases
(asbestos) or related litigation (Dalkon Shield).
Id. at 903. Two of the twelve listed settled class actions were state court cases. See id. at
901.
220
Under Rule 23(b)(3), in order to certify the class the court must find “that the
questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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ferences among those claims—the federal appellate courts came to
the view that mass tort class actions could not satisfy the predomi221
nance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). In the process, the federal appellate courts developed a healthy respect for the
222
“likely difficulties in managing a class action,” and refused to treat
223
Moreover,
trial as a fiction in a world dominated by settlements.
federal appellate courts have increasingly insisted that certification
decisions be based on an inquiry that gets beneath the allegations of
224
the complaint, even if that inquiry overlaps with the merits. Finally,
since the advent of discretionary interlocutory appeals of class certifi225
cation decisions in 1998, federal appellate courts have been in a better position both to develop class action jurisprudence and to police
adherence to it by the district courts.

221

See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1996); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 624-34 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069,
1084-86 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th
Cir. 1995); Marcus, supra note 28, at 1282-86, 1305-08; Linda Silberman, The Role of
Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2007-11 (2008) (exploring cases in which circuit courts have denied mass tort class certification). Amchem,
one of the three federal appellate decisions Professor Marcus singles out as influential,
see Marcus, supra note 28, at 1285-86, involved a settlement class. See infra text accompanying notes 228-238.
222
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D); see also, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288
F.3d 1012, 1018-20 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a single nationwide class would be
unmanageable because the case would need to apply different law for the residents of
each state and because there were many distinct factual issues); Castano, 84 F.3d at 743-44.
223
See, e.g., In re Masonite Corp. Hardboard Siding Prods. Liab. Litig., 170 F.R.D.
417, 421 (E.D. La. 1997) (“Differences among state laws . . . can combine with fact differences . . . , making the class model unmanageable and inefficient.”); id. at 423
(“[T]his Court cannot imagine managing a trial under the law of 51 jurisdictions on
the defectiveness of Masonite siding.”); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods.
Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 350 (D.N.J. 1997) (noting that “plaintiffs have the burden
of designing a workable plan for trial embracing all claims and defenses prior to class
certification”).
224
See, e.g., In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he obligation
to make such determinations [regarding Rule 23 requirements] is not lessened by
overlap between a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issue . . . .”); Szabo v. Bridgeport
Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is not possible to evaluate impending difficulties without making a choice of law, and not possible to make a sound
choice of law without . . . mak[ing] a preliminary inquiry into the merits.”); Castano, 84
F.3d at 744 (stating that “[g]oing beyond the pleadings is necessary” to properly reach
a certification decision).
225
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). “By the mid-1990s, defendants in class actions began
to favor federal courts, just as plaintiffs once did. Conversely, many plaintiffs’ lawyers
began to prefer state courts.” Morrison, supra note 9, at 1526 (footnote omitted).
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For a time, however, it appeared that one type of class action
might escape the growing skepticism of the federal courts about
multistate class actions. The occasion for hope came in asbestos litigation, which inundated American courts, state and federal, in the
1980s, and which, after a certain period, became “mature” in the
sense that the underlying facts concerning the defendants’ conduct
were known, the legal questions had been litigated to death, the values of cases were well established, and each additional case was, in
226
many respects, a rerun of hundreds of others. Yet, the asbestos cases
in the federal courts seemed to defy efficient resolution, as federal
judges tried first one and then another technique to spare themselves
and litigants the extraordinary expense and delay of the traditional
treatment, while Congress turned a deaf ear to repeated pleas for a
legislative solution. One of the techniques that proved largely unavail227
ing was class actions for litigation. But something changed.
Companies that had previously reviled the class action came to see
it, or at least one form of it, as a potential instrument of salvation, and
so did many federal judges. I refer to the so-called settlement class action, involving in its most familiar form the virtually simultaneous filing of a class action and of a proposed settlement. Here, it was hoped,
was a vehicle by which plaintiffs could secure prompt relief at less cost
and mass tort defendants could receive a comprehensive resolution of
a litigation problem that might otherwise consume years, if not dec-

226

See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 659 (1989).
227
See supra text accompanying notes 219-220. Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,
782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986), was an unusual case both because it involved only claims
previously filed in Texas and because the court of appeals seemed intent on using the
occasion to chastise Congress for failing to provide a legislative solution for the asbestos crisis and perhaps to scare it into action by foreshadowing the extent to which that
crisis was forcing departures from the traditional approach to litigation:
Courts have usually avoided class actions in the mass accident or tort setting.
Because of differences between individual plaintiffs on issues of liability and
defenses of liability, as well as damages, it has been feared that separate trials
would overshadow the common disposition for the class. The courts are now
being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current volume
of litigation and more frequent mass disasters. If Congress leaves us to our
own devices, we may be forced to abandon repetitive hearings and arguments
for each claimant’s attorney to the extent enjoyed by the profession in the past.
Id. at 473 (citations omitted); see also id. (“Necessity moves us to change and invent.”).
As we shall see, the Fifth Circuit’s cri de coeur was not unique. See infra note 238.
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ades. For defendants seeking “global peace,” the settlement class ac228
tion seemed just the thing.
There had been many settlement class actions in other areas, including the securities area, before the technique was tried in the as229
Those cases revealed potential abuses of the sort
bestos litigation.
that concerned the Advisory Committee in the 1960s, since in some of
the cases it appeared that class counsel had sold out the class to defendants anxious to purchase quick and global peace on the cheap.
And both the flowering of settlement class actions and the perception
of abuses played a role in the Advisory Committee’s decision to reexamine Rule 23, a process that continued for more than a decade and
that, until 2003, yielded only the amendment authorizing discretion230
ary interlocutory appellate review of class certification decisions.
Also affecting the timing and content of the Advisory Committee’s
work were the Supreme Court’s decisions in two cases involving attempts to resolve asbestos litigation through the mechanism of the set231
232
tlement class action. In both cases, Amchem and Ortiz, the attempt
was unsuccessful. Moreover, the Court left seriously in doubt the circumstances in which settlement classes could be certified and settlements approved in mass tort class actions—indeed, in any multistate
class action involving numerous different state laws. Although the
Court in Amchem disagreed with the Third Circuit’s view that manageability is as much a concern in considering certification of a settle-

228

See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 190, at 685-88.
See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 146 (1996).
230
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also supra text accompanying note 225. One reason
for the paucity of amendments during this period is that for a time the rulemakers
were waiting for the report of the ad hoc Working Group on Mass Torts appointed by
the Chief Justice. The report was made public in early 1999. See ADVISORY COMM. ON
CIVIL RULES & WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION
(1999). It recommended the creation of a follow-on body to make concrete recommendations for change, id. at 67-70, a recommendation that Chief Justice Rehnquist
treated with neglect the quality of which (benign or not?) may be inferred from subsequent developments. The creation of the Working Group, in any event, can be seen to
reflect the judiciary’s awareness that mass torts present special problems, some of
which are not amenable to solutions by court rule.
231
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-25 (1997) (affirming a
reversal of a judgment that approved a settlement, on the ground that the case could
not properly be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)).
232
See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999) (reversing the approval of a settlement on the ground that the case could not properly be certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
229
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ment class as it is when a litigation class is in question, the Court gave
234
even greater prominence to the requirement of predominance.
Moreover, the Court’s treatment of the requirement that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
235
237
class” in both Amchem236 and Ortiz highlighted the difficulties of
structuring class actions so as to avoid possible conflicts without creating
238
so many subclasses as to make the case unmanageable.

233

See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-20. But see id. (“But, as we earlier observed, the
Court of Appeals in fact did not ignore the settlement . . . .” (citation omitted)).
234
See id. at 622-25. In my view, treating predominance as a basic structural protection instead of the warrant of efficiency that the rulemakers intended was an error
that may have been caused by the Court’s determination to avoid some of the thorny
constitutional questions that the case presented, including in particular questions relating to so-called “futures”—people who had not manifested adverse physical consequences from their occupational exposure to asbestos or, less plausibly in that particular context, were not even aware that they had been exposed. See generally Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901 (2000).
235
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
236
521 U.S. at 625-28.
237
527 U.S. at 856-59.
238
Professor Nagareda has described the resulting incentives: “With the prospects
for class settlements in the mass tort area dimmed, if not entirely extinguished, by the
Court’s decisions, the new terrain for peacemaking predictably has shifted outward in
both directions—to aggregate settlements on the immediate left and to Chapter 11
reorganizations on the immediate right.” Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript at 26-27) (footnote omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1014659. The directional language refers to a schematic moving from purely
private on the left to purely public on the right. In the omitted footnote, Professor
Nagareda discusses the settlement class approved in the Diet Drugs (Fen-Phen) litigation, noting the practical problems plaguing its implementation. See id. (manuscript at
26 n.117); see also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 498, 506-07 (E.D. Pa.
2005). But note studies showing that, although federal mass tort (personal injury and
property damage) class action filings declined after Amchem, they increased after Ortiz,
and that such filings remained more or less constant from 2001 through 2005. See
Hensler, supra note 214, at 910. Finally, note Hensler’s data on “mass toxic torts of the
2000s.” See id. at 912, 913 tbl.2 (finding only two mass tort federal class actions, one of
them partial, in nine litigations).
Even though Amchem’s analysis is not confined to the domain of mass torts, the Third
Circuit was at pains to call attention to the fact that a settlement class action before it did
not involve either a mass tort or “futures.” See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 1998). The review it afforded the district court’s
choice of law, and hence that court’s predominance analysis, was hardly searching. See
id. at 315. The explanation may lie in Judge Scirica’s cris de coeur, which are reminiscent
of Jenkins, see supra note 227, and might be thought to have invited legislation like CAFA:
It may be argued that problems national in scope deserve the attention of national courts when there is appropriate federal jurisdiction. Because of the
extraordinary number of claims, fairness counsels that plaintiffs similarly in-
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D. State Court Class Actions
The discovery in the mid-1990s that the class action data generated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts were unreliable has prompted the Federal Judicial Center to begin to fill the
239
empirical vacuum with data based on docket studies. I am aware of
no reliable data, historical or current, concerning state court class ac240
We do
tions, and I doubt that reliable data exist for most states.
know, however, that most states have used Rule 23 as the model for
their own class action provisions, and it seems safe to assume that class
actions did not become, if they ever have been, a major player in litigation in any state’s courts until some years after 1966. Indeed, given
Purcell’s reminder that since the 1950s the federal courts had become
241
an attractive forum for plaintiffs, and the fact that the class action
revolution started in the federal courts, one would have expected no
great urgency to follow the federal model were it not for the counterrevolution led by the Supreme Court.
As we have seen, the Court’s decisions in Snyder and Zahn closed
the door of the federal courthouse to cases seeking relief under state
jured by the same course of deceptive conduct should receive similar results
with respect to liability and damages.
In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 290.
From a policy standpoint, it can be argued that national (interstate) class actions are the paradigm for federal diversity jurisdiction because, in a constitutional sense, they implicate interstate commerce, foreclose discrimination by a
local state, and tend to guard against any bias against interstate enterprises.
Yet there are strong countervailing arguments that, at least under the current
jurisdictional statutes, such class actions may be beyond the reach of the federal courts.
Id. at 305.
239
See Willging et al., supra note 229, at 178-79. This is tedious and time-intensive
work. The task has, however, become greatly simplified with the conversion of the federal courts to electronic case files. The FJC’s studies of experience under CAFA, see
Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1743-62, are critical to an evaluation of the impact of
that legislation on the workload of the federal courts. It may be impossible to replicate
that research for the state courts, although CAFA supporters have presented some
data concerning so-called “judicial hellholes.” See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson
Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
143, 160-68 (2001); infra note 367.
240
See Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1763 (“The lack of state court data on class
actions stems from multiple sources, including the lack of necessary resources to collect the data in the state systems and the lack of common computerized case management systems.”). But see id. at 1748 n.84 (referencing preliminary data from California).
241
See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 240-43; supra text accompanying note 169.
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law in which there were not sufficient putative class members with
claims meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement of the diversity
242
By 1973 (at
statute to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s numerosity requirement.
the latest), therefore, would-be counsel for such groups had an incentive to seek changes in state law that would enable the maintenance of
243
Moreover, they could expect a favorable
these cases in state court.
response from those responsible for the rules of procedure in many
states, whether because the lawmakers shared the aspirations of the
244
Advisory Committee that wrote the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 or,
perhaps more commonly, because their practice was generally to follow the federal model.
Once class action treatment on the federal model became widely
available in the state courts, it is likely (but in the absence of reliable
data one can hardly be confident) that for many years most of the
cases brought there were those to which Snyder and Zahn had closed
245
the federal courthouse, that is, small-claims state law class actions.
Eventually, however, departures from the federal model, in the language of the governing state law provision or its interpretation, might
lead class counsel (who had a choice) to select state court. So too
might the general constellation of rules and institutional practices
that, after Erie and its progeny, still affected choice between a state
and federal forum.

242

See supra text accompanying notes 199-204.
For the dates when states that acted in response to the 1966 amendments did
so, see infra Appendix. As suggested below, probably the most common reason states
followed the model of amended Rule 23 was their general practice of following the
Federal Rules. In that regard, eight of the eleven states that embraced the 1966 Rule
23 amendments between 1966 and 1971, and nine of the twelve states that did so between 1970 and 1974, were found to be “replica” states in a 1986 study. Compare John
B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1986) (listing the twenty-three jurisdictions—twenty-two states and the District of Columbia—that “meet all nine of our
criteria for systematic replication of the Federal Rules”), with infra text accompanying
notes 416-445 (listing the states adopting class action rules similar to the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule 23 between 1966 and 1971 and between 1970 and 1974). In
other words, seventeen of twenty-two “replica” states had followed the federal lead on
class actions by 1974.
244
Note in that regard another major innovation of the 1966 amendments, the
(b)(2) class for injunctive relief, the major animating purpose of which—the facilitation of civil rights class actions—is discussed supra note 184.
245
See Cabraser et al., supra note 29, at 399 (“But ‘small claims’ consumer class actions have typically proceeded in the state courts, because each class member did not
have the requisite $75,000 in damages to trigger federal jurisdiction.”).
243
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Two sets of rules that are not supposed to affect that choice
(unless Congress otherwise provides) are the rules respecting personal
jurisdiction and choice of law. The force of the mandate for vertical
uniformity was long clearer as to the latter than the former. But the
1993 overhaul of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should have put any doubts about the requirement of jurisdictional
246
Similarly, a peruniformity to rest, particularly in diversity cases.
emptory per curiam opinion insisting on the application of state
247
choice of law rules in diversity cases settled the continuing vitality of
248
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. Doubts on that score
may have been due to the fact that Klaxon was an object of scorn by
249
Henry Hart and remains unpopular in some academic circles today.
Klaxon’s continuing vitality is instead both unremarkable and wholly
defensible, albeit not constitutionally required. Or at least it is for one
who understands the Court’s goal of dismantling the system of corpo250
rate diversity litigation.
Klaxon did nothing, however, to discipline state choice of law, a
task that the Court had undertaken in the 1920s and 1930s, only to
abandon it because the constitutional tools—due process and full
251
For a time in the
faith and credit—were not adequate to the task.
late 1970s and early 1980s, it appeared that the Court was revisiting
the question whether the Constitution might provide more robust
federal protection against state court overreaching that encouraged
interstate forum shopping through both aggressive assertions of personal jurisdiction and aggressive applications of forum law. As it

246

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Given the Court’s peculiar decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), see infra text accompanying notes 257-264,
this statement requires refinement to the extent that adjudication of the claims of absent class members is thought to present a problem of personal jurisdiction. Whatever
the merits of the Court’s approach in state court litigation, it has no bearing on litigation in federal court. See infra note 259.
247
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1975).
248
313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that federal courts in diversity cases must apply
the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit).
249
See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513-15 (1954); supra text accompanying notes 173 and 177.
250
See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1938-44 (commenting on Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class
Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006)); supra text accompanying note
178. For a very useful summary of academic reactions to Klaxon by successors of Hart
who question his views about that case, see FALLON, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note
202, at 636-42.
251
See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
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turned out, a 1981 decision by a badly fractured Court revealed that
the prospects for robust protection in the choice of law realm had not
252
On the other hand, starting in 1977, the
changed since the 1930s.
Court issued a series of decisions evidently aimed at curbing aggressive assertions of personal jurisdiction, through interpretations of the
Due Process Clause.
Unfortunately, however, most of the cases that the Court chose for
the latter purpose did not involve problematic interstate forum shopping in any meaningful sense, whether or not one agrees with the
Court’s conclusions concerning the constitutionality of the exercises
253
of jurisdiction. This is not surprising to the extent that, like Interna-

252

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981). Nor have those
prospects changed since 1981. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003)
(“In light of this experience, we abandoned the balancing-of-interests approach to conflicts of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” (citing Hague, 449 U.S. at 308
n.10)); id. at 499 (“Without a rudder to steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of balancing coordinate States’ competing sovereign interests to resolve
conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”). It is, of course, a separate
question whether the Court should have assimilated the sovereign-immunity question
in Hyatt to the choice of law questions presented in those earlier cases.
253
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) ( jurisdiction permitted)
(wife who, with husband’s consent, moved to California with children upon separation
and sued there for divorce and alimony); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (Taiwanese defendant in state court
action brought after a motorcycle accident in the forum state impleaded Japanese
component-part manufacturer); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)
( jurisdiction permitted) (plaintiff franchisor sued Michigan franchisee in Florida, the
franchisor’s state of incorporation and corporate headquarters, for breach of franchise
agreement containing Florida choice of law clause); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984) ( jurisdiction permitted) (plaintiff brought libel suit in her home state, where
she likely sustained the greatest injury); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (plaintiffs sought damages in Oklahoma for accident in that state, where they were hospitalized); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (plaintiff sought domestication
and modification in California of Haitian divorce decree after she had moved to California following separation, and after defendant had subsequently consented to
daughter moving to California to live with her mother); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977) ( jurisdiction not permitted) (shareholder brought derivative action in
Delaware against officers and directors of a Delaware corporation on the basis of acts
in other states that caused financial damage to the corporation, treating defendants’
stock and stock options as property for quasi in rem purposes). But see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) ( jurisdiction permitted) (libel suit in New
Hampshire by resident of New York, after initial suit against Ohio corporation in Ohio
was barred by the state’s statute of limitations); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)
( jurisdiction not permitted) (plaintiff brought suit in after-acquired domicile of Minnesota for accident-related injuries sustained in Indiana, where the plaintiff then lived,
by treating the defendant’s insurance policy as property located in Minnesota). Note
that World-Wide Volkswagen was an instance of state-federal forum shopping, rather than
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tional Shoe itself, the cases in question involved assertions of specific
254
jurisdiction, as to which the Court’s 1945 decision may have been
255
calculated to reduce rather than increase interstate forum shopping.
It is therefore even more unfortunate, and it is surprising, that “problematic interstate forum shopping” also was not involved in the two
post-1945 cases in which the Court has analyzed the limitations that
due process imposes on state court assertions of general doingbusiness jurisdiction. As a result, one of the most dubious tools of interstate forum shopping by plaintiffs remains in play, in class actions
as in ordinary litigation.256
Even before the growing skepticism of federal courts about multistate (particularly, but not exclusively, mass tort) class actions provided a powerful incentive for class counsel (who had a choice) to opt
for state courts—that is, at a time when state courts were (probably)

interstate forum shopping. Deep-pocket diverse defendants financed appellate litigation by their nondiverse codefendants in the hope that the latter would be dismissed
from a lawsuit in a plaintiff-friendly state court, enabling removal by the diverse defendants to federal court (an ultimately successful strategy that eluded Justice Blackmun).
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 317 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (admitting that he
was “somewhat puzzled why the plaintiffs . . . are so insistent that the regional distributor and the retail dealer, the petitioners here, who handled the ill-fated Audi automobile involved in this litigation, be named defendants”); Charles W. Adams, World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson—The Rest of the Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1140 (1993) (“Neither Justice Blackmun nor the other Justices could have been expected to know of
Creek County’s pro-plaintiff juries . . . .”).
254
See Burbank, supra note 105, at 746-47. And even in some of the cases not involving specific jurisdiction (because the plaintiffs’ claims did not bear the prescribed
relationship to the activity on which jurisdiction was predicated), both the plaintiffs
and the states involved had a legitimate interest in locating litigation in the chosen forum. See supra note 253.
255
See supra text accompanying notes 163-167.
256
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) ( jurisdiction not permitted); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)
( jurisdiction permitted); Burbank, supra note 105, at 749-53. My normative judgment
about forum shopping in Perkins is influenced by the fact that Ohio, where the defendant conducted essentially all of its (very limited) business during and immediately
after World War II, was the only domestic court conceivably—and given problems in
the Philippines in that period it may have been the only court—available for adjudication of the dispute. Similarly, Texas, where the defendant in Helicopteros bought the
helicopter whose crash caused the plaintiffs’ decedents’ deaths and where the employee pilots were trained, was the logical choice if any domestic court was permissible.
On the relevance of the status of the defendant as a domestic or foreign corporation,
see Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a
Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 389-92 (2004). For an interesting recent article
also calling into question the constitutionality of general doing-business jurisdiction,
see A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 617, 655-57 (2006).
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presiding over mostly small claims class actions—the allure of the state
class action litigation format as an instrument of interstate forum
shopping became apparent. At least it did when the Supreme Court
257
decided Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, a class action in which the
Kansas courts had applied Kansas law to the claims for interest on delayed royalty payments of all members of a multistate class. As is well
known, the Court in Shutts articulated constitutional limitations on
both the assertion of personal jurisdiction and the choice of law. The
question of jurisdiction, however, did not concern the defendant’s interest in freedom from litigation in an exorbitant forum. Rather, the
Court accepted the defendant’s invitation to opine about the constitutionality of the assertion of adjudicatory power over the claims of the
258
absent members of the plaintiff class. Rejecting the defendant’s argument that due process required those individuals’ consent, the
Court arguably made the mistake of accepting the premises of the argument. In any event, in its jurisdictional aspect Shutts is one of the
more mischievous opinions in the field of procedure, further obscur259
ing the distinction between procedural and substantive due process.
257

472 U.S. 797 (1985).
See id. at 806-14.
259
A state cannot deprive its own residents of property without affording them the
procedural protections that a balancing of all of the relevant interests indicates are
minimally required. Granting that members of a multistate plaintiff class lose something of value when claims brought on their behalf are rejected on the merits, why
should due process require anything more than what Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940), suggested that it requires in the class action context, namely adequate representation? Id. at 42-45. And if adequate representation is not sufficient, why isn’t notice and an opportunity to be heard, coupled with adequate representation, sufficient?
The Shutts Court’s distinctions between the burdens that litigation imposes on defendants and those imposed on absent members of a plaintiff class, see 472 U.S. at 81011, might be thought to support a conclusion that adequacy of representation is all
that due process requires, at least in a negative-value class action. On that view, the
Court erred in taking seriously the argument, predicated on the analogy to defendants, that (in the absence of minimum contacts) consent was required. In any event,
the Court’s opinion appears to move unthinkingly from the observation that Kansas
did afford notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to opt out to the
conclusion that in class actions seeking predominantly monetary relief, due process
requires all of those things. See id. at 811-12.
Shutts’s jurisdictional holding is inapposite in federal court class actions on behalf
of U.S. residents, where the question could only arise in any event in a Rule 23(b)(1)
or (b)(2) class action. Such residents have minimum contacts with the relevant territorial unit, and Rule 4(k)(1)(A) makes state law relevant only with respect to defendants.
Although Shutts has given rise to the fallacy that it speaks with binding precedential effect to problems of due process that do not implicate geography, and/or to federal class actions, as Tobias Wolff points out, we should not neglect the possibility that
258
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It is, however, no barrier to damages class actions in state court so
long as the state provides what Rule 23 requires in such a case.
Although one can regret the Court’s approach to the question
whether the laws of other interested states were in conflict with the
260
law of Kansas, it is apparent that the Justices’ main goal was to draw
a line in the sand, making clear that the occasion of a class action does
not entrain immunity from constitutional limitations on state choice
of law, however slight they may be. Attempts to read more into Shutts,
and in particular a constitutional prohibition against “bootstrapping”—i.e., applying a different choice of law rule in class actions to
enable certification as against predominance and manageability objec261
Indeed, for the class action
tions—are, in my view, not persuasive.
bar, the Court’s decision may have been like a limiting instruction, in262
viting attention by discouraging it.
Certainly, the bar would have realized—it was a common topic of
discussion in law school classrooms soon after Shutts—that a decision
applying the law of Oklahoma, the defendant’s principal place of
business, to all claims probably would not have been vulnerable under
the Court’s reasoning, whether or not that decision involved boot263
Attentive members of the bar would also have been
strapping.

in some circumstances procedural due process requires an opportunity to opt out. See
Wolff, supra note 27, at 2076-80.
260
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 816-18 (discussing possible conflicts but leaving “more
thoroughgoing treatment” to the state court on remand).
261
See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1944-48. For an argument in favor
of such a bootstrapping prohibition, see Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1839, 1911-18 (2006) [hereinafter Nagareda, Discontents]; Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 74 UKMC L. REV. 661, 664-65
(2006).
262
See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Manageable Nationwide Class: A Choice-of-Law Legacy
of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 74 UMKC L. REV. 543, 543 (2006) (“Shutts confirmed the authority of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over class actions and certify
classes of nationwide scope.”); id. at 545 (“From the perspective of plaintiffs’ advocates,
Shutts seemed like a godsend . . . .”); id. at 553 (stating that federal courts “were able to
evade application of the Shutts rule, and avoid dealing with multistate classes at all”).
263
Of course, one hopes that, in considering the tactical implications of Shutts, the
bar also attends to the potential problems of professional responsibility, and indeed of
adequate representation, that single-minded pursuit of class certification can entail.
Thus, in the hypothetical variant of Shutts mentioned in the text, what if Oklahoma law
were less favorable to some members of the putative class? A recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas has put such problems in relief by insisting on the application
of conventional preclusion law to class actions even in situations where the claims precluded could not have been made in the class action (because they would have pre-
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aware that the defendant’s choice of law victory proved short-lived and
partial, and that the Supreme Court’s ability to police the state courts
264
In sum, Shutts may have done more harm
effectively is theoretical.
than good both to the cause of restraining interstate forum shopping
and to the jurisprudence of due process.
We have seen that, notwithstanding a few early certifications of
Rule 23(b)(3) multistate mass tort class actions in the federal courts,
the federal appellate courts pretty quickly put an end to that phenomenon, usually finding a lack of predominance because of differences in the law to be applied (and/or the facts relevant under differ265
ent laws) and insuperable problems of manageability. We have also
seen that, notwithstanding a change of heart on the part of some defendants who, in a search for global peace, joined with plaintiffs in
seeking certification of mass tort classes and approval of prepackaged
settlements, the Supreme Court made it very difficult for the lower
federal courts to certify in such cases, first under Rule 23(b)(3) in Am266
chem, and then under Rule 23(b)(1) in Ortiz.
These developments, particularly the first of them, added substantially to entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ class action lawyers’ incentives to
test the class action waters in state courts. They also provided incen-

vented class certification). See Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430
(Tex. 2007).
264
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730-34 (1988) (rejecting contentions
that the Supreme Court of Kansas unconstitutionally distorted other states’ laws on
remand after Shutts). This prompted Justice O’Connor to protest:
Faced with the constitutional obligation to apply the substantive law of another State, a court that does not like that law apparently need take only two
steps in order to avoid applying it. First, invent a legal theory so novel or
strange that the other State has never had an opportunity to reject it; then, on
the basis of nothing but unsupported speculation, “predict” that the other
State would adopt that theory if it had the chance.
Id. at 749 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Class counsel may also be aware of Patrick Woolley’s interesting argument that
choice of law and class certification burdens are analytically discrete and that, by conflating them, some federal courts have erroneously placed both burdens on the party
seeking class certification. See Patrick Wooley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1739-43 (2006). On this view, state courts so inclined can blunt some of the force of Shutts and of recent federal and state case law
emphasizing the plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating compliance with Rule 23 (or its
state equivalent). Thus, they can insist that the choice of law question be addressed
first, invoke a presumption that forum law is applicable, and place on the party seeking
to displace that law the burden of demonstrating that some other law is applicable. See id.
265
See supra text accompanying notes 219-225.
266
See supra text accompanying notes 226-238.
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tives to seek certification of multistate classes stating claims under
other bodies of substantive law, particularly commercial law, in both
federal and state courts. Moreover, the prospect that the state courts
might replace the increasingly inhospitable federal courts as the preferred venue for multistate class actions arose at a time when the
plaintiffs’ bar was vying with business groups for the election of state
court judges thought to be sympathetic to their respective interests in
the larger “tort reform” debate, although the existence of any causal
267
relationship between the two phenomena remains unclear.
In any event, it is clear that, for a time at least, some plaintiff class
action lawyers were successful in securing certifications in multistate
class actions that could not have been certified under developing fed268
Moreover, in some of these cases
eral class action jurisprudence.
state courts held that the law of one state governed the claims of all
class members, while in others they accepted class counsel’s argument, perhaps supported by the “expert” reports of law professors,
that there were no meaningful differences in state law and/or that any
269
such differences were manageable. It is also clear, however, that the
267

See, e.g., Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 73 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007). “It bears emphasis that empirical research has yet to explore systematically the relationship, if any, between class certification and the involvement in state judicial elections of interest groups for whom such
rulings might well be a major topic of concern—whether the local plaintiffs’ bar or
business-side interests.” Nagareda, supra note 238 (manuscript at 8-9). Professor Nagareda notes defense-side research that “documents substantial political contributions
from the local plaintiffs’ bar to state-court judges in a jurisdiction often dubbed a
magnet for nationwide class actions.” Id. (manuscript at 9 n.31); see also infra text accompanying notes 270-271 (noting that changes in interpretation of state class action law
tended to correlate with changes in political complexion of the state supreme court).
268
This is not to disagree with Elizabeth Cabraser, who contends that “the postShutts era has seen relatively few [state court] nationwide class actions actually granted
at the trial level, or affirmed on appeal, for trial purposes.” Cabraser, supra note 262,
at 545. Yet, as Judge Easterbrook observed, a “single positive trumps all the negatives.”
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766-67 (7th
Cir. 2003); see also Nagareda, supra note 238 (manuscript at 9) (discussing the “game of
finding the one state court inclined to certify”). Although not claiming “to address
empirical proof,” Cabraser states that “a survey of complex litigation practitioners
would yield corroborating data that most successful state court nationwide class actions
served as settlement vehicles, which the defendants embraced and supported as their
preferred mechanism of resolution.” Cabraser, supra note 262, at 545. Finally, she asserts that “[i]n mass torts particularly, the overwhelming majority of multistate class
certification decisions were rendered by federal courts, and most grants of class certification were issued for settlement purposes rather than to structure trials.” Id. at 545-46.
269
See, e.g., Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 624-26 (Okla. 2003)
(upholding, in part, a class certification after determining that the law of only one
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identity of these state court magnets changed over time, and those
changes tended to follow in the wake of personnel changes in the
271
It rehighest court of a state that had previously been a magnet.
mains (and will always remain) unclear whether, if CAFA had not
been enacted, the perceived abuses associated with state magnet
courts would have continued, or whether the political processes that
ended them in some states (or some other processes) would have accomplished the same thing wherever they arose.
E. Overlapping Class Actions
Contemporary class action practice seems to confound the basic
assumptions of preclusion law by preferring multiple cases to just one.
This has long been true in certain substantive fields, such as securities
law, and the phenomenon of multiple duplicative or overlapping class
272
actions has increased as the class action bar has become more entrepreneurial, more sophisticated, and more competitive.
The federal courts have a well-developed system for disciplining
the chaos of overlapping class actions. Enacted in 1968 to permit the
federal judiciary to refine and extend the reach of techniques developed informally in order to deal with a flood of antitrust cases involvstate, Michigan, would apply). For other such cases regarded as abusive, see S. REP.
NO. 109-14, at 24-26 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24-26; Marcus, supra note
28, at 1301 n.294; Silberman, supra note 221, at 2012-14. The quality of the “expert”
opinions offered by distinguished law professors in some cases involving differences in
state law—which they sought to wish away—is embarrassing. Indeed, I accepted a rare
engagement as an expert (as opposed to consulting lawyer) in part because of my concern about the phenomenon. See Opinion of Stephen B. Burbank, Expert Report,
Alvis v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. A-164,880 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 28, 2003) (on file with
author).
270
See Cabraser, supra note 262, at 547-48 (discussing changes in class action law in
Alabama and Louisiana, with both states becoming less receptive to class actions);
Marcus, supra note 28, at 1294-95 (describing legislative attempts to end “drive-by” certification in Alabama, Texas, and Mississippi).
271
The Texas/Oklahoma litigation saga recounted by Professor Silberman is an
example of both of the last two propositions. See Silberman, supra note 221, at 2015-19;
see also Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1483, 1483-86 (2005) (detailing movements for tort reform in, among other states,
Texas, Alabama, and Mississippi); Goldberg, supra note 267, at 81 (“The new judges
completely changed tort law in Texas, so that it became more favorable to defendants.”); Editorial, Swing of Torts, TIMES DAILY (Florence, Ala.), Nov. 13, 2007, available
at http://www.timesdaily.com/article/20071113/news/711130304 (discussing the perception that “change in political complexion” of the Supreme Court of Alabama affected the results in cases involving business litigants).
272
I use the term “overlapping class actions” to refer to both duplicative and overlapping class actions.
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ing the electrical equipment industry, the Multidistrict Litigation
273
Statute empowers the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML) to transfer all cases having common questions of fact to a single federal court, where they are subject to coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. So long as a case has been filed in federal
court or can be removed there, it can be transferred by the JPML, and
it is no surprise that overlapping class actions are particularly likely to
receive multidistrict treatment.
Although the statute requires remand of actions to the transferor
courts upon the completion of pretrial proceedings unless they have
274
275
been previously terminated, few are in fact remanded for trial.
That too is no surprise. Less than two percent of federal civil cases
276
terminate at or after trial.
Most class actions settle, just as most
other cases settle, and a transferee judge under § 1407 is empowered
to decide dispositive pretrial motions, a form of disposition that,
across the entire federal civil docket, now accounts for far more ter277
That is not to say, however, that a transminations than trials do.
feree judge is similarly situated to a judge in ordinary litigation in her
capacity to bring about nontrial dispositions. Like counsel who could
not take a case (or claim) to trial, a multidistrict transferee judge may
be thought disarmed in the quest for a global settlement by the inability to try the case. That, in any event, appears to be a reason why the
federal judiciary was so upset by the Supreme Court’s decision in the
278
Lexecon case, disapproving the prior practice whereby transferee
279
courts had transferred cases to themselves for trial purposes, and
280
why it has worked so hard to secure a legislative fix.

273

28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
See id. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded . . . to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .”).
275
See Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges,
Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, ME. B.J., Winter 2004, at 16, 21
(“It is only occasionally that cases are remanded for trial.”).
276
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) (noting a
decline in the trial termination rate from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002).
277
See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 617-18
(2004) (estimating an increase in the summary judgment termination rate from 1.8%
in 1960 to 7.7% in 2000).
278
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
279
Under the practice disapproved in Lexecon, the transfer was pursuant to § 1404,
which meant that the transferee district had to be one where the case could originally
274
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Prior to CAFA, there was no provision in federal law that permitted the removal of overlapping state court class actions that were otherwise not removable. In the increasingly entrepreneurial and competitive environment described above, that meant that all of the
efforts of a transferee federal court to broker a settlement of overlapping federal class actions might come to naught because a state court
281
A great deal of
class action was settled first, with preclusive effect.
time and effort by the court and the parties might, therefore, be
wasted. Even if not, the coexistence of overlapping class actions before
different courts could cause serious problems in the conduct of the
coordinated or consolidated proceedings called for under the statute.
The incentives that the federal parties and federal transferee
courts have to avoid such difficulties can elicit very creative interpretations of federal law. Similar incentives operate when those subject to
federal court judgments seek to evade their preclusive effect in state
courts. In that situation, many federal courts approved the removal of
282
the state court actions under the All Writs Act. The Supreme Court
283
put an end to this tactic, which bordered on the frivolous, in the
284
Syngenta case.
Both before and after Syngenta, some transferee

have been filed (as a matter of personal jurisdiction and venue as well, of course, as of
subject matter jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S.
335, 342-44 (1960).
280
As Judge Hodges explained,
It would obviously be a lot more efficient if the transferee judge had the authority to try the cases that remain. That would add another settlement tool
into the calculus that normally produces settlement anyway. It would probably be more efficient, which is why the Judicial Conference and the panel
supported legislation that would change that part of the statute and alter the
result required by Lexecon, but I can’t say we are not able to function efficiently
for the want of it at the moment.
Hansel, supra note 275, at 21.
281
The Supreme Court’s decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516
U.S. 367 (1995), made it clear that there would be very little room for class members
who did not opt out of the state court class action to avoid its binding effect, even if the
settlement purported to release claims within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Id. at 375-86.
282
28 U.S.C. § 1651; see also, e.g., Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F.3d 424, 427 (8th Cir.
1999) (holding that removal of a class action was proper under the All Writs Act); Sable v. Gen. Motors Corp., 90 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
283
See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 401, 470 (1999) (“Permitting federal courts to expand the scope of removal
jurisdiction by resort to the All Writs Act only distorts the analysis for determining
when intervention is appropriate.”).
284
Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33-34 (2002).
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courts sought to make overlapping state court class actions go away
through the use of injunctions. Recalling the role of injunctions in
the jockeying for forum control under the system of corporate diver285
these efforts confront exceptions in the Antisity litigation,
286
Injunction Act that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, are very
287
narrow.
Uncertain about the availability of authority in existing law to se288
cure the removal of overlapping state court class actions, and seriously constrained by Supreme Court precedent under the AntiInjunction Act, key members of the federal judiciary responded by initiating consideration of possible amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and to federal statutes that might ease the burdens
posed by overlapping class actions dispersed between the federal and
state courts. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules developed a variety of proposals that would have authorized a federal court to enjoin
(1) state court certification of a class substantially similar to one that
the court had previously refused to certify, and (2) state court approval of a proposed class action settlement substantially similar to
289
one that the court had previously refused to approve.

285

See supra text accompanying note 115.
28 U.S.C. § 2283.
287
See, e.g., Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 635-39 (1977) (holding
that § 16 of the Clayton Act did not provide an express exception to the AntiInjunction Act, the prohibitions of which “exist separate and apart from those traditional principles [of equity and comity]”). For a sensitive treatment of the exceptions,
see In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 233-39 (3d Cir. 2002). As Martin Redish and I have
previously argued, and as Tobias Wolff develops in his article for this Symposium, the
Anti-Injunction Act is in need of a complete overhaul. See Burbank, supra note 164, at
215, 228-30; Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1347 (2000); Wolff, supra note 27, at 2054-66. Until then, the best hope for a jurisprudence that transcends labels (i.e., does not stretch to assimilate a particular case to one
involving jurisdiction over property) seems to me the insight that the exception for
injunctions that are “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 2283, calls for
careful consideration of “jurisdictional” policy. A federal transferee court exercising
jurisdiction under § 1407 should be able to enjoin overlapping state court class actions
when they are actually interfering with the conduct of coordinated and consolidated
pretrial proceedings.
288
Syngenta was decided in 2002, while the rulemaking effort discussed here occurred in 2001. Yet, as my gentle description of the view of the All Writs Act rejected
in Syngenta suggests, see supra text accompanying note 283 (“border[ing] on the frivolous”), the technique was widely recognized to have very bleak prospects.
289
See Edward H. Cooper, Reporter’s Call for Informal Comment: Overlapping Class Actions 8-19 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
comment2002/Reporter_Call_for_Comment.pdf.
286
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Made aware of serious doubts about the existence of power to im290
plement such changes by court rule, the rulemakers convened a
panel to consider the proposals at a conference in Chicago in 2001.
The panelists were virtually unanimous in the view that, whatever the
merits of the proposals, they were beyond the rulemaking power, and
291
the rulemakers abandoned the effort. The conclusion that effective
action would require legislation prompted the Civil Rules Committee
to recommend to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(“Standing Committee”) and to the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee that they “support the concept of minimal diversity for large,
multi-state class actions, in which the interests of no one state are
paramount, with appropriate limitations or threshold requirements so
that the federal courts are not unduly burdened and the states’ juris292
diction over in-state class actions is left undisturbed.”
The federal judiciary was already on record supporting a limited
use of minimal diversity, and its eagerness to secure a legislative fix for
293
Lexecon is evident in the comments submitted, in March 2001, on
legislation containing both such a fix and also provisions for sweeping
mass disaster litigation into federal court under a theory of minimal
294
diversity. Although, as enacted in 2002, this legislation has very lim-

290

See Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to author (May 22, 2001) (attaching a
letter responding to Judge Scirica’s request that Professor Hazard and the author of
this Article provide their views on the proposals that, as revised, were subject to the request for comment cited supra note 289) (on file with author).
291
See, e.g., Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of Meeting of
Jan. 10-11, 2002, at 4; Stephen B. Burbank, Class Action Conference: Preliminary Remarks (Oct. 23, 2001) (on file with author). The other members of this panel were
Judge Diane Wood and Professors Daniel Meltzer, Linda Mullenix, Martin Redish, and
David Shapiro. See E-mail from author to Judge Lee Rosenthal, U.S. Dist. Court, S.
Dist. of Tex. (Oct. 18, 2001) (on file with author). A judge who attended the conference and thus heard one of the panelists (the author of this Article) suggest, albeit
dubitante, that a federal court might be able to accomplish the same thing as a matter
of federal common law, persuaded a panel of his court to do just that. Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation, 333
F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) is creative. It is also highly problematic as a matter of preclusion law and as an interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act. But see Wolff, supra note
27, at 2074-76.
292
Memorandum from David F. Levi, Chair, to Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 17
(May 7, 2002), reprinted in Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee (May 20,
2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2002.pdf.
293
See supra text accompanying note 280.
294
See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the
U.S., to Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, at 1 (Mar. 13, 2001), reprinted in 147 CONG. REC.
H896-97 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001) (expressing “the support of the federal judiciary for

1514

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 156: 1439

ited application (it requires, among other things, that “at least 75
295
natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location” ), it
might be deemed a forerunner to CAFA in the use both of minimal
296
diversity and of an exception that, if only by insisting on the traditional definition of corporate citizenship, evidently takes a narrow
297
view of state interests.
Prior to the Judicial Conference’s meeting in March 2003, and
notwithstanding the May 2002 memorandum from the Civil Rules
298
Committee, the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee wrote a report
urging continued opposition to the use of minimal diversity to bring
class actions into federal court. As a fallback position, that Committee
urged the Conference to support only such proposed legislation as

H.R. 860, the ‘Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001’”).
Section 2 of this bill contained a Lexecon fix designed “to allow a judge with a transferred case to retain it for trial or to transfer it to another district.” Id. at 1, 147 CONG.
REC. at H896. The letter noted that in 1988 the Judicial Conference “approved in
principle the creation of federal jurisdiction that would rely on minimal diversity to
consolidate multiple litigation [sic] . . . arising out of a single event.” Id.
295
28 U.S.C. § 1369(a) (Supp. V 2005); see also supra note 4. As enacted, however,
it did not contain a Lexecon fix.
296
This statute provides in pertinent part,
(a) IN GENERAL.—The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises
from a single accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete location, if—
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the accident
took place in another State or other location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a resident of the State where a substantial part of the accident
took place;
(2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of whether
such defendants are also residents of the same State or States; or
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1369(a).
297
The relevant exception provides,
(b) LIMITATION OF JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.—The district court
shall abstain from hearing any civil action described in subsection (a) in
which—
(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of
which the primary defendants are also citizens; and
(2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the laws of that State.
Id. § 1369(b).
298
See supra text accompanying note 292 (discussing this memorandum). The
Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee’s fallback position, on the other hand, may have
been consistent with the position advocated by the Civil Rules Committee.
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left in state court cases in which the states had legitimate interests, defined to include cases in which substantially all members of the class
were from a single state or were people alleging death, personal injury, or property damage within the state. As to both, the Committee
specifically contemplated leaving in place the default regime’s juris299
dictional rules.
The report of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee elicited a
response from the Standing Committee that offered somewhat different, and somewhat inconsistent, rationales in opposition to the proposed definition of the universe of cases that should remain in state
300
On the merits, the Standing Committee seemed to want to
court.
bring statewide class actions into federal court for coordinated or consolidated proceedings, noting that a defendant might be sued on the
301
At the same time, the Standing Comsame claim in all fifty states.
299

See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION (Agenda E-9) (Mar. 2003) (on file with author); ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION, CLASS ACTION LEGISLATION (Agenda E-9), at 5 n.9 (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter AGENDA E-9 ADDENDUM] (on file with author) (“The Committee’s proposed
approach . . . would leave the determination of the citizenship of the defendants, and
the satisfaction of the complete diversity requirement, to be made in accordance with
current jurisdictional rules.”). For other accounts of this history that mute the disagreement between the two Conference committees, see Lee & Willging, supra note
26, at 1726-33; Marcus, supra note 26, at 1801-03. Morrison seems to have been unaware of it. See Morrison, supra note 9, at 1541 (noting the change in the position of
the Judicial Conference without exploring the reason, and contending that the Conference “plainly has not endorsed S. 2062 and its companion bills”). In fact, disagreement between the Rules Committees and the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee on
this subject existed from at least 1999. See Letter from Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair,
Civil Rules Advisory Comm., to Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges, Middle District of Florida,
at 2 (Aug. 10, 1999) (on file with author) (“[I]t is apparent that there is a federal problem that Congress can properly address.”).
300
See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, OVERLAPPING, COMPETING, AND DUPLICATIVE CLASS ACTIONS
(Agenda E-18) (Mar. 2003), at 13-16 [hereinafter RULES AGENDA E-18], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST3-2003.pdf.
301
The Standing Committee noted,
The [Federal-State] Committee’s proposal would prevent the filing in, or removal to, federal court of most actions where the class is limited to nearly all
in-state plaintiffs—no matter what the primary defendants’ relationship is to
the state or whether that state’s law governed—so long as one non-diverse defendant was joined. The likely consequence would be that a defendant might
find itself litigating statewide class actions in many states. While avoiding potential concerns about a state court applying its law nationwide, many of the
consequences associated with multiple actions would remain. A federal court
could still find itself competing with as many as fifty overlapping class actions;
the litigants might still find themselves competing for recovery; and the de-
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mittee observed that such details were heavily freighted with politics
302
and should be left to Congress.
In the revised report of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee,
which had the concurrence of the Standing Committee, the recommendation did not clearly signal the former committee’s views on al303
location, and they were watered down in the accompanying explana304
tion.
Moreover, a March 26, 2003, letter to Congress on behalf of
305
the Judicial Conference repeated the watered-down version. Finally,
when Senator Leahy requested that the federal judiciary submit “legislative language” to implement its views about the appropriate allocation of jurisdiction over class actions, the response on its behalf
evinced the same lack of clarity that characterized the Federal-State
Jurisdiction Committee’s revised recommendation and “deliberately
avoided specific legislative language, out of deference to Congress’s
306
judgment and the political process.”

fendants might still seek protection under the bankruptcy laws, because they
offer the sole means of consolidating and resolving multiple claims.
Id. at 14-15; see also Cabraser et al., supra note 29, at 399 (“[A] U.S. defendant might
face multiple state class actions asserting claims arising from the same product or
course of conduct, and claims arising from the nation-wide marketing of a standard
product had no sure means of being centralized in a single federal court.”).
302
See RULES AGENDA E-18, supra note 300, at 15-16 (“We do not believe the Judicial Conference should involve itself in the specific provisions of proposed legislation.”).
303
See SECOND ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION, CLASS ACTION LEGISLATION (Agenda E-9)
(Mar. 2003), at 1-2 (on file with author).
304
See id. at 2 (“Parallel in-state class actions in which the plaintiff class is defined
as limited to the citizens of the forum state are not included within the term ‘significant multi-state class action litigation.’”); id. at 4 (“While the relationship of the defendant to the forum may have some bearing on state adjudicatory power, an insistence
that all primary defendants maintain formal in-state citizenship is too limiting and may
preclude in-state class actions where a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum
state, regardless of citizenship.”).
305
See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the
U.S., to Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chair, Comm. on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2003) (on file with author).
306
Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the United
States, to Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate, at 3 (Apr. 25, 2003), reprinted in 150 CONG. REC. S7686-87 (daily ed. July 6,
2004) (statement of Sen. Carper).
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V. CAFA’S SIGNIFICANCE: A PRELIMINARY VIEW
Our culture of “adversarial legalism” relies on litigation to provide
compensation for injury and to enforce important social norms to an
307
There is reason for concern
extent probably unique in the world.
that CAFA will retard state regulation of harmful activity by including
within its jurisdictional sweep not just multistate class actions, but also
class actions that are of intense interest to individual states, whose law
will govern all or most of the claims. Of course, that concern should
only arise to the extent that CAFA alters the balance of power in forum selection that existed in the default regime. To that extent, however, it would be exacerbated by evidence suggesting that some of
CAFA’s supporters hold—and evidently would have the federal courts
adopt—an essentialist and prerealist view of the proper role of aggre308
gation.
CAFA unquestionably changes the balance of power in forum selection. Educated about the litigation dynamics created by the default
regime, or at least about the willingness and ability of entrepreneurial
309
class counsel, as they pejoratively put it, to “game the system,” the
statute’s supporters understood that changes in the provisions concerning diversity and the amount in controversy, although necessary
for the attainment of their objectives, would not be sufficient. Thus,
even if class counsel could not prevent removal by naming a nondiverse defendant, it might be possible to include a friendly defendant
307

See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3 (2001) (“Compared to other
economically advanced democracies, . . . [t]he United States more often relies on lawyers, legal threats, and legal contestation in implementing public policies, compensating accident victims, striving to hold governmental officials accountable, and resolving
business disputes.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse or Cure?, 91 JUDICATURE 163 (2008). As Professors Hazard, Gedid, and
Sowle have noted,
There is little prospect of legislation that will displace personal injury litigation with some form of social insurance, or displace consumer litigation with
more stringent administrative regulation. On the contrary, the litigation form
for resolution of social disputes—proceedings under the aegis of courts—is an
essential part of our culture, as de Toqueville long ago observed.
Hazard et al., supra note 180, at 1948.
308
See supra text accompanying note 28 (describing the views of some CAFA supporters towards class actions); infra text accompanying notes 364 (same); see also Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1953 (commenting on Nagareda, Discontents, supra
note 261, and “argu[ing] that it takes an essentialist view, shaped by current federal
arrangements, on normative questions, including questions of institutional legitimacy”).
309
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6.
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310

who would not agree to removal, to sue the target defendant in its
home state, or to keep the litigation’s true scope and ambitions hidden until the default regime’s one-year limitation on removal had
passed. As we have seen, CAFA’s removal provisions address each of
those tactics, allowing any defendant to remove (apparently, the entire case), and eliminating both the removal disability of in-state (di311
versity) defendants and the one-year limitation on removal.
CAFA’s supporters were aware that the federal judiciary long opposed predecessor class action bills on workload and federalism
grounds. They were also aware of the default regime’s other hurdles
for state court defendants seeking to remove to federal court: first,
the rule that the party seeking access to federal court has the burden
312
of establishing the existence of jurisdiction, and second, the general
313
precept to construe the removal statute strictly against jurisdiction.
Finally, if for either reason they anticipated a hostile reception to
CAFA removals, they knew that the general statutory ban on appellate
314
review of remand orders could frustrate their goals.
CAFA itself addresses appellate review, however fecklessly, by
permitting a party aggrieved by an order granting or denying a remand motion to petition for review to the court of appeals, and by setting strict limits on the time within which that court must render a de310

This tactic contributed to the Judicial Conference’s 1987 recommendation that
removal be permitted by “any defendant,” instead of “the defendant or the defendants,” under § 1441(a). See Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3152
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 93 (1987–1988) [hereinafter House Hearings]. This was the only
one of five recommendations concerning removal not enacted. Compare id. at 93-94
with Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102
Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988). It is tempting to view the choices as reflecting the preferences of a Congress controlled by Democrats. Yet the Judicial Conference had previously rejected the recommendation, probably because it would increase the workload
of the federal courts, see House Hearings, supra, at 95, and the Reagan Administration’s
Department of Justice did oppose it on that ground. See Judicial Branch Improvements
Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1482 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 202-03 (1988) (“This would add more cases to
an already overburdened federal judiciary that the state courts are perfectly adequate
to handle.”). Court workload, not the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants, dominated this round of jurisdiction reform, suggesting that in Congress, as in
the courts, the 1980s were an interlude of quiet before the storm that led to CAFA. See
supra text accompanying note 213.
311
See supra Part II.B.
312
See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 32, at 253 n.12.
313
See id. at 235 & n.68.
314
See supra text accompanying notes 48 & 76 (discussing discretionary appellate
review of remand decisions under CAFA).
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315

cision in a case in which it grants review. CAFA’s supporters sought
to assist state court defendants in crossing the default regime’s other
316
hurdles to removal through the use of legislative history.
It evidently did not trouble CAFA’s supporters that, by eliminating
a provision in the 2003 bill that would have enabled unnamed members of a putative class to remove, they were giving defendants the option to “game the system”—as, for instance, by choosing to remain in
a state court that was hospitable to abusive settlements of the type that
317
CAFA regulates in federal court. Moreover, by focusing only on the
techniques of forum manipulation available to plaintiffs (and then
only in the default regime as of 2005), they pretermitted the historical
and institutional perspective necessary to make a reliable judgment as
to whether “gaming the system” (by either side) should carry a pejora318
tive connotation.
We have seen that when Congress first formally blessed the definition of corporate citizenship for diversity purposes in 1958, it left
largely in place the existing balance of power in forum selection be319
In order to make a reliable judgtween plaintiffs and defendants.
315

See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (Supp. V 2005). The correction of the scrivener’s error,
“not less than 7 days after entry of the order,” to the intended “not more than 7 days
after entry of the order” has proved challenging only for those who embrace theories
of statutory interpretation with a fervor usually reserved for religion. See generally Adam
N. Steinman, “Less” Is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the Class
Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1230 (2007) (discussing this error).
316
Some courts have deemed significant the juxtaposition of these methods of attempting to change the status quo. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No. 05-2340,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15396, at *24 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005) (“[B]y making substantive
changes with respect to the aggregation rule, but failing to express a concomitant
change in the burden of proof, Congress implicitly acknowledged and adopted the
long-standing rule that a removing defendant bears the burden of proof for establishing diversity jurisdiction.”), rev’d on other grounds, No. 06-4855, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS
27617 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2007).
317
See supra note 27; see also Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in
a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1653 (2006) (noting that CAFA gives defendants a “wait-and-see” option for removal). Professor Purcell correctly observes that
CAFA’s elimination of the default regime’s one-year limitation on removal “handed
defendants a new weapon that could actively encourage the very collusion the statute
purported to end.” Purcell, supra note 5, at 1874.
318
See supra text accompanying notes 9-10 (noting that forum shopping need not
be a ground for criticism).
319
See supra text accompanying notes 177-178. It seems unlikely that any of the
post-1958 changes in federal statutory law had a major impact on the general balance
of power in forum choice for ordinary diversity litigation. As to the diversity statute,
Congress raised the amount-in-controversy requirement to in excess of $50,000 in
1988, see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201,
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ment about the need for the change in that balance that CAFA effects,
a number of developments since the disintegration of the system of
corporate diversity litigation seem to me particularly salient.
It is one thing to call for realism about the likelihood of local bias
against corporations engaged in national commerce. If, as Charles
Warren and Felix Frankfurter argued, it was nonsense to treat (some)
320
such corporations as outsiders in almost all states in the 1920s, it is
321
nonsense on stilts today. It is quite another thing, however, to advocate that the fiction of corporate presence, which International Shoe
sought to banish, should be replaced by a fiction of multiple corporate domiciles in the law of personal jurisdiction. A perspective on
the American litigation system that takes a dynamic and comparative
102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988), and to in excess of $75,000 in 1996, see Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000)). In addition, Congress addressed problems arising
in discrete categories of cases in 1964 (citizenship of liability insurance companies
sued under state direct action statutes), see Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-439,
§ 1, 78 Stat. 445, 445 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (c)(1)), and in 1988 (citizenship of
representatives of estates of decedents, infants, or incompetents, and citizenship of
permanent resident aliens), see Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act
§§ 202(a), 203(a), 102 Stat. at 4646 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(c)(2), 1332(a)). In
1990, Congress passed the supplemental jurisdiction statute. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1367). As to the removal statute, in 1988 Congress enacted two changes
with implications for forum shopping. First, it provided that defendants sued under
fictitious names (“John Doe defendants”) be disregarded in determining whether diversity exists. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act § 1016(a), 102 Stat.
at 4669 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). Second, it enacted a one-year limitation on
removal (from the time a case is commenced in state court) in diversity cases. See id.
§ 1016(b), 102 Stat. at 4669 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). Thereafter, in 1990,
Congress abolished the much-vexed institution of separate and independent claim removal in diversity cases. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 312, 104 Stat. at 5114
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)). Recall that this provision was once a redoubt of corporate defendants but had long since been deprived of its utility. See supra text accompanying notes 122-125. Finally, Congress made numerous changes to the general
venue statute affecting diversity cases between 1958 and 2005. Such changes applied
(or apply) only to cases brought originally in federal court and thus have no obvious
relevance to the federal-state forum game. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at
1558 n.8 (“Our coding turned up not a single dispute over venue.”). Since the removal statute has its own venue provision, however, the desire to secure a more favorable venue in a case that could be removed may prompt a plaintiff to file in federal
court. See supra note 72 (noting that a majority of CAFA cases have been originally
filed in federal court).
320
See supra note 102.
321
See STATE-FEDERAL STUDY, supra note 79, at 13 (proposing a statutory provision
barring a corporation or other business organization from access to federal court in
any state where it has maintained “local establishment” for more than two years in any
action arising out of that establishment’s activities).
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view of constitutional requirements and has regard for proportionality
should not tolerate most exercises of general doing-business jurisdic322
One holding such a
tion over domestic (i.e., U.S.) corporations.
view may conclude that a federal diversity forum, and the possibility of
transfer within the federal court system, should be available to a corporate defendant that is sued in a state in which it is not incorporated
and does not have its principal place of business on claims having
nothing to do with its activities in that state, at least if the plaintiff is
323
not a resident of the state.
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman argued, in the context
of judgment-recognition practice, that a polity’s rules concerning jurisdiction are a “hallmark” of the fairness with which that polity han324
In the condles “litigation involving significant foreign elements.”
temporary litigation market, a plaintiff’s choice of a forum that lacks
either a regulatory interest over the plaintiff’s claims (which it would
have if specific jurisdiction existed and perhaps, but more controversially, if the plaintiff were a resident) or an abiding relationship with—
which may include a regulatory interest over—the defendant (such as
the state of incorporation, at least, would have), is reason for worry
whether the quest is for legitimate litigation advantage.
Apart from exorbitant assertions of state court adjudicatory authority that twenty years of Supreme Court neglect could only have
325
encouraged, the litigation market for which Congress legislated in
1958 was a very different market from that to which Congress responded in 2005. The most important changes occurred because of
the transformative power of the modern (post-1966) class action.
Purcell’s description of how an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar
evolved and devised tactics first to counteract removal by corporate
defendants and then, once developments in the law of personal jurisdiction permitted, to shop for (and keep) a favorable forum among

322

See Burbank, supra note 105, at 749-53 (criticizing general doing-business jurisdiction); see also supra text accompanying notes 166, 253-256 (noting limited and equivocal Supreme Court authority on doing-business jurisdiction).
323
Cf. Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 (1923)
(“[O]rderly, effective administration of justice clearly does not require that a foreign
carrier shall submit to a suit in a State in which the cause of action did not arise, in
which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon, in which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and in which the plaintiff does not reside.”).
324
Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1610 (1968).
325
The Court did not decide a case involving the constitutional limitations on
state court jurisdiction between 1958 and 1977.
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326

the states, seems almost quaint today. The modern class action is
not just an extraordinarily powerful instrument of law enforcement.
For a plaintiffs’ bar that is ever more entrepreneurial and competitive,
it is an extraordinarily powerful addition to the mix of incentives and
disincentives that drive forum choice.
Recurrent attempts by the Supreme Court to police interstate forum shopping through constitutional control of choice of law have
327
also proved largely ineffective. It is usually very easy for a state court
that is so minded to find in the complex underlying facts a constitutionally cognizable contact in the state whose law that court wants to
apply, and usually just as easy to interpret the law as animated by at
least one policy that the contact implicates, thereby triggering a constitutionally adequate basis for its application. When the choice of law
question arises in a putative class action, and when the answer to the
question will determine whether a class can be certified, nothing in
the Constitution prevents the state court from “bootstrapping” in or328
der to overcome predominance and manageability problems.
Moreover, particularly for putative negative-value class actions, “bootstrapping” may not be necessary, since proponents of such litigation
have emphasized the realm of deterrence in which policies that can
lead to the application of one state’s law (i.e., that of the defendant’s
329
headquarters) are likely to be found.
330
I suspect that the phenomenon of “drive-by class certification”
was on the cutting edge of obsolescence in the state courts in 2005. I
also suspect that the phenomenon of ever-changing magnet courts
(“judicial hellholes”) might well have run its course if left, not to its

326

See supra text accompanying notes 117-133, 145-149.
See supra text accompanying notes 153-155, 257-264.
328
See supra text accompanying note 261 (discussing the constitutionality of “bootstrapping”).
329
Recent scholarship has correctly noted the weakness of an agency-costs critique
when applied to negative-value class actions in which the main goal can plausibly be
deemed deterrence rather than compensation. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B.
Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial
Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006); William Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney
General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004). In my view, however,
those authors have not succeeded in articulating a principled method for determining
when deterrence is plausibly deemed the main goal of litigation (which surely requires
attention to the substantive-law scheme), or in suggesting means to prevent inefficient
overenforcement.
330
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 22 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 22.
327
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331

own devices, but to the political process.
Even if so, however, what
politics takes away, politics can restore. Moreover, not all of the cases
or types of cases that caused CAFA’s supporters heartburn can be assigned to politics, lack of resources and experience, or the other dimensions that feed invidious comparisons of the state and federal
courts. Some state courts were certifying multistate classes because
they shared the commitments of the federal rulemakers in 1966, because they believed that either one state’s law or a manageable group
of state laws could and should be applied, and because they otherwise
thought certification appropriate under their governing rules.
Just because the Constitution does not foreclose such decisions
does not mean that there is no federal interest in regulating the proc332
Yet, we have
ess by which or the forums in which they are made.
333
seen that, even as revised by Friendly and Frank, the traditional view
of Article III’s diversity grant (the only view that the Supreme Court
has ever espoused) seems rather far removed from the vision projected in CAFA. There we are told that the “framers . . . provid[ed]
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national impor334
For that reason alone, Douglas
tance under diversity jurisdiction.”
Floyd’s work on the constitutional infirmities of CAFA must be taken
335
seriously. Unless the Supreme Court were to disavow the traditional
331

See Class Action “Judicial Hellholes”: Empirical Evidence Is Lacking (Pub. Citizen,
Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2005, http://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf, at 6-8
(2005) (summarizing recent legislative changes in state class action systems).
332
Sherman identifies such an interest:
But more important than the [federal courts’] resource and expertise issue
was the argument that national corporations should not be subjected to multistate class actions in state courts and particularly in target venues that would
define their legal liability nationwide. This was a powerful argument, and the
defection of a number of Democratic senators from their leadership’s opposition to CAFA seems to have been influenced by this concern.
Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L.
REV. 1593, 1608 (2006) (footnote omitted).
333
See supra text accompanying notes 77-95.
334
CAFA § 2(b)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005); see also supra text accompanying note 11.
335
See generally C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification
for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487 (2006) [hereinafter Floyd, Inadequacy]; C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (2004)
[hereinafter Floyd, Limits] (examining the origins and validity of pivotal assumptions
underlying federal jurisdiction expansion enactments). More recently, Professor
Pfander has provided other reasons, having to do with the proper role of ancillary jurisdiction, to limit the reach of minimal diversity. See Pfander, supra note 203, at 144959; infra note 339.
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view of the purposes of the Constitution’s diversity grant, for which it
is largely responsible, the Justices might have difficulty explaining how
the exercise of jurisdiction in some of the cases covered by CAFA’s
336
very broad reach can be justified.
As Floyd points out, that task should be even harder for a Court
337
that has promoted the constitutional values of federalism. It should
338
not be sufficient simply to cite the Tashire case, the Court’s perfunctory blessing (decades after the event) of minimal diversity in one of
the very few contexts in which Congress has previously provided for
339
it. Moreover, congressional attempts to buoy the constitutional case
for CAFA by invoking interstate commerce are, as Floyd demonstrates
340
Indeed, the
in another article, also vulnerable to close analysis.
kitchen-sink quality of CAFA’s statements of findings and purposes
341
might be thought evidence of either congressional hypocrisy or,
more charitably, a legislative phenomenon akin to alternative judicial

336

See Floyd, Limits, supra note 335, at 652-71 (identifying the lack of fit between
most of CAFA’s stated purposes and the purposes of the grant of judicial power in Article III).
337
See id. at 645-50 (discussing Supreme Court cases with the theme of preservation of federalism and dual sovereignty).
338
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967); see also Floyd, Limits,
supra note 335, at 632-33 (discussing Tashire).
339
Federal jurisdiction for statutory interpleader is a far easier sell than is the existence of federal judicial power in a putative class action on behalf of 101 members, 100
of whom, including the named class representative, are from the state where it was
brought against a local defendant who then removed it. That such a case would be
within one of CAFA’s mandatory exceptions, requiring the court to decline jurisdiction, does not alter the fact that the statute purports to confer it. Consider the views of
Professor Pfander:
[T]he Court’s decision [in Tashire] to uphold the exercise of jurisdiction over
claims in the nature of interpleader represents only a modest extension of the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction rather than a wholesale endorsement of
minimal diversity. Earlier decisions had required diversity between the stakeholder and one set of claimants to the fund, and had permitted the exercise
of ancillary jurisdiction over other, nondiverse claimants to the same fund.
Tashire might be viewed as having simply clarified that this ancillary conception of interpleader was available in an original proceeding.
Pfander, supra note 203, at 1453-54 (footnote omitted).
340
See Floyd, Inadequacy, supra note 335, at 507-20; id. at 532 (“[T]he repeated invocation of the language of the Commerce Clause in the statement of findings and
purposes and the legislative history . . . is a red herring.”).
341
See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1942 (“Less charitably, they meet
the philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s definition of ‘bullshit,’ because they are made with
apparent indifference to their truth content.”).
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determinations, confidence in any one of which is undermined by the
342
concern that none of them fully engaged the court’s attention.
There would nonetheless be serious irony in a decision by the Supreme Court holding CAFA unconstitutional (in some applications),
however persuasive it might be in light of the traditional account of
the diversity grant in Article III. For, although there is essentially no
support for CAFA’s articulated vision of diversity litigation in the Supreme Court’s decisions explaining the purposes of the grant—and
343
only partial and equivocal support in the legal literature —as Purcell
demonstrates, the Court was hardly consistent in practicing what it
preached while umpiring the system of corporate diversity litigation.
Indeed, CAFA’s vision of diversity jurisdiction as opening the federal
courts to “interstate cases of national importance” is pretty close to—a
twenty-first century update of—that which drove the Court during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when corporate diversity litigation was a staple of the federal courts’ docket.344 It is also
pretty close to that which animated Congress when it first defined
345
corporate citizenship for jurisdictional purposes in 1958.
A reasonable member of Congress—even one who was aware that
in the period from 1875 to 2004, “the overall importance of diversity
346
cases to the construction of judicial policy ha[d] waned” —could
thus have concluded that there was a need to change the balance of
power in forum selection for class litigation between plaintiffs and defendants. The Supreme Court had been no more consistent in adjusting federal diversity jurisdiction to the pressures and demands of the
modern class action than it had been during the system of corporate
diversity litigation. It had failed in efforts to use the Constitution to
control the excesses of state court personal jurisdiction and choice of
law that added to the allure of state court class actions when the federal courts were not available and when they ceased to be hospita347
Some state courts were clearly rubber-stamping multistate
ble.
classes proffered by class counsel, and although there were reasons to
believe that the situation was improving, at least one of those rea-

342

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982) (explaining the
rationale for the rule that a judgment based on alternative determinations is not preclusive except to the extent affirmed on appeal).
343
See supra text accompanying notes 77-95.
344
See supra text accompanying note 144.
345
See supra text accompanying notes 174-176.
346
Curry, supra note 4, at 463.
347
See supra text accompanying notes 246-264.
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sons—personnel changes on courts whose members are elected—
348
provided no protection against recrudescence.
Finally, although
reasonable minds could differ as to whether a state court’s application
of one law to the claims of all members of a multistate class was itself
an abuse, there was little question that (1) certification in such cases
would usually prompt settlement; (2) the choice of law, even if constitutional, might subordinate important interests of other states; (3) in
negative-value class actions, there was a risk of inefficient overenforcement; and (4) consumers would ultimately absorb many of the
costs of any judgment or settlement, retrospective or prospective.
The same conclusion, however, by no means follows for class actions that are not in any meaningful sense “multistate.” CAFA’s supporters sought to meet both workload and federalism objections in a
variety of ways. First, they relied on a small-class carve-out and on the
aggregate amount-in-controversy requirement to keep smaller class
actions, defined from either perspective, in state courts and out of
349
federal courts. From the first predecessor bill on which the federal
judiciary commented to the statute that was enacted, although the size
of the carve-out remained at 100, the amount in controversy rose from
in excess of $1 million to in excess of $5 million, exclusive of interest
350
and costs. Second, rightly or wrongly, CAFA’s supporters concluded
that Congress had already worked out a satisfactory adjustment of federal and state interests for securities and shareholder class actions,
351
and that such adjustment could simply be incorporated in CAFA.
Third, and most controversially, they relied on a number of “exceptions” to jurisdiction that were designed to permit or require a federal
district court to decline to exercise jurisdiction where the interests of
the states in keeping class actions in their courts were thought to out352
weigh the federal interests sought to be advanced in CAFA.
348

See supra text accompanying notes 267-271. For the confounding effect of “outlier” courts on attempts to discipline public policy with the fruits of methodologically
sound empirical research, see infra note 367.
349
The latter has been a tried and true technique of deflecting attempts to abolish
or narrow diversity jurisdiction generally.
350
See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the
U.S., to Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House
of Representatives, at 2 (Aug. 23, 1999) (on file with author) (describing the exceptions to the grant of jurisdiction in H.R. 1875).
351
See supra text accompanying notes 53-56; supra note 76.
352
See supra Part II.A.4. The “local controversy exception” was added late in the
long legislative process of refinement, a critical part of the compromise that permitted
the statute to pass. See 151 CONG. REC. S1006 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
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Reliance on the amount-in-controversy requirement to meet federalism objections recalls Purcell’s insight that “one of the great, if
largely unspoken, social and legal compromises of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries . . . [was that] [i]f plaintiffs agreed to
keep their claims reasonably small, they could guarantee themselves a
353
state forum.” We should also recall, however, that when the system
of corporate diversity litigation evolved, doctrine that treated a corporation as a citizen of only one state was counterbalanced by jurisdictional (including removal) provisions that, as interpreted, enabled
many plaintiffs to keep their cases in state court, notably but not exclusively by joining a nondiverse defendant. Moreover, in slightly expanding corporate citizenship in 1958 but not changing the removal
regime, Congress in fact further empowered plaintiffs desiring to liti354
gate in state court.
Let us by all means acknowledge the force of Purcell’s argument
that the Court’s actual implementation of the system of corporate diversity litigation reveals a conception of the jurisdictional grant quite
different from the traditional account and that Congress acted consistently with that reconceived vision in 1958. Let us also acknowledge
that a similar vision animates CAFA itself. It was, however, disingenuous for Congress to try to have it both ways, and thus also to rely on
the fictions of corporate citizenship, when fashioning exceptions to
jurisdiction that were advertised as honoring the legitimate interests
of the states. To be sure, Congress’s purpose to deal with multistate
class actions meant that the default regime’s requirement of complete
diversity and its removal-related instruments of countervailing power
for plaintiffs could not be left in place. It would have been a simple
matter, however, to acknowledge the fictions, and in the process, actually to serve state interests when crafting exceptions.
CAFA’s exceptions, or some of them, are numbingly complicated
and, as already observed, well calculated to keep lawyers and courts
busy for years in work that advances the cause of substantive justice
355
For present purposes, however, the details need not
not one wit.
detain us. It suffices to note that none of the exceptions permits a state
court to retain (if the defendant chooses to remove) a class action brought on
behalf solely of the citizens of that state, alleging injuries sustained in the state
353

PURCELL, supra note 107, at 251; see also supra text accompanying note 133.
See supra text accompanying notes 170-178. Recall that Congress also raised the
amount in controversy to in excess of $10,000 in 1958.
355
See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1565-67 (stating that CAFA creates
social waste).
354
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as a result of the in-state activities of an out-of-state corporation doing substantial business in the state. Such a case is, therefore, defined as of “national importance.”
This is the sort of case that class counsel in the default regime
usually could keep in state court through the joinder of a nondiverse
defendant. It is also the sort of case in which there could be no concern about an exorbitant exercise of personal jurisdiction, no doubt
about the existence of the forum state’s regulatory interest, no constitutional question about a choice of forum law, and, likely, no reason
to fear ad hoc manipulation of state law. Moreover, any such manipulation designed to permit aggregation (as for instance through a pre356
sumption of reliance in a class action alleging fraud under state law)
would represent a policy choice that was within the prerogatives of
state institutions, the internal allocation of power among which presents no question of federal interest.
357
With eyes not blinded by fictions, the reason for federal subject
matter jurisdiction in such a case might seem to be a desire to give the
corporate defendant a choice to seek, not a neutral forum, but a more
358
On that view, by yielding to the overreaching of
favorable forum.
CAFA’s supporters, Congress gave new life to the view that the federal
359
Less tendentiously, the mere
courts are “business men’s courts.”
fact that a corporation is engaged in interstate commerce makes state

356

See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471
(1987) (book review) (noting the use of “dubious substantive strategies that enable
packaging”).
357
See Shapiro, supra note 63, at 123-24 (“Now, it could be said that the problem
here lies not with CAFA, but with the definition of corporate citizenship used for all
diversity purposes. . . . [I]t would have made more sense to choose some other basis
than citizenship, such as residence or corporate presence, to determine a party’s connection to the forum state.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 136 (“By using citizenship (domicile) of both the plaintiffs and defendants as the measure of how localized a
controversy is, Congress has insured that many controversies that are very closely connected to only one state will not be able to fit the exceptions no matter how the courts
interpret the statute.”).
358
See Cabraser, supra note 262, at 548 (“It is indisputable that the primary political goal of CAFA was to remove state class actions to the federal system, where, it was
assumed, they would be dealt with severely (either through active denial of class certification, or simply by being warehoused indefinitely by an overwhelmed judiciary).”);
Purcell, supra note 5, at 1887 (“CAFA did not so much save defendants from biased
state courts as reward them with access to an alternate forum that they regarded as
more favorable to their interests.”).
359
See Friendly, supra note 81, at 498 (“There was a vague feeling that the new
courts would be strong courts, creditors’ courts, business men’s courts.”); see also supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
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law class action litigation against it (in all states but two) a matter of
such strong “national interest” as to trump the interests of the several
states.
What precisely are those interests? After all, CAFA does not pur360
port to change Erie jurisprudence, and thus federal courts exercising
the jurisdiction it confers are seemingly bound to apply state “substantive” law (including the specific state law(s) selected by the choice of
361
Yet, federal
law rules of the state in which the federal court sits).
courts sitting in diversity are famously not authoritative sources of
state law, and the exercise of diversity jurisdiction has, even in the re362
cent past, been at cross purposes with the evolution of state law.
These potential costs of ordinary diversity litigation are much more
salient when state courts can, and predictably will, be stripped of the
capacity to use a potent remedial form to implement substantive policy
363
in a jurisdictional world that is no longer meaningfully concurrent.
360

See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46
(“[T]he Act does not change the application of the Erie Doctrine.”); id. at 61, 66
(same); Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1943 & n.129 (noting evidence that
Congress did not intend to change the allocation of lawmaking authority under Erie);
supra note 178.
361
I have previously sketched an argument that would justify a federal court under
CAFA in refusing to apply a state choice of law rule that “bootstrapped” to enable aggregation, on the ground that such a rule would be inconsistent with CAFA’s jurisdictional policy. See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1949-52.
362
See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and
Judicial Federalism after Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1463-65 (1997) (discussing problems when “federal courts may be precluded from exercising similar judicial creativity
[to that exercised by state courts] by principles of judicial federalism”); Heather Scribner, Protecting Federalism Interests After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: A Response to
Professor Vairo, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1440-42 (2005) (arguing that federal courts
should abstain from deciding diversity cases when the applicable state law is unclear);
Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1677-82 (1992) (criticizing diversity jurisdiction for interfering
with the development of state law); see also S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 87, reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 80 (Minority Views of Senators Leahy, Kennedy, Biden, Feingold, and
Durbin) (“[T]he class action legislation will slow—and in some cases thwart—the continual interpretation of state law.” (internal quotation omitted)).
363
See Marcus, supra note 28, at 1311-12 (arguing that CAFA ultimately weakens
“the regulatory effect of state law”); Scribner, supra note 362, at 1441-42 (same). As
Alan Morrison states,
[I]t is my experience that class actions often raise claims that seek to push the
boundaries of legal liability to new levels, and when the claim is based on state
law, but is in federal court, federal judges, not state judges, will have the last
word on the meaning of state law.
Morrison, supra note 9, at 1527; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., No.
05-0666, 2006 WL 999955, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2006) (“Under CAFA, plaintiffs
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We know that some of CAFA’s supporters were not seeking different class action law so much as they were seeking different attitudes
towards class certification. They hoped that many of the putative class
actions removed under CAFA would be denied certification and go
away. We also know that the authors of the Senate Report rejected a
major premise of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, deeming institutionally illegitimate the goal of promoting law enforcement through
364
Congress could,
negative-value class actions enabled by court rule.
of course, alter that policy judgment respecting negative-value class
actions on a transsubstantive basis, as it has done occasionally in spe365
But if it were to do so, one would hope,
cific substantive contexts.

attorneys must now bring most indirect purchaser class actions under state antitrust
law in federal court. . . . [T]his means that, as a practical matter, state courts will rarely
get to interpret their own state antitrust laws.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Indeed, Cabraser argues that federal courts should take a “fresh approach”
to enabling “multi-state classes to proceed under a class action framework” because “we
no longer enjoy the safety valve of dual state-federal court systems where such class actions are involved.” Cabraser, supra note 262, at 567. She continues, “CAFA has eliminated the state court ‘safe harbor’ in which single-state class actions can be litigated.”
Id. Professor Nagareda’s interesting discussion of the uncomfortable role that choice
of law plays in class certification perhaps implicitly recognizes the latter point. For he
observes that, “[i]n institutional terms, [choice of law] principles crafted to mediate
the authority of competing state sovereigns turn out to sort the parallel roles of class
action litigation and the administrative state—of private and public—potentially leaving only the latter.” Nagareda, supra note 238, at 10. Presumably that is not a concern
to the extent that statewide class actions can pick up the slack.
364
See supra note 28 and accompanying text. In this respect, the Senate Report
calls to mind a 1980 dissenting opinion of Justice Powell. In response to the Court’s
observation that reliance on private attorneys general had been “facilitated by Rule
23,” Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980), and that the empowerment of those with negative-value claims was “a central concept of Rule 23,” id. at 338
n.9, Justice Powell argued that “predicating a judgment on these concerns amounts to
judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement
available for particular substantive claims.” Id. at 354-55 (Powell, J., dissenting). He
added that “[s]uch a judgment ordinarily is best left to Congress” and that, “[a]t the
very least, the result should be consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the
claim.” Id. at 355; see also supra note 198 (quoting more of Justice Powell’s opinion).
365
See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the Truth in Lending
Act, which did not have an amount-in-controversy requirement); Burbank, Aggregation,
supra note 178, at 1928-30 (describing the possibility that a legislature could view negative-value class actions as a “‘vehicle’ or ‘format’ for the vindication of substantive
rights”). An alternative strategy to capping class recoveries would be to bar class actions in certain types of cases where the risk of inefficient overdeterrence seems particularly great. In that regard, a provision of New York law, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b)
(McKinney 2005), prohibits class actions seeking to recover a statutory penalty or a
minimum measure of recovery (i.e., statutory damages) unless the statute specifically
authorizes their use. In Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (N.Y. 2007),
the New York Court of Appeals held that treble damages authorized by a state antitrust
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first, that it would act transparently, and second, that in doing so, it
would attend to at least one difference, to wit, the source of the governing substantive law. In any event, if the federal courts were to follow the lead of the Senate Report, the costs of their altered stance toward negative-value class actions would be incurred by the states,
which would be largely denied the ability to pursue a different vision
366
of justice in their courts through the class action.
It remains to be seen, of course, whether, like some kinds of federal preemption, CAFA will create the federal uniformity of a regulatory void.367 In any event, at a time when the Supreme Court has re-

statute constitute a penalty for this purpose. Still another strategy is to bar class actions
in cases seeking recovery of very small individual amounts. Thus, South Carolina requires that each member of a damages class have a claim putting in controversy more
than $100. See S.C. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(5) (“[I]n cases in which the relief primarily sought
is not injunctive or declaratory with respect to the class as a whole, the amount in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars for each member of the class.”); Gardner v.
Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 200, 201-02 (S.C. 1991) (applying Rule
23(a)(5)).
366
As one court has observed,
[W]hen faced with almost identical medical monitoring class certification motions, state courts are generally more amenable to granting certification than
are federal courts.
Further, this dichotomy carries serious implications in light of CAFA. As
noted above . . . the likelihood that federal jurisdiction will attach to even a
single-state class action is much higher after passage of CAFA. To the extent
that some areas of state substantive law are only adjudicated in the form of
class actions, CAFA will thus work to preclude state courts from any opportunity to address certain areas of law. More to the point at issue here, CAFA will
also remove from state courts the chance even to apply their own civil procedural rules to determine the threshold question of whether certification of a
medical monitoring class is appropriate. The upshot of CAFA, then, is to
move questions of medical monitoring class certification out of state courts
and into federal courts—a move, which, based on existing precedent, favors
defendants.
In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 279, 308 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (internal
quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
367
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 497-98 (2008) (discussing how federal preemption in the
products-liability context can lead to remedial and enforcement voids that can leave
consumers without recourse); cf. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339
(1980) (“The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action
of government.”).
Professor Walker’s prediction that CAFA’s consumer-protection provisions will
prove the “most significant” part of the statute, Walker, supra note 26, at 849-50, reflects another prediction, to wit, that CAFA’s “jurisdictional provision . . . will have little
independent effect.” Id. at 849; see also id. at 851; id. at 867 (predicting that removals
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discovered the constitutional safeguards of federalism, and whether or
not Professor Floyd’s views about CAFA’s constitutional infirmities
persuade, it hardly seems too much to expect clarity about the reasons
thought to warrant access to federal court. Moreover, however troublesome some of the policy choices animating the 1966 amendments
to Rule 23 may now appear from the perspective of political legitimacy, it hardly seems too much to expect such clarity when federal jurisdictional legislation enables litigants to deprive states of the ability
368
to implement similar policy choices as a matter of state law.
There is, however, one element in the legislative mix not yet considered, namely, the policy of using federal jurisdiction to mitigate the
costs of overlapping class actions. Even if consideration of the way in
which CAFA implements that policy does not alter the conclusion that

“will not result in different outcomes, only more class action litigation in federal
court”). The latter prediction is based entirely on a pre-CAFA Federal Judicial Center
study of a sample of 438 removed cases. See generally Willging & Wheatman, supra note
84. Comparing results in retained and remanded cases within a subset of 292 closed
removal cases from the sample, the researchers found that “[f]ederal and state judges
were about equally likely to certify a class, whether for trial and litigation or settlement.” Id. at 640; see also id. at 635 tbl.11 (finding class certification in twenty-four remanded cases (twenty percent), as compared to thirty-seven retained cases (twenty-two
percent)). They also found that the median class monetary recovery or settlement in
remanded (state court) cases was greater than in retained (federal court) cases, but
that this was a function of class size, and that the median recovery per class member
was greater in retained cases than in those remanded. See id. at 639 tbl.15.
Without in any way diminishing the value of such empirical work, particularly in a
policy landscape dominated by anecdotes, this is a very small sample. Moreover, I
doubt that removed and remanded cases are representative of pre-CAFA cases filed in
state court in which there was no attempt to remove (which would include cases terminating in collusive settlements and probably many statewide—as opposed to multistate—class actions). See supra text accompanying notes 353-354 (describing such
cases). Finally, although the FJC authors make a sound empirical observation when
noting that data from avowedly “outlier” courts are unrepresentative, see Willging &
Wheatman, supra note 84, at 597 n.21 (commenting on Beisner & Miller, supra note
239, which focused on three outlier courts), CAFA’s supporters relying on those data
did not need to claim that all, or even most, state courts were “magnet courts” or “judicial hellholes.” See Beisner & Miller, supra note 239, at 155 (“[C]lass action lawyers are
bringing a large number of cases in a small number of state courts that have become
‘magnets’ for interstate class actions and that thus exercise a wildly disproportionate
role in adjudicating national disputes.”); id. at 157 (“[T]his new wave of class actions
was not evenly distributed among state courts nationwide.”).
368
In noting that “the sponsors of the bill were not very precise when describing
how the exceptions would work,” Professor Shapiro seems not to consider that their
ambiguity and inconsistency may have been deliberate and strategic. Shapiro, supra
note 63, at 125. For the negative impact on democratic values of using “procedure” to
transform legal rights, see generally JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation
Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717 (2004).
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the statute was an abdication of Congress’s duty to safeguard legitimate state interests, attention to it may provide cover to those among
CAFA’s supporters, in and out of Congress, who do not wish to be associated with the notion that the business of the federal courts is busi369
ness.
The Judicial Conference opposed the early (i.e., late-1990s) class
action jurisdiction bills on workload and federalism grounds. The
bills in question had a much lower amount-in-controversy requirement and fewer exceptions and carve-outs to permit class actions to
370
remain in state court. But the Conference supported using minimal
diversity to deal with the problems of dispersed litigation arising out
371
of a common accident or disaster.
Between the time that the Conference opposed a pre-CAFA bill in
1999 and its reconsideration of that position in 2002–2003, a number
of important developments occurred, including, first, the Chief Justice’s silence in response to the recommendations of the Mass Torts
Working Group and, second, the work of the rulemakers in trying to

369

In his valuable article, Morrison suggests that the primary rationale originally
invoked for CAFA was “the concern that overlapping and/or duplicative class actions
cannot be consolidated in a single court, which can cause inefficiencies and possibly
conflicting orders,” and that it was subordinated in the debate to the “national class
action rationale . . . largely because there are a number of poignant examples.” Morrison, supra note 9, at 1531; see also id. at 1539 (“As the bills proceeded in Congress, the
overlapping class action concept began to take a back seat to another rationale . . . .”).
This is not the way I read the history, at least in the Senate (I have not reread the
House history for this purpose). It is true that Senator Kohl mentioned the goal of
“avoid[ing] a collusive ‘race to settlement’ by consolidating overlapping cases” in connection with S. 2083, which he co-sponsored with Senator Grassley. See 144 CONG.
REC. 24,603 (1998) (statement of Sen. Kohl). That was not, however, the primary rationale he invoked. See id. (noting that S. 2083 “encourages closer scrutiny of class actions through several provisions”); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at
1555 n.4 (“Class action abuses were the original target of the bill . . . .”). Moreover, by
the next Congress—five years before CAFA was enacted—addressing the problems
created by overlapping and/or duplicative class actions was clearly secondary to the
goal of bringing “interstate class actions” into federal court. See S. REP. NO. 106-420, at
9 (2000) (describing the key components of the proposed Class Action Fairness Act of
2000). As the discussion in the text reveals, I also do not share Morrison’s sanguine
view about the “overlapping and/or duplicative class actions” rationale, although I
note his acknowledgment that “there is remarkably little empirical evidence to support
even a removal bill designed to solve problems from multiple unremovable class actions.” Morrison, supra note 9, at 1538 n.40. Finally, I certainly agree with his view that
statewide class actions—that is, actions restricted to the residents or citizens of one
state, even when based on the same claim—should not be removable. See id. at 1546
n.59.
370
See supra text accompanying notes 350-351.
371
See supra text accompanying notes 293-297.
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devise solutions to the problems created by overlapping class actions
dispersed between the federal and state courts. The rulemakers’ efforts culminated in the conclusion that the problems were beyond the
power of the rules process to fix. As a result, the Civil Rules Committee and the Standing Committee had become convinced that any solution to the problems created by overlapping class actions would have
372
to come from Congress.
The Judicial Conference’s struggle to fashion a position on CAFA
in 2003 suggests that key actors within the federal judiciary were divided as to both whether to support the legislation and where the line
should be drawn between cases that such legislation should allow to
be brought into federal court and cases that it should leave in state
373
The prospects for successful opposition on general grounds
court.
may have been slim as a matter of political reality. Moreover, the judiciary had already supported the use of minimal diversity for targeted
374
jurisdictional purposes in connection with the 2002 legislation (as
375
well as in the Federal Courts Study Committee Report). By inconsistently espousing and/or partially obscuring the specific federalism
concerns of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee, and by refusing
to respond with specifics to a request for legislative language, the federal judiciary may have ensured that politics would indeed triumph.
One who has cautioned the institutional judiciary about its com376
munications with Congress should probably applaud the Conference for refusing to be drawn into the intensely political battles over
the line-drawing exercise that CAFA required. From that perspective,
it should make no difference that the refusal occurred in response to
a specific request from a member of Congress. It is one thing for the
federal judiciary merely to remind Congress that proposed legislation
portending a substantial diversion of cases from state courts to the
federal courts should be evaluated in terms of its workload and federalism implications. It is quite another thing to specify just what
proper regard for federalism requires. Yet, it is also important to recall that the institutional federal judiciary has not always been consistent in its invocation of principle, and thus that some of its communi-

372

See supra text accompanying notes 288-292.
See supra text accompanying notes 298-306.
374
See supra text accompanying notes 293-297.
375
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 79, at 44-45.
376
See Burbank, supra note 7, at 1729-34 (discussing the potential costs of such
communications).
373
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cations with Congress invoking principle have been designed to ad377
vance particular policy views.
The 1999 letter on behalf of the Conference went beyond a mere
reminder to keep federalism values in mind. That letter, after all, included the assertion that “[t]ime-honored principles . . . counsel that
access to the federal courts be expanded only where the expansion
would serve a substantial federal interest and only where the parameters of the expansion have been carefully crafted to address the perceived problem without unnecessary adverse effects on state judicial
378
379
The March 2003 letter was even more specific.
In
processes.”
context, then, the subsequent refusal to provide specific legislative
language in a letter that again submerged the particular federalism
380
concerns raised by the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee virtually
ensured that the political process would vindicate the maximalist view
of the Standing Committee.
CAFA’s statement of findings and purposes gives no notice of a
perceived problem arising out of overlapping class actions dispersed
between the federal and state courts and also no notice of congres381
sional purpose to address those problems. Even without consulting
382
the legislative history, however, the existence of that aim can be in-

377

See id. at 1733 (describing the costs of the judiciary’s “taking sides in an inevitably policy preference-laden debate”); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist
Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 308-09 (2003) (“[I]ndividual
judges are discouraged from breaking ranks with the official conference policy, and
the policies become an expression of norms of the judiciary by which entrants to the
federal judiciary are socialized into its ranks.” (footnote omitted)).
378
Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham to Representative Henry J. Hyde, supra
note 350, at 5.
379
See Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham to Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, supra note 305, at 2 (“Accordingly, parallel in-state class actions would not
present, on a broad or national scale, the problems of state projection of law beyond
its borders and would present few of the choice of law problems associated with nationwide class action litigation.”); id. at 3 (“While the relationship of the defendant to
the forum may have some bearing on state adjudicatory power, an insistence that all
primary defendants maintain formal in-state citizenship is too limiting and may preclude in-state class actions where a defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum
state, regardless of citizenship.”).
380
See supra text accompanying note 306.
381
See CAFA § 2(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 note (Supp. V 2005); supra text accompanying note 11.
382
See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 23, 38, 40-41 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
23, 36-37, 38-39 (expressing Congress’s intent to minimize duplicative class actions and
forum shopping); see also Shapiro, supra note 63, at 130-31 (discussing the proper interpretation of “principal injuries” in the “local controversy exception” in light of the
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ferred from two of the statute’s exceptions, the “discretionary exception” and the (mandatory) “local controversy” exception. As to the
former, one consideration that a federal court is to take into account
when deciding whether, “in the interests of justice,” to decline to exercise jurisdiction is “whether, during the 3-year period preceding the
filing of that class action, [one] or more other class actions asserting the
same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have
383
been filed.” As to the latter, even if all of the other, very restrictive,
conditions are met, the exception evaporates unless “during the 3-year
period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action
has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against
384
any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons . . . .”
Passing differences in language and focusing only on the “local
controversy” exception, the exclusion from the exception would prevent a federal court from declining to exercise jurisdiction under
CAFA if one statewide class action involving different class plaintiffs
but similar claims against the same defendant had been filed within
three years (even if that class action were itself not removable under
CAFA!). One of the supposed selling points of the compromise enabling CAFA’s passage was that it “limit[ed] a court’s authority to base
federal jurisdiction on the existence of similar class actions filed in
other states by disallowing consideration of other cases that are more
385
than three years old.” This was an exceedingly small point at which
to stick. The exclusion effectively privileges the supposed federal interest in managing overlapping class actions over the interests of a
state, even in cases where greater than two-thirds of class members
and a defendant from whom significant relief is sought are citizens of
386
that state and the principal injuries alleged were incurred there.

legislative history, and concluding that exceptions “were to be used for truly local controversies, not local subsets of nationwide controversies”).
383
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(F).
384
Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii).
385
149 CONG. REC. S16,103 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
386
As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted,
The Committee wishes to stress that another purpose of this criterion is to ensure that overlapping or competing class actions or class actions making similar factual allegations against the same defendant that would benefit from coordination are not excluded from federal court by the Local Controversy
Exception and thus placed beyond the coordinating authority of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 40-41 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 39. Many people
have failed to grasp the effect of these provisions on statutory exceptions that were al-
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The affront to federalism values in this provision may not simply
be that the provision disables states from adjudicating cases in which
they have an intense interest. Once the state court class actions are
brought into federal court, they will likely be subject to the tender
mercies of the multidistrict litigation process. In that process, the incentives of key participants—some counsel, defendants, and the transferee court—will be to create bigger “litigations” either by evading the
restrictions on settlement classes that the Supreme Court prescribed
in Amchem and Ortiz or through abandonment of the class form for
nonclass aggregations. The incentives, in other words, will be to elide
factual and legal differences that, although impeding certification, are
what states regard as critical conditions for, or determinants of, effec387
tive regulation.
ready very narrow. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 72, at 495 (“[Mississippi trial lawyer Richard] Scruggs predicts that attorneys seeking leverage in settlement negotiations with
corporations will file class action suits in a big state such as California, along with companion suits in smaller neighboring states where there might be overlapping claims—
assuming they can find injured individuals who are residents of those smaller states.”).
Indeed, even some academics do not seem to grasp the narrowness of the exceptions.
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 28, at 1313 (“Also, CAFA allows for single-state class actions
in state court, so large cases in California and New York, for example, may compensate
for regulation lost to the statute.”); id. at 1290 (inaccurately summarizing exceptions).
But see, e.g., Morrison, supra note 9, at 1534 (“[T]he way [the exceptions] are drafted
will result in virtually no cases ever being remanded.”); id. at 1538 (“There is only the
most remote chance that a case will be sent back to state court under one of the narrow remand provisions . . . .”); Shapiro, supra note 63, at 85-86 (“The exceptions were
drafted in a way that will make it very difficult for plaintiffs to use them, even in many
cases that more properly belong in state, rather than federal court.”). The FJC’s ongoing empirical work includes the question of whether CAFA’s exceptions “preserve state
court jurisdiction over in-state class actions.” Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1737. If
their work in that respect is to be of any value, it will be essential to define “in-state
class actions” precisely and to follow that definition consistently.
387
See Marcus, supra note 26, at 1769 (“[O]ne possible result of CAFA’s juridictional policy could be to empower future federal courts to become more creative in
favor of class action treatment than they have been in the past.”); id. at 1813-19 (discussing the development of choice of law rules for class actions in efforts to impede or
allow class certification); Mark Moller, Class Action Lawmaking: An Administrative Law
Model, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 39, 107 (2006) (“[T]here is reason to fear that class action
courts face special institutional pressures that predispose them to favor certification.”).
Interpretation of a number of Supreme Court opinions have [sic] reduced the
effectiveness of the class action as a means of settling a mass conflict. This development has led a number of judges and attorneys, particularly in pharmaceutical cases, to attempt mass settlements on a consolidated and cooperative
basis without the formalities of a class action. The substitute quasi-class action
aggregate technique has advantages and is being closely studied.
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 540-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations
omitted). Those who were surprised by Judge Weinstein’s call for the expansion of
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On that view, CAFA may result in the replication on a grander
scale, under cover of settlement, of some of the supposed abuses in
state court class actions that Congress said it wanted to stamp out.
The difference would be that the balance of bargaining power in set388
Indeed, in an inversion
tlement would have shifted to defendants.
of the notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy, CAFA may dry up the market for statewide class actions,389 leading counsel who understand the
dynamics of the MDL process to seek to be first in line with a multistate class action that nods and winks past a Supreme Court that has
390
lost interest. Whatever the potential benefits and costs of gathering

CAFA’s jurisdictional reach in this opinion, see id. at 542 (“It may be useful for Congress to consider expanding the Class Action Fairness Act from class actions to at least
some national MDL, non-Rule 23, aggregate actions.”), need look no further for an
explanation. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1993-98 (1997)
(discussing the “possibility that Judge Weinstein’s utility function drives him to seek (or
create) the extraordinary in preference to the ordinary—‘litigations’ rather than cases”).
388
Professor Stephen Shapiro’s assertion that “the settlement leverage will still tilt
towards the plaintiffs,” Shapiro, supra note 63, at 131, seems to neglect the added leverage defendants will have in most MDL proceedings involving multiple statewide class
actions by reason of their ability to prevent certification for litigation. Cf. Purcell, supra
note 5, at 1874 (discussing the added leverage that defendants have to extract collusive
settlements after CAFA by remaining in state court but threatening removal and the
risk of a federal court refusing certification).
389
See Cabraser, supra note 262, at 544 n.6 (“The remaining alternatives [to a state
court nationwide consumer class action] would seem to be fifty separate class actions . . . or more likely, after the enactment of [CAFA], . . . a multistate class action in
federal court.”).
In Figueroa—which was not an MDL proceeding because the competing class actions were in state court—the court that ultimately declined to approve the settlement
had preliminarily certified a multistate class for claims that included breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, unjust enrichment,
money had and received, and unfair business practices and false advertising under
statutes of all fifty states. Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292,
1300-01, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2007). Apparently, the court accepted plaintiffs’ contentions
that there were no consequential differences among state laws. See id. at 1300-01; cf.
supra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of class counsel to wish
away differences in state law so as to secure certification of multistate classes in state
court). But cf. Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 730 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing
certification of a multistate class alleging breach of express and implied warranties because of failure of plaintiffs to demonstrate predominance).
390
As Stern reported,
Milberg Weiss co-founder Mel Weiss sees an opportunity in the new class action bill statute [sic]. He expects smaller law firms that specialize in state
courts to seek out his firm of 120 lawyers now that more class actions will wind
up in federal court. “In some ways, it will help me,” Weiss says.
Stern, supra note 72, at 495.
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mass disaster litigation in the federal courts, it is difficult to understand why difficulties encountered in the management of overlapping
class actions under the default regime warranted a remedy so grossly
overinclusive. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why an adequate
solution to those difficulties was not possible through a minor
391
amendment to the Anti-Injunction Act.
This aspect of CAFA raises most clearly the question whether the
additional burdens that the statute imposes on the federal courts will
adversely affect the quality of justice, not just in the cases that it allows
to be brought to federal court, but also in the rest of the federal
docket. This concern is particularly acute at a time when civil trials
392
are vanishing, when the resources the federal courts receive from
393
Congress may be inadequate to handle their (pre)existing work, and
when some of those courts appear to be embracing procedural shortcuts that are themselves troublesome from the perspective of the op394
timal enforcement of the substantive law. This concern is also more
insistent to the extent that some key members of the federal judiciary
sought (or at least welcomed) the burdens CAFA will impose. Animated by an expansive (if not imperialistic) view of the gathering
powers of federal courts, some federal judges have become inured to a
view of modern litigation that, by privileging the goals of reducing expense and delay, ignores the costs of complexity.395
391

Distinguish the cases in question here—in connection with the “local controversy” exception—from the kinds of cases that were the object of the aborted rules
proposals and Judge Easterbrook’s Bridgestone/Firestone opinion, which were, by and
large, multistate class actions. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
392
See supra note 277 and accompanying text (noting that more cases are terminated by summary judgment than by trial).
393
See Cabraser et al., supra note 29, at 401 (“Since CAFA provides for no new
judgeships, no additional staffing, and no new resources for the federal judiciary,
CAFA will further increase the federal courts’ already heavy burdens.”); Lee & Willging, supra note 26, at 1726 (“From a purely administrative perspective, the resulting
increase in complex cases seemed dangerous, threatening to consume scarce judicial
resources and to place additional pressures on an already overburdened federal judiciary.”).
394
See Burbank, supra note 277, at 624-25 (discussing legal and factual “carving”
for purposes of granting summary judgment, both of which can subvert the substantive
law); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (redefining pleading requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8); Editorial, The Devil in the
Details, 91 JUDICATURE 52 (2007) (criticizing Twombly for constricting access to federal
court). The author is chair of the Editorial Committee of the American Judicature Society, which publishes Judicature.
395
See Burbank, supra note 356, at 1476-83; Burbank, supra note 307 (discussing
complex American litigation); see also supra note 72 (questioning the Federal Judicial
Center’s decision—for all consolidated cases, including those subject to the MDL
process—to include only lead cases in their analysis of CAFA cases in federal court).
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Finally, there is evidence that the federal courts are resisting some
396
of the most egregious overreaching of CAFA’s supporters. Whether
or not that is true, the experience of the federal judiciary in commenting on legislative proposals and implementing the final product may
advance understanding of the institution as an interest group.
Failure to speak with one voice in the legislative process leading
up to CAFA prevented the federal judiciary from checking the excesses of interest-group and partisan politics. The voice that, as a solo,
might have made a difference—cautioning against overloading already burdened federal courts—was recognizable as both inflected
with institutional self-interest and pitched to the interests of all liti397
The other voice in the federal judiciary’s
gants in federal courts.
duet—championing the gathering powers of federal courts—not only
took a narrower view of institutional interest, but it could also be
enlisted in the chorus of those who, while waving the Stars and
398
In such circumstances, it
Stripes, were singing L’Internationale.
396

See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1579-91 (presenting data
seeming “to show that both the district courts and the courts of appeals have resisted
an expansive reading of CAFA”).
397
See Burbank, supra note 7, at 1733 n.254 (“On matters as to which one would
expect the judiciary to try to maximize the institution’s collective preferences, . . . everyone recognizes that judges are self-interested and can discount what they say without
closing off an obvious and important source of relevant information.”). But see id.
(“[T]here are reasons to doubt the judiciary’s ability to forecast the work that new
statutory rights would create.”). Speaking in July 2003, when CAFA’s prospects remained unclear, Judge Hodges, the chair of the JPML, said,
We certainly don’t want to open the floodgates to an onslaught of litigation
in the federal courts that would overwhelm us and require the creation of
otherwise unneeded additional federal judges or encroach upon traditional
jurisdiction of the states. It is a very sensitive area. It is a question of how you
strike a balance in the long run in defining what constitutes a mass tort, how
many claims there should be, how many plaintiffs, what the amount of [sic]
controversy should be, and to what extent you are going to relax the diversity
requirements. Even then, there are always going to be some cases that would
remain in state court. The so-called minimal diversity bill is pending in Congress now, and the chance of passage is anybody’s guess. I really don’t know.
Hansel, supra note 275, at 20.
398
See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002) (disparaging an approach to class certification that reflects “the model of the central planner”); Burbank, supra note 7, at 1733 (noting that the perception that the institutional
judiciary’s position on proposed legislation, even though supposedly based on neutral
principle, is in fact based on ideological considerations causes the judiciary to “incur
the same costs as if it were actually participating on the merits of such debate”); id. at
1734 n.254 (arguing that the judiciary should provide data to Congress without advancing an argument about the “‘proper’ role of the federal courts”); Lee & Willging,
supra note 26, at 1732 (“The judiciary’s concerns about caseload were balanced by its
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would hardly be surprising that, once the occasion for attempted institutional unity had passed, both a more capacious view of institutional
interest and divergent views about the requirements of federalism
399
found powerful voices.
CONCLUSION
The view one takes of a statute that was enacted three years ago is
necessarily preliminary, at least in some dimensions. Mindful of the
400
ease with which a federal statute’s “antecedent period of travail” can
be forgotten, it seemed to me useful to record here some of the history that may illuminate an appreciation, if not the interpretation, of
what is, after all, a major piece of federal legislation.
Unfortunately, although the statute’s studied ambiguity on critical
questions has already generated a great deal of litigation, the extent of
401
its impact on the “happy relation of States to Nation” remains unclear and likely will be for a long time to come. So too does its impact
on the general quality of justice in the federal courts, although the
Federal Judicial Center’s empirical studies should provide a basis for
402
judgment on some dimensions of that question.
The hypocrisy and ambiguity underlying and infecting CAFA are
especially vexing for one who, although informed by the political science literature on judicial behavior, has an abiding faith in the federal
judiciary to prefer law to ideology when the law is clear. Nonetheless,
I doubt that the federal judiciary will bring about a regulatory void—

own interest in finding solutions to the problems associated with multiple and overlapping class action litigation in the state and federal courts.”). As I have previously
observed,
[A]lthough the breakdown of the congressional committee system and the
other forces that have led to the dominance of party influence and party discipline in legislative politics help to explain why members of Congress might
in fact regard the judiciary as just another interest group, we all suffer when it
is so regarded.
Burbank, supra note 7, at 1741.
399
See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 1589-90 (“[T]he insignificance of
the factor representing docket pressure indicates that judges are not resisting CAFA
merely because of a heavy workload.”); see also supra text accompanying note 393 (noting the possible inadequacy of judicial resources).
400
George H. Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA. L. REV. 504, 504 (1935).
401
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 1, at 2. For the importance of looking to
the impact of CAFA on state courts, see supra text accompanying note 14.
402
For a description of the FJC’s ongoing work, see Lee & Willging, supra note 26,
at 1743 (describing Phases II and III of the FJC study).
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the fondest hope of some of CAFA’s supporters—in those cases where
the argument in favor of federal jurisdiction is strongest. Indeed,
mindful of the impact that politics (through judicial selection) has
had on forum preference for class actions, viewed from the perspective of either the federal or the state courts, it seems possible that
CAFA’s supporters, too, may come to regret the extent of their success
403
in opening access to federal court. That does not allay, however, the
concerns that arise from considering the likely fate of cases for which
the argument in favor of federal jurisdiction reduces to the fictions of
corporate citizenship and the gathering powers of federal courts.
At the end of the day, CAFA’s exceedingly narrow exceptions are
revealed as another depressing example of legislative overreaching by
those who invoke the virtues of federalism when it is convenient to do
404
so. There is no need, and no good reason, to await experience under the statute, much of which, for years, will consist of jurisdictional
litigation that lacks any social utility. CAFA’s exceptions should be
amended now to restore the balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants in class actions where a state’s interest in regulation
through litigation is intense and where the argument for federal jurisdiction relies on the fictions of corporate citizenship and the gathering powers of federal courts. One way to do that would be to add
exceptions that allow putative class actions composed predominantly
of in-state citizens and putative class actions alleging in-state injury to
person or property to remain in state court if they would remain there
405
under the default regime. Yet, it would seem a shame to compound
403

See Marcus, supra note 26, at 1769 (“There is no particular reason to assume the
enduring attractiveness for business interests of federal courts’, compared to state
courts’, views on class certification and related matters . . . .”); id. at 1789 (suggesting
that CAFA may in the long run benefit plaintiffs, rather than defendants).
404
See Purcell, supra note 5, at 1871 (“CAFA inspired an astonishing reversal in the
attitude of conservatives and Republicans toward the state courts.”). To the extent,
however, that indignation on this score has a partisan element, it should be tempered
by Professor Pfander’s account of legislation proposed by Senator Tydings in 1969
“that broadly authorized the federal courts to assert jurisdiction over consumer class
actions based on state law.” Pfander, supra note 203, at 1445. As Pfander observes, the
“apparent purpose of the legislation was . . . to shift consumer class actions into federal
court to secure the application of what were then perceived as the more liberal joinder
provisions of Rule 23.” Id. at 1446. Moreover, the proposed legislation died in part
because of the “concerted opposition of the very business groups that were later to
support the adoption of CAFA.” Id. at 1446-47.
405
This appears to have been the approach of the Federal-State Jurisdiction
Committee of the Judicial Conference:
In that context, this Committee endorsed an approach that it believes will preserve a greater role for the state courts than the role contemplated in the pre-
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the waste of litigation fostered by jurisdictional provisions that are
keyed to the number of citizens in a putative class. Moreover, citizenship ratios themselves do not reliably signal state interest. For those
reasons, in a regime of minimal diversity that acknowledged the power
of fictions to thwart legitimate state interests, it might make more
sense to confine the additional exception to any putative class action
seeking recovery only on behalf of those alleging in-state injury to person or property as a result of the activities of the defendant—without
regard to the citizenship of either plaintiffs or defendants. Such a
provision would have the additional value of dispensing with some of
the more troublesome maneuvers by which plaintiffs can defeat removal in the default regime, notably through joinder of a nondiverse
406
The contemplated amendments to CAFA should also
defendant.
eliminate provisions in existing exceptions that are designed to enable
federal court management of overlapping class actions, but which
might result in recrudescence in federal court of some of the state
court abuses that CAFA sought to eliminate. Finally, Congress should
consider whether, in light of scholarship discussing targeted jurisdic407
tional policy, amendments to the Anti-Injunction Act are necessary
to give the federal courts what they really need.

vious legislative proposals. That approach would create new exceptions to any
class action legislative proposal relying on minimal diversity jurisdiction.
Those exceptions would preclude the use of minimal diversity where (1) substantially all members of the class are citizens of a single state, or (2) the
claims arise from death, personal injury, or physical property damage within
the state.
AGENDA E-9 ADDENDUM, supra note 299, at 5. The Committee observed that its proposed approach “would leave the determination of the citizenship of the defendants,
and the satisfaction of the complete diversity requirement, to be made in accordance
with current jurisdictional rules.” Id. at 5 n.9. See supra text accompanying note 299
(discussing the history of this proposal).
406
See supra text accompanying note 356. The provision would also eliminate
whatever room remained (under the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee’s proposal),
if any, for forum shopping facilitated by general doing-business jurisdiction.
407
See Burbank, Aggregation, supra note 178, at 1949-52 (arguing that CAFA is animated by a different, more targeted, policy of federal jurisdiction from the policy of
diversity jurisdiction implemented in Erie’s progeny); Wolff, supra note 27, at 2069-72
(noting that CAFA provides federal jurisdiction in cases that may lead to “broad commercial harms” or a decrease in confidence in the judicial system and, for these reasons, may fall within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act in certain cases); supra
note 287 (advocating careful consideration of “jurisdictional” policy in interpreting the
“in aid of jurisdiction” exception under the Anti-Injunction Act).
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APPENDIX
Table 1: State Adoptions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
This table contains information on state adoptions of the 1966 amendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The first four sections contain states not
adopting the rule or for which a date could not be found. The remaining sections are organized in chronological order.
State and Year

Description

States Without Class Action (2)
Mississippi408
Virginia409
States Retaining a Rule Not Derived from the Federal Rule (3)
California

“California’s operative general class action statute . . . was enacted in 1872 as part of California’s
Field Code and has remained essentially un410
changed.” However, “California class action jurisprudence embraces and synthesizes Rule 23 and its
jurisprudence.” 411

Nebraska

Still retains the “procedural statutes based on the
Field Code of 1849.” 412

408

See Don Barrett & Alfred H. Davidson IV, Mississippi, in STATE LAWS SUBCOMM.
OF THE CLASS ACTIONS AND DERIVATIVE SUITS COMM., ABA, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS
ACTION LAW 2007–2008, at 379, 379 (Dennis K. Egan et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
ABA, SURVEY] (“The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure contain no section permitting
class actions.”). For partial alternatives to class actions in states that do not follow Federal Rule 23, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes:
Differences from—and Lessons for?—Federal Rule 23, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008) (manuscript at 102-03), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090554.
409
See Dale W. Pittman, Virginia, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 711, 711.
410
Elizabeth J. Cabraser et al., California, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 55, 56.
411
Id. at 76.
412
Edward D. Hotz & Shawna D. Peterson, Nebraska, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note
408, at 417, 417.
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State and Year

Description

Wisconsin

Rule includes only the concepts of numerosity and
commonality and states them in the disjunctive.413
Interpretations of the Federal Rule are nevertheless
414
persuasive.

States Retaining the 1938 Version of the Federal Rule (1)
North Carolina415
States Adopting the 1966 Federal Rule for Which a Date Could Not Be Found (2)
Connecticut
Maine
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1966–1971 (11)416
Arizona (1966)417
Minnesota (1967)

413

Rule adopted 1951, amended 1967, and revised
1988.418 The Minnesota Supreme Court indicated in
1972 that “the first two requisites” of the rule had
been met in a case.419 Since the 1938 Federal Rule
divided class actions into types instead of providing
a list of prerequisites, it can be assumed that the
1967 amendment was the conforming amendment.

See Charles H. Barr & Dennis K. Egan, Wisconsin, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note
408, at 743, 743 (“[U]nlike the federal rule, the Wisconsin rule does not explicitly address typicality, adequate representation, predominance or superiority.”).
414
Id. at 743-44.
415
See Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 354 S.E.2d 459, 463 (N.C. 1987) (discussing the North Carolina legislature’s explicit adoption in 1967 of a rule similar to the
1938 version of the Federal Rule, despite the 1966 federal amendments).
416
There are three states (Colorado, Delaware, and Indiana) for which the date of
adoption could be narrowed only to some time between 1966 and 1971. Homburger
indicates that these states had adopted the revisions sometime before publication of
his article. See Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 631 n.133 (1971) (listing states modeling their class action procedures after
the 1966 Federal Rule).
417
See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 23 state bar committee’s note (1966 Amendment) (referring
readers to the “official comment of the federal advisory committee . . . on the change
in Federal Rule 23”).
418
MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.01 credits (West 2006).
419
Klicker v. State, 197 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Minn. 1972).
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Description
420

Montana (1967)

Washington (1967)421
Kansas (1969)422
Kentucky (eff. 1969)

Amendment history indicates that Kentucky’s civil
procedure rule was adopted in 1953 and later
423
amended effective 1969 and 1978. Homburger
indicates it had been amended to match the Federal
Rule by 1971; thus, we can assume that the 1969
424
amendment was the conforming amendment.

New Jersey (eff. 1969)

Rule was effective in 1969 and amended in1974 and
425
subsequently. A New Jersey appellate court discussed the rule in 1972 and gave the 1966 federal
426
amendments as the rule’s source.

South Dakota (1969)427
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1970–1974 (12)428
North Dakota

420

Adopted the 1966 Rule some time between 1971 and
1973, but an exact date could not be obtained.429
North Dakota has since changed its (cont.)

See Paul C. Collins et al., Montana, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 399, 402
(“Rule 23 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure was completely rewritten in 1967 to
adopt the language of the federal rule.”).
421
See Stephen M. Rummage & Fred B. Burnside, Washington, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 715, 715-16 (noting that Washington adopted its class action rule,
which is identical to the Federal Rule, in 1967).
422
Order Amending and Supplementing Certain Provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 203 Kan. LXII, LXXIV-LXXV (1969).
423
KY. R. CIV. P. 23.01 credits (West 2007).
424
See Homburger, supra note 416, at 631 n.133.
425
N.J. CT. R. 4:32-2 note (West 2008).
426
See Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 287 A.2d 736, 737 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
427
See Order No. 2, In re Amendment of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 83 S.D. xi,
xvii-xx (1969).
428
The categories (1966–1971 and 1970–1974) overlap the years 1970 and 1971
because three states cannot be confidently dated between 1966 and 1971. See supra
note 416.
429
Homburger indicates that North Dakota retained the 1938 Rule in 1971. Homburger, supra note 416, at 626 n.94. However, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in
1973, labeled Federal Rule 23 as identical to North Dakota Rule 23. Horst v. Guy, 211
N.W.2d 723, 726 (N.D. 1973).
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State and Year

Description

North Dakota (cont.)

rule to adopt the Uniform Class Actions Act,430 as
has Iowa (though Iowa did not adopt the 1966 revisions in the interim).431 It appears that the Uniform
432
Act was largely inspired by the 1966 Rule, and
these two states are thus included as adopters.

Ohio (eff. 1970)433
Nevada (1971)434
Tennessee (eff. 1971)435
Utah (1971)436
Vermont (1971)

Original undated reporter’s note calls this rule
437
“identical to Federal Rule 23.” Later code compilation states that Vermont’s rules of civil procedure
438
were first promulgated in 1971.

Wyoming (1971)439

430

See Ronald H. McLean & Jane L. Dynes, North Dakota, in ABA, SURVEY, supra
note 408, at 491, 491.
431
See C. Carleton Frederici, Iowa, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 237, 238.
432
See id. (“The author believes that the drafters of the Uniform Act took the 1966
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the case law interpreting and deciding various issues . . . and
tried to codify what they thought were the best decisions . . . .”).
433
See Barbara Quinn Smith, Ohio, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 515, 517, 538
(noting that sections (a), (b), and (c) of the Federal Rule and the Ohio Rule are identical, and that the Ohio Rule went into effect in 1970).
434
See NEV. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (2007) (stating that the Nevada
rule was revised in 1971 to match the 1966 federal change).
435
See Martha S.L. Black, Class Actions Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure
23, 46 TENN. L. REV. 556, 558 (1979) (explaining that Tennessee changed its class action rule, in 1971, to be “substantially identical” to Federal Rule 23 “in most respects”).
436
UTAH R. CIV. P. 23 note (Lexis 2007) (stating that Utah’s class action rule was
amended in 1971).
437
VT. R. CIV. P. 23 reporter’s notes (2000).
438
See James S. Holden, Foreword to Vermont Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure and
District Court Civil Rules, in VT. STAT. ANN., at ix, ix (2000).
439
See Patrick R. Day, Wyoming, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 751, 755 (“Wyoming’s current class action rule . . . has not been amended since 1971 when it was
adopted as a counterpart to the original federal rule [sic].”).
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State and Year

Description

Hawaii (1972)

Original rule adopted in 1954, amended in 1972,
and further amended in 1999.440 Since the Hawaii
Supreme Court used language consistent with the
1966 Federal Rule in 1978, 1972 must be the con441
forming amendment.

Missouri (1972)442
Alabama (1973)443
Massachusetts (1973)444
Oregon (1973)445
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1975–1979 (9)
Idaho (1975)446
Louisiana (1975)

440

Originally adopted a pared-down version of the
447
1938 Rule, permitting only “true” class actions.
The Louisiana Supreme Court chafed under this
restriction, judicially expanding the scope of class
448
actions over several decades. The first explicit use
of federal precedent was in 1975.449 The Louisiana
legislature revised the rule in 1997 to match the
450
Federal Rule.

HAW. R. CIV. P. 23 history (LexisNexis 2007).
See Life of the Land v. Burns, 580 P.2d 405, 410 n.6 (Haw. 1978).
442
See MO. R. CIV. P. 52.08 committee’s note 1974 (2007) (“This is the same as
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); id. credits (West 2007) (identifying
1972 as the year of adoption).
443
See ALA. R. CIV. P. 23 committee’s comments on 1973 adoption (2007) (paralleling the advisory committee’s note to the Federal Rule).
444
See MASS. R. CIV. P. 23 reporter’s notes—1973 (2007).
445
See Bernard v. First Nat’l Bank of Or., 550 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Or. 1976) (stating
that Oregon enacted a modified version of Federal Rule 23 in 1973).
446
See IDAHO R. CIV. P. 23 credits (2007).
447
Donald C. Massey et al., Curtailing the Tidal Surge: Current Reforms in Louisiana
Class Action Law, 44 LOY. L. REV. 7, 37 (1998) (explaining that only “true” class actions
were allowed prior to a 1975 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court).
448
See id. at 43 (“Within a ten-year period, the Louisiana Supreme Court effectively
repealed Louisiana’s restrictive class action statute, judicially enacted the broader federal rule, and extended its application to the mass tort arena . . . .”).
449
See id. at 37-38 (discussing Stevens v. Bd. of Trustees, 309 So. 2d 144 (La.
1975)).
450
Act of July 1, 1997, No. 839, 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1389 (West).
441
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Description
451

New York (1975)
Alaska (1976)452
Illinois (1977)453

Pennsylvania (1977)454
Texas (1977)455
New Mexico (1978)

Although the rule adopted in 1978 was similar to
the 1966 Federal Rule, virtually no class actions were
filed in New Mexico prior to July 1, 1995, when the
456
rule was again revised to match the Federal Rule.

Oklahoma (1978)457
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1980–1984 (5)
Florida (1980)458
Iowa (1980)459

Has adopted the Uniform Class Actions Act.460

Michigan (1983)461

451

Act of June 17, 1975, ch. 207, 1975 N.Y. Sess. Laws 313 (McKinney).
Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 258 (Oct. 15, 1976) (on file with author).
453
See Eshaghi v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac Inc., 574 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (noting that the Illinois class action rule was adopted in 1977 and patterned after the Federal Rule).
454
See PA. R. CIV. P. 1701 credits (West 2007).
455
See Smith v. Lewis, 578 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (“The 1977
amendment to [Texas Rule of Civil Procedure] 42 was patterned after [Federal Rule]
23 with little change.”).
456
See Marte D. Lightstone, New Mexico, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 455,
455-57.
457
Act of Apr. 29, 1978, ch. 245, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws. 644.
458
See The Florida Bar, In re Rules of Civil Procedure, 391 So. 2d 165, 168-70
(1980) (creating a new class action rule based on Federal Rule 23).
459
Frederici, supra note 431, at 238 (stating that Iowa enacted the Uniform Class
Actions Act in 1980).
460
See supra note 432 and accompanying text (suggesting that the drafters of the
Uniform Class Actions Act looked to Federal Rule 23 for guidelines).
461
See Dennis K. Egan, Michigan, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 345, 345 (explaining that Michigan’s class action rule was overhauled in 1983 to substantially match
the Federal Rule).
452
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Description
462

New Hampshire (1983)
Maryland (1984)463

States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1985–1989 (1)
South Carolina (1985)464
States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1990–1994 (2)
Arkansas (1990)

Arkansas Supreme Court adopted a new class action
rule in 1979 that replaced an earlier statute that was
465
based on the idea of virtual representation. Much
of the 1979 rule was a “verbatim reiteration” of the
466
previous statute, and the court initially put substantial weight on the fact that the legislature had
not adopted the Federal Rule for class actions de467
spite adopting a number of other federal rules.
The rule was narrowly construed until about 1988,
when the court found “the spirit of the federal rule”
468
present in the state rule. Since the court seems to
have adopted the Federal Rule wholesale in 1990,
469
that is used as the effective date.

Rhode Island (1991)470

462

N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 27-A history (LexisNexis 2007).
See John Parker Sweeney & Matthew T. Wagman, Maryland, in ABA, SURVEY,
supra note 408, at 311, 311 (“In 1984 Maryland adopted a version of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as its own class action rule . . . .”).
464
B. Randall Dong, South Carolina, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 623, 623-24.
465
Kenneth S. Gould, New Wine in an Old Bottle—Arkansas’s Liberalized Class Action
Procedure—A Boon to the Consumer Class Action?, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 2 (1994).
466
Id. at 8.
467
Id. (discussing Drew v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 610 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. 1981)).
468
Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 747 S.W.2d 81,
86 (Ark. 1988).
469
In re Changes to the Ark. Rules of Civil Procedure, 304 Ark. 733, 738-41 (1990).
470
Paul V. Curcio, Rhode Island, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 611, 611 (labeling the Rhode Island rule, as a result of its 1991 amendments, “nearly identical” to the
Federal Rule).
463
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Description

States Adopting the Federal Rule, 1995–1999 (1)
West Virginia (1998)

Used a variation of the 1938 rule until 1998.471 Nevertheless, courts occasionally used elements of the
revised Federal Rule before 1998 in determining
whether to certify a class.472

States Adopting the Federal Rule, 2000–2004 (1)
Georgia (2003)

471

The state has only recently adopted the 1966 revisions, 473 though the ABA Survey indicates that they
474
had effectively adopted the rule previously. However, there is not a lot of case law and much of it is
from after 2000.

See Joseph Beeson, West Virginia, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 735, 735
(“Rule 23 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted on April 6, 1998, is
essentially identical to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”).
472
Id. at 739 (identifying the West Virginia factor test, which is similar to the federal factor test, in class certification decisions).
473
Act of June 4, 2003, § 3, 2003 Ga. Laws 820.
474
See Kevin A. Maxim, Georgia, in ABA, SURVEY, supra note 408, at 165, 165 (“[I]n
practice Georgia parties litigated class action issues as if the standardized text had been
implemented years [prior to 2003].”).

